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Preface 
Cooperation is undeniably an important element of human life. From an evolutionary 
perspective cooperation is crucial, as groups with cooperating members have selective 
advantages compared to groups with less cooperative members, and therefore have a better 
chance to survive. In the economic context cooperation is essential for societies, 
organizations and teams. For instance, think about effort provision in teams, the private 
provision of public goods, the use of natural resources, climate protection, contributions to 
charities, or tax honesty. All mentioned examples represent a social dilemma, in which group 
members have to overcome their selfish interests to free-ride and, instead, cooperate to obtain 
an efficient outcome. In order to foster cooperation in social dilemmas, social norms have 
evolved. Frequently such norms are enforced, e.g. by peer punishment. Interestingly, peer 
punishment occurs, although it usually bears some cost for the punishing party. We encounter 
examples of norm enforcement, i.e. punishing free-riding, everyday. For instance, team 
members are excluded by their colleagues for little work morale, pedestrians complain about 
people littering in public places or people waiting  lines insult queue-jumpers.  
Economic research on cooperation and norm enforcement is crucial to derive 
appropriate interventions for the real world, e.g. for politics and organizations. For instance, 
the knowledge about whether teams or individuals are more cooperative in social dilemmas 
can be used when deciding about parties to conduct political negotiations. Understanding the 
factors that increase cooperation and reduce punishment might be important for organizations 
to increase the efficiency of their working teams. Empirical economic research on 
cooperation and norm enforcement so far has shown that norm enforcement in the form of 
peer punishment is one of the most successful mechanisms to enhance cooperation in social 
dilemmas (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Among others it has inspired the development of 
seminal theoretical models, namely models of other-regarding or social preferences. These 
approaches go beyond the traditional concept of the homo-oeconomicus and include the long-
time neglected fact that people also care about others. Models of inequity aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; for a similar approach see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) or social welfare 
(Charness and Rabin, 2002) are important examples of these approaches. They strongly 
improved the predictions of real world behaviour in social contexts.  
Regarding the methodology for the research on cooperation and norm enforcement, 
laboratory experiments play an important role. In contrast to standard empirical methods 
laboratory experiments have several advantages: They allow a high degree of control, 
including a controlled variation of certain independ t variables, a randomized assignment of 
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subjects to treatments and a context-free elicitation of preferences. Therefore laboratory 
experiments allow causally attributing differences in behavior to differences in treatments. 
All studies in this dissertation include laboratory experiments. However, the main criticism 
on laboratory experiments is their external validity. Hence, it is put into question whether the 
results of laboratory experiments are generalizable to the real world. To encounter this main 
criticism the last study of this dissertation additionally includes a natural field experiment. 
In all studies of this dissertation cooperation and/or norm enforcement are examined in 
the lab in the context of a public goods setting or its binary version, a prisoners’ dilemma 
game, which constitute a social dilemma. The norm enforcement possibility is implemented 
by an additional decision stage in which players receive information on the individual 
cooperation decisions of their group members and ca punish them by reducing their income 
(whereby punishing is costly also for the punishing party). The first chapter of this 
dissertation explores the question how cooperation changes when decision-makers are not 
individuals, as commonly assumed in theoretical models and most laboratory experiments, 
but unitary teams, i.e. a team of several individuals has to come up with a unitary decision. 
Chapter 2 investigates how cooperation and norm enforcement (and therefore efficiency) are 
affected when groups have to reach a certain threshold of group income in order to “survive”, 
i.e. in order to participate in the game in the future and therefore earn more money. Chapter 3 
makes a contribution to the exploration of the external validity of lab experiments by 
combining norm enforcement behavior in a natural field experiment with behavior of the 
same persons elicited in the lab.   
Chapter 1, which is joint work with Martin Kocher, examines how cooperation in a 
public goods setting changes, if the decision-makers are interacting unitary teams instead of 
individuals. There is a sizeable literature, especially n social psychology, stating that teams 
are less cooperative and, thus, more competitive than individuals, which psychologists term 
the “(interindividual-intergroup) discontinuity effect”. In economics cooperation of 
individuals has been extensively studied. In contrast, n analysis of the aggregation of 
individual cooperative preferences to a single team decision when teams interact as players in 
a social dilemma is missing. However such an analysis seems warranted as the social 
psychological studies on the discontinuity effect apply a very special experimental design. 
Moreover, many relevant economic decisions in the real world that involve social dilemmas 
are very well characterized by teams acting as decision makers, from the small (e.g. families, 
management teams) to the large (e.g. company boards, governments, international 
organizations). Thus, assessing team reasoning and te m decision-making seems fruitful for 
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economists in order to derive correct predictions for real life and to draw appropriate 
conclusions in which settings decisions are better taken by individuals or by teams.  
In a between-subjects design we implement two laboratory treatments with interacting 
individuals and interacting teams of three team members in a public goods setting. In contrast 
to most of the literature so far we implement repeated interaction that additionally enables us 
to study learning and the dynamics of interaction. Eliciting individual beliefs about others’ 
contributions, asking for contribution proposals bythe team members before the team 
decision, and adding an independent measure of cooperative preferences on the individual 
level allow us to analyze the mechanisms behind team decision-making. Team members 
anonymously communicate via real-time chat within their team, which guarantees maximal 
control over the interaction. At the same time the analysis of the chat communication allows 
valuable additional insights into the motives of team decisions.  
We rather find a reverse discontinuity effect with teams to be more willing to cooperate 
than individuals, at least in the first half of the public goods game. Our results support several 
reasons for this finding: Firstly, contributions inthe public goods game strictly increase 
social welfare. Furthermore the chat analysis strongly suggests that efficiency-concerns of 
teams might be an important reason for their enhanced willingness to cooperate. A second 
explanation for the reverse discontinuity effect is related to the more optimistic expectations 
towards other teams than towards other individuals. Especially conditional cooperators (in 
contrast to free-riders) have more optimistic expectations towards other teams than towards 
other individuals. Our chat analysis suggests that t ese more optimistic expectations 
combined with advantageous inequity aversion might lead to an increased willingness to 
cooperate in the team setting. A third explanation hat we cannot completely rule out might 
be an enhanced motivation of teams to (indirectly) build up a cooperative reputation.  
Concentrating on the team decision-making process, we find that the applied decision 
rule is affected by the cooperative preferences of team members: Teams consisting only of 
conditional cooperators decide more often by implementing an informal compromise than 
other teams. The final team decision is not only affected by the team composition in terms of 
cooperative preferences and the implicit decision rules applied. It also depends on the first 
proposal verbalized in the team discussion – we thus observe an anchoring effect – and, 
interestingly, the level of cooperation increases with the length of the discussion within a 
team. 
Given the numerous examples in which cooperation decisions are taken by teams, our 
results have broad practical implications, e.g. for organizations and politics, and suggest that 
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team decisions can be more cooperative than individual ecisions and need not be seen too 
negatively. 
In chapter 2, which is also joint work with Martin Kocher, we investigate how 
cooperation and norm enforcement, i.e. efficiency, in a public goods setting with punishment 
opportunities are affected by a group extinction mechanism. Drawing on evolutionary ideas 
the group extinction mechanism reflects the fact tha group members can “survive”, i.e. in the 
lab proceed in future periods and earn more income, only if the group income exceeds a 
certain survival threshold. In real life the existenc  of groups in the long run often depends on 
the achievement of a minimum group income, e.g. working groups in companies or 
organizations often fight for survival as a group, i.e. they can easily be dissolved if 
unsuccessful. Although group extinction often takes place in real-world settings, this study is 
the first one to investigate the effect of this mechanism. However, if the possibility of group 
extinction is not taken into account in economic research, laboratory experiments may yield 
wrong predictions concerning the extent of cooperation and norm enforcement in real-world 
public goods settings where punishment is an option. This argument is supported by the 
following facts: More often than not laboratory expriments with public goods settings and a 
punishment option show severe efficiency problems, as cost for punishment mostly exceed 
the benefits from increased cooperation. The efficin y problem is even worse if a retaliation 
option exists. Data from field experiments on norm enforcement show lower rates of 
punishment than the laboratory data. Besides the fear of retaliation that plays a role, 
efficiency concerns could be much more important in the field than conventionally believed. 
Given that the possibility of group extinction is an important factor in real world public goods 
settings with a norm enforcement option, evidence on the effect of this mechanism yields 
important practical implications, e.g. for working teams in organizations.      
Pertaining to the design our setup implements a repeat d linear public goods game with 
costly punishment opportunities in the lab. The design features four experimental treatments 
in a two-by-two factorial between-subjects design: Within the first dimension, we vary 
whether peer punishment is available with or withou a retaliation option, i.e. whether a one-
sided or two-sided punishment option is given. The second dimension that is varied is the 
existence of a survival threshold. If the survival threshold is present, groups have to reach a 
certain level of group income in order not be extinct as a group in the next period. The 
treatments all include four identical parts with five periods each. If a group is extinct in one 
part, group members are excluded from the public goods game – and therefore get an income 
of zero – in the following periods of that part. In order to be able to examine learning effects 
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over parts, we allow the extinct subjects to restart the public goods game in the following part 
within a new group.  
Referring mainly to the theoretical model of social welfare by Charness and Rabin 
(2002) we hypothesize that the salience of the effici ncy concern created by the group 
extinction mechanism increases cooperation and reduces (counter-) punishment, and thus, 
increases efficiency. Our results mainly confirm these hypotheses: The group extinction 
mechanism leads to higher efficiency, partly by increasing cooperation and partly by 
decreasing norm enforcement. We furthermore find that groups learn to adapt to the survival 
threshold over time, indicated by the decreasing number of extinct groups over parts. Hence, 
the effect of the group extinction mechanism may be ev n enhanced in settings with longer 
interaction terms or when further forms of punishment, .g. feuds, are possible. Our findings 
contribute – among others – to a better understanding of why in real-world scenarios often 
low levels of peer punishment have been observed. Our results further imply that the threat of 
group extinction can be applied, adapted or made transparent in the field in order to increase 
efficiency, e.g. in working groups. 
In chapter 3 I examine whether the norm enforcement behvior in the lab translates to 
norm enforcement behavior of the same subjects in the field. Laboratory experiments have 
for a long time been the fundament of behavioral economics and they undoubtedly have 
several advantages in comparison to standard empirical methods. However, the external 
validity of laboratory experiments is often put into question. This criticism is especially 
pronounced in the domain of social preferences, as their elicitation is particularly prone to an 
experimenter demand effect. In the light of this criticism I conduct a within-subjects 
comparison of costly norm enforcement between the lab and the field.  
In a natural field experiment queuers are observed when a norm violator cuts in line in 
front of them. In order to minimize the possibility of an experimenter demand effect a 
research assistant invites the subjects from the field to the lab without revealing that they 
participated in a field experiment. In the lab three treatments dealing with norm enforcement 
are implemented: The standard treatment to examine norm enforcement in the lab – a three-
person prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-sided punishment option (see Fehr and Gächter, 
2000; 2002; Falk et al., 2005) – and a treatment additionally allowing for counter-punishment 
(Nikiforakis, 2008), i.e. a three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a two-sided 
punishment option. Moreover I apply a newly created game with which I try to represent the 
situation in the queue in an abstract way. This so-called “queuing game” includes a one-sided 
punishment option. 
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Additionally to the behavioral data from the field and the lab experiment, I elicit of the 
same subjects the intended norm enforcement behavior stated in a survey. The latter presents 
three scenarios of real life situations, which describe different violations of concrete social 
norms. Apart from being able to investigate the external validity of stated norm enforcement 
intentions elicited in the questionnaire, the survey allows me to examine whether a so-called 
norm enforcing type exists, i.e. somebody who generally behaves in a norm enforcing way 
across several concrete social norms. 
I find a norm enforcement rate of 32.1% in the field. Norm enforcement in the field 
correlates with decisions in the lab treatment including a two-sided punishment option, but 
not with decisions in the treatments in which no counter-punishment option exists. 
Specifically I find that the likelihood of norm enforcement in the field increases with the 
willingness to cooperate and with the sanctioning of defectors in a prisoners’ dilemma game 
with a two-sided punishment option. This lab-field comparison is a first examination of the 
external validity of norm enforcement behavior in the lab and therefore generalizations have 
to be made with care. However the result suggests the following: Firstly, with respect to norm 
enforcement, it confirms prior survey evidence that weighing up the danger of being counter-
punished is crucial for norm enforcement decisions in the field. Secondly, concerning the 
methodological aspect, the result indicates that more evidence from the field is necessary to 
establish the external validity of the standard treatment with a one-sided punishment option. 
Furthermore I find a high external validity of the norm enforcement intentions stated in 
the survey, as long as the same social norm is affected in the survey scenario and in the field. 
I do not find evidence for a norm enforcing type. Instead the likelihood of norm enforcement 
seems to vary with the concrete social norm violated, and specifically with the negative 
externality of the social norm violation.        
Overall the lab-field comparison is encouraging with respect to the generalizability of 
lab behavior to the field. However, it also illustrates that the relevant institutional factors of 
the field need to be incorporated in the lab to allw for external validity of lab experiments.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Cooperation and Decision-Making of Teams in Public 
Goods Experiments 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
There is a sizable literature in social psychology n the inclination of small groups or 
teams1 to cooperate in prisoners’ dilemmas compared to indiv duals. The general finding is 
that teams are less cooperative and, thus, more competitive (Charness and Sutter, 2012, as 
well as Kugler et al., 2012, provide recent surveys). Insko, Schopler and co-authors have 
coined the term “(interindividual-intergroup) discontinuity effect” for the difference in 
cooperative/competitive behavior between small teams and individuals, and they have 
established the effect in a large number of experimental studies.2 
The preference for cooperation of individuals and the aggregation of cooperative 
preferences within teams matter commonly in social interaction: they play a role in team 
work, collective action, the organization of society, or the private provision of public goods. 
Nonetheless, economic assessments of the aggregation are still missing. Cooperation of 
individuals has been studied extensively in economics, using the prisoners’ dilemma game in 
earlier papers and the voluntary contribution mechanism, also known as the public goods 
game, later (see Chaudhuri, 2011, for a recent survey). In contrast, an analysis of the 
aggregation of individual cooperative preferences to a single team decision (in so-called 
unitary teams) when teams interact as players in a social dilemma is still missing. Such a 
study seems warranted for at least two reasons. Firstly, the setup that Insko, Schopler, and co-
authors apply is a very special one. Teams interact f ce-to-face both within teams and 
between teams before taking a decision. Hence, communication within teams and across 
teams is important, and effects from the communication are hard to control for. Secondly, 
many relevant economic decisions in the real world that involve social dilemmas are very 
                                                
1 The meaning of the two terms group and team is sometimes the same in the literature and sometimes not. In 
this paper we stick to the term team.   
2 For instance, Insko et al. (1987a; 1987b; 1988; 1990), Insko and Schopler (1987), Schopler and Insko (1992), 
Schopler et al. (1991; 2001), Wildschut et al. (2003; 2007), Wildschut and Insko (2007).  
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well characterized by teams acting as decision makers, from the small (e.g. families, 
management teams) to the large (e.g. company boards, governments, international 
organizations). Thus, more generally, assessing team reasoning and team decision making 
seems fruitful for economists.3 
The objective of this paper is to fill a gap in thelit rature. To the best of our knowledge, 
we are the first in economics to systematically study the aggregation of cooperative 
preferences into a team decision when teams interact as decisions makers in a social dilemma 
and compare the outcomes with a standard social dilemma in which individuals interact. Our 
laboratory experiment based on a comparatively large sample provides several advantages 
over the existing literature: Firstly, it uses a public goods game instead of the prisoners’ 
dilemma game, where the former allows for a larger strategy space, a more continuous 
measure of cooperation, and a finer-grained analysis of responses. Secondly, in contrast to 
most of the literature, we implement repeated interaction that enables us to study learning and 
the dynamics of interaction, alongside the pure preference for cooperation. Given recent 
results by Müller and Tan (2013), the time horizon of an interaction (even in a design that 
rules out reputational concerns) could affect individuals and teams differently (see also 
Kocher and Sutter, 2005). Despite the learning possibility we are, thirdly, able to control for 
initial individual cooperative preferences by using a preference elicitation method developed 
by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and validated for repeated interactions by Fischbacher and 
Gächter (2010). This allows for keeping control of the team composition with respect to 
individual cooperative preferences (cooperation types). Fourthly, we control for expectations 
with regard to cooperation of other decision makers, which turns out to be important in 
explaining differences between individual behavior and team decisions. And finally, fifthly, 
we implement a team interaction that allows for within-team communication, but the real-
time chat sustains anonymity of individuals even within teams. Such a setup guarantees 
maximal control over the interaction. However, the analysis of the chat protocols provides 
valuable additional insights into the decision making dynamics within teams. 
In contrast to expectations based on the literature in social psychology, our empirical 
results strongly indicate that teams are more willing to cooperate and less willing to compete, 
at least in the first half of the game. We thus repo t a “reverse discontinuity effect”. As a 
consequence, teams also achieve higher profits than individuals. Expectations regarding 
teams are in line with the higher levels of cooperation. The effect is especially driven by 
conditional cooperators, who – in comparison to free-riders – are more optimistic with 
                                                
3 As a consequence, Camerer (2003) mentions in his textbook Behavioral Game Theory the study of group 
decision-making among the top ten research projects in behavioral and experimental economics. 
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respect to the contributions of other decision makers in the team setting and are, therefore, 
more likely to cooperate when they act as a team meber than when they act individually. 
Concentrating on the team decision-making process, we find that the applied decision rule is 
affected by the individual cooperative preferences of team members: Teams consisting only 
of conditional cooperators decide more often by imple enting an informal compromise than 
other teams. The final team decision is not only affected by the team composition in terms of 
cooperative preferences and the implicit decision rules applied. It also depends on the first 
proposal verbalized in the team discussion – we thus observe an anchoring effect – and, 
interestingly, the level of cooperation increases with the length of the discussion within a 
team. 
While, as mentioned above, there is no existing study that compares individual 
decisions in public goods games with team decision, the literature on team decision making 
in economics allows for some inferences with regard to the expected effects when one looks 
at related games that have been investigated. The gen ral finding of these studies (table A.1.1 
in appendix A.1.1 provides an overview) is that unitary teams are more selfish and more 
rational than individuals (Charness and Sutter, 2012; Kugler et al., 2012). In the dictator 
game teams as dictators send smaller amounts (Luhan et l., 2009), in the ultimatum game 
they send and accept smaller amounts (Bornstein and Y iv, 1998), in the trust game teams 
are less trusting (Kugler et al., 2007) and less tru tworthy (Cox, 2002), in the centipede game 
teams exit earlier (Bornstein et al., 2004), and in the gift exchange game teams as employers 
make lower wage offers than individuals when the communication within teams occurs via 
chat (Kocher and Sutter, 2007).4 
In contrast, for instance, Bosman et al. (2006) find for the power-to-take game no 
differences between teams and individuals, neither n the role of the take authority, nor in the 
role of the responder. Cason and Mui (1997) provide evidence that for certain teams the team 
choices are more generous than the individual choices of the same team members in the 
dictator game. Kocher and Sutter (2007) find in case of face-to-face communication within 
teams higher effort levels for teams than for individuals. Müller and Tan (2013) implement a 
Stackelberg market game played either once or over 15 periods in a stranger design. In the 
one-shot game, they find no differences between teams and individuals, whereas in the multi-
period case their results indicate that team decisions are farther away from standard game 
                                                
4 Abbink et al. (2010) find that the conflict expenditures of teams in a contest game are substantially larger than 
those of individuals. However, Abbink et al. (2010) do not study unitary teams, i.e. there is no phase of 
deliberation among team members. Similarly, Kugler and Bornstein (2013) find individuals to cooperate better 
with other individuals than teams with other teams. However, their teams are not unitary but characterized by 
intra-team conflict.  
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theoretic predictions than individuals: As first movers, they make lower output choices (and 
therefore act in a more collusive way), as second movers, they reward or punish first movers 
more strongly than individuals. Balafoutas et al. (2014) carry out an experiment that involves 
a double price-list technique for allocation decision  with individuals and teams. Teams in 
comparison to individuals are significantly more frquently classified as efficiency-loving 
and less frequently classified as spiteful or competitiv .5 
Social dilemmas in their linear version – regardless of whether talking of prisoners’ 
dilemmas or public goods games – share the common feature that it is individually rational to 
free ride (contribute nothing), but collectively optimal to cooperate (contribute the entire 
endowment). Thus, efficiency concerns of decision makers might matter when it comes to the 
cooperation decision. Obviously, the existing evidence on an individual-team difference in 
games that involve efficiency concerns is mixed: In the trust game and the centipede game 
team decisions lead to less efficient outcomes thanindividual decisions (Cox, 2002; Kugler et 
al., 2007; Bornstein et al., 2004). In the power-to-take game, Bosman et al. (2006) find no 
effect, whereas allocation task and the Stackelberg game results seem to indicate that teams 
are more efficiency-oriented than individuals (Balafoutas et al, 2014; Müller and Tan, 2013). 
The inconclusive results on game and allocation decisions that involve potential efficiency 
concerns provide another reason for conducting the present study. 
Taking the results from the related literature and our findings together, there are a 
couple of straightforward implications for managerial decisions and institutional design. 
Depending on whether one wants to encourage or discourage cooperation, having individual 
decision makers or setting up teams as decision makers can be optimal. Delegating teams in 
positive-sum negotiations seem to be the better choice than delegating individuals. The 
assessment of interactions that are bound to be organized in teams, such as global climate 
negotiations or coordination in international organiz tions, seems less pessimistic than it was, 
based on the previous literature. Nevertheless, more evidence on the aggregation of 
individual preferences within teams and on team decisions compared to individual decisions 
is clearly required in order to substantiate these implications for real-world situations. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present our 
experimental design and the hypothesis for our main research question. Section 3 provides 
                                                
5 Charness et al. (2007) present an economic study in wh ch they implement a prisoner’s dilemma game. They 
vary the saliency of group membership and find that it leads to more defection. However, in their study 
decisions on behalf of groups are taken by individual group representatives and not by teams that haveto come 
up with a joint decision. Furthermore, unitary team decision making has been studied in interactive games that 
require some rational reasoning (e.g., Cox and Hayne, 2006; Cooper and Kagel, 2005; Kocher and Sutter, 2005; 
Kocher et al., 2006; Gillet et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2009; Zhang and Casari., 2012; Feri et al., 2010). 
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the empirical results, and section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
1.2 Experimental Design, Procedures and Theoretical Predictions 
In the following we explain the setup of the experiment and derive theoretical 
predictions. 
 
1.2.1 Experimental Design 
Our basic decision situation is a standard linear public goods game (PGG, also known 
as the voluntary contribution mechanism; see Marwell and Ames, 1981; Isaac et al., 1985; 
Isaac and Walker, 1988). The participants are randomly assigned to units of three members.6 
Each unit member receives an endowment E of 20 points. The members of each unit then 
decide simultaneously how much of their endowment to contribute to the public good, ci, 
with 200 ≤≤ ic , or to a private account. The payoff function is given by 
                   ∑
=
+−=
3
1
*5.020
j
jii ccπ     (1.1) 
where the value of the public good is equal to the sum of contributions by all unit members. 
If a participant contributes one point to the public good, the private marginal return a is 0.5 
points, and the social marginal benefit is 1.5 points. Hence, aa 31<<  applies, and it implies 
a social dilemma: If we assume pure money-maximizing preferences, the dominant strategy 
for each unit member is to free ride, i.e. 0=jc  for all j. However, the socially efficient 
outcome is reached with full contribution of all unit members. 
We implement two treatments in a between-subjects design: a treatment in which 
individuals interact with individuals (IND) and a treatment in which teams interact with 
teams (TEAM) in the public goods game. IND is mainly based on the experimental design by 
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). TEAM lets three-person teams decide on contribution levels 
as one unit member. 
Subjects in both treatments know that the experiment co sists of two parts and some 
questionnaires and that the parts are independent of each other. The first part is identical for 
both treatments and elicits the individual cooperative preferences in a one-shot linear public 
goods game according to Fischbacher et al. (2001). Using the strategy vector method we ask 
participants to indicate their contribution to the public good for each period average 
                                                
6 Note that we denote three interacting parties in the PGG as a unit, in order to differentiate from the term team, 
which represents one interacting party within the unit. 
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contribution level of the other two unit members. In order to be able to incentivize these 
conditional decisions, we ask participants to make n unconditional contribution to the public 
good before. Subjects know that at the end of the first part one unit member is randomly 
drawn for whom the conditional contribution, based on the unconditional contributions by the 
other two unit members, is payoff-relevant. For the other two unit members the unconditional 
contribution is payoff-relevant. Payoffs are calculated according to Eq. (1.1). Subjects are 
told that the feedback on the behavior of the other wo unit members and on the own income 
from the first part is only given after the second part.  
In the second part unit members in both treatments are asked to make unconditional 
contribution decisions in the linear PGG described above, which is played over 10 periods in 
a stranger matching. In the second part, either three individuals (IND) or three teams 
(TEAM) interact in the PGG. We first outline IND and then explain the specifics of our setup 
in TEAM. In IND, subjects know that they are reassigned at the beginning of the second part 
to two other individuals than in the first part, and that re-shuffling of the unit composition 
takes place after every period (stranger design). Subjects are told that in each period they 
decide on their individual contribution to the public good. Then they have to indicate their 
beliefs about the average contribution made by the other two unit members. Incentives for 
correct beliefs are kept small to minimize hedging i centives. For reasons of simplicity the 
linear scoring rule is implemented, meaning that subjects receive 3 points for correct guesses 
and 2 (1) point(s) if their estimation deviates by 1 (2) point(s) from the actual average 
contribution of the other two unit members. Subjects know that at the end of each period they 
are informed about the sum of contributions made by the other two unit members, their 
income from the private account, their income from the public good and their total period 
income. They also get feedback at the end of each period about their income from the belief 
elicitation. 
Subjects are told that at the end of the second part one period is randomly chosen that is 
payoff-relevant for the income from the PGG. Irrespctive thereof, a further one is chosen 
that is payoff-relevant for the income from the belief elicitation. Both periods are chosen for 
each subject individually. At the end of the second part subjects receive feedback about their 
final income from the second part. 
In TEAM units consist of three teams, whereas each team consists of three team 
members. Subjects know that the team composition is kept constant over all periods, whereas 
teams interact in each period with other teams. We implement a team size of three m mbers 
as this allows us to observe the effects of various mplicit decision rules including decisions 
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under a majority rule. In each period of the second part, participants are first asked to make 
an individual, non-binding proposal for the team contribution. The proposal helps us to study 
the aggregation of individual proposals into a team decision. Subjects know that this proposal 
is shown to the other two team members before the team interaction starts. They are told that 
they have to reach a unanimous decision within their team on the contribution to the public 
good. Subjects communicate within their teams (but not between teams) via a real-time chat.7 
The team communication is unrestricted, except thatpar icipants must not reveal their 
identity or insult each other. Messages are always sent to the two other team members 
automatically; directed messages to only one other team member are not feasible. 
If a team does not reach a unanimous decision within five minutes in each period, the 
team gets a second chance within an additional minute. If no consensus is reached after this 
grace period, the period income from the PGG is zero points for all members of this team. 
For the calculation of the sum of contributions in the unit in this case, one team member is 
chosen randomly by the computer, and her individual proposal is used as the relevant team 
contribution. This procedure is common knowledge.8 Each team member enters the team 
contribution on her own screen in order to ensure unanimity. Note that we do not give teams 
any instructions on how to reach a unanimous decision. After the common contribution 
decision team members indicate their individual beliefs about the average contributions by 
the other two teams in their unit in the incentive compatible way explained above. Subjects in 
TEAM know that at the end of each period they are individually informed about the sum of 
contributions by the other two teams, their income from the private account, their income 
from the public good and their total income from the PGG. They also get feedback on their 
income from the belief elicitation at the end of each period. 
The per-capita incentives in the PGG are identical between conditions TEAM and IND. 
All members of a team make the same contribution tic  to the public good, where the 
superscript t indicates the team and 200 ≤≤ tic  holds. The income from the public good is 
divided by the number of members within a team. Hence, the period income of player i in 
TEAM is calculated as:  
3/*5.020
3
1
3
1








+−= ∑∑
= =j t
t
j
t
ii ccπ                       (1.2) 
                                                
7 We implement a chat communication in order to eliminate possible uncontrollable influences from face-to-face 
communication, as e.g. effects of attractiveness. 
8 In our sample all teams reach a unanimous decision n all periods, except for two teams in one period each. 
Over all 10 periods and all 60 participating teams, the second chance to communicate within teams was only 
necessary in 13out of 600 cases. 
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After completion of the second part participants are sked to answer questionnaires. 
Participants in TEAM first fill in a questionnaire on their team decision-making experience. 
In both treatments the two scales extraversion and agreeableness from the NEO-Five-Factors-
Inventory (Borkenau and Ostendorf, 2008) are applied to elicit traits with a social component 
(results not reported here). Both treatments end with a short socio-economic questionnaire. 
 
1.2.2 Procedures 
We conducted 13 sessions – 3 sessions in IND and 10 sessions in TEAM – which took 
place in the experimental laboratory MELESSA of theUniversity of Munich between May 
2010 and February 2011. The sessions in TEAM last for approximately two hours, the 
sessions in IND last approximately 30 minutes less. Altogether 246 subjects participated in 
our experiment. In order to parallelize between IND and TEAM the probability of meeting 
the same unit member(s) in the next period(s) again, subjects are told in the second part that 
they are in a matching group with five other potential unit members and that they are 
randomly re-assigned in each period to two of them. Hence, in both treatments 6 potential 
unit members (consisting either of individuals or teams) were reshuffled after each period. In 
treatment IND, 24 subjects participated in two and 18 subjects participated in one session, 
which yields altogether 11 statistically strictly independent observations. In treatment TEAM 
18 subjects participated in each session, which yields altogether 60 teams and 10 independent 
observations. 
At the beginning of each session the experimenter read the neutrally framed instructions 
for part I aloud. The instructions for part II and for the questionnaires only followed, when 
the preceding part was finished.9 In order to test the participants’ understanding of the 
incentive structure and the dilemma situation, subjects were asked to answer four control 
questions, which are outlined in appendix A.1.3. Wecan assume full understanding, as we 
only started the treatments as soon as all participants answered all questions correctly. 
Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) from a list of voluntary 
participants and earned on average about 20 € each. They were German-speaking, mostly 
students of different academic backgrounds except economics, and had not participated in a 
public goods experiment at the MELESSA laboratory before. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
 
                                                
9 Appendix A.1.2 reproduces the instructions for the team treatment. Note that we use the term g oup instead of 
unit in the instructions and contrast it with the term team. 
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1.2.3 Theoretical Predictions 
Our main research question asks whether teams are mo or less cooperative than 
individuals in the public goods game. The empirical findings, so far, outlined in the 
introduction are not fully conclusive. In this section we derive theoretical predictions based 
on several preference models. According to standard g me theoretic predictions, which 
assume profit-maximization, subjects select ci = 0. This unique Nash equilibrium applies 
independent of whether the decision-maker is an individual or a member of a team. Based on 
backwards induction, predictions for the finitely repeated public goods game are the same as 
for the stage game. Hence, standard theory predicts no differences in cooperation between 
individuals and teams. 
However, it has been shown that empirical data on cooperation can be better predicted 
by theoretical models that incorporate social preferences, e.g. the model of inequity aversion 
by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (for a similar approach see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) state that a non-selfish player i might have a utility loss from inequality 
of monetary outcomes between herself and the members of a reference group. The utility loss 
from disadvantageous inequality, meaning that player i earns less than other players in the 
reference group, is higher than the disutility from advantageous inequity, meaning that player 
i earns more. For a public goods game with three unit members the inequity aversion model 
predicts multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria, given sufficiently strong inequity aversion. 
The reference group consists of all unit members. 
In case of teams interacting with teams, we assume that the median voter model holds, 
i.e. the final team contribution is equal to the median of the individual contributions (the 
median level of social preferences). Furthermore we assume that the reference group consists 
of the two team members of player i and the six members of the other two teams in her unit.
Hence, altogether player i compares her payoff with the payoffs of eight other p rsons, where 
the payoff of the other two team members by our unitary team design has to be the same as 
the payoff of player i. The latter implies that the utility loss from inequality of earnings 
related to the other unit members is mitigated in TEAM compared to IND. This entails that 
the median team member in TEAM must have a higher disutility from advantageous 
inequality than an individual in IND to make positive contributions in equilibrium.10 To 
summarize, the inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predicts potentially 
lower average contributions in TEAM than in IND.  
                                                
10 The formal proof is available from the authors on request. See also Kugler et al. (2007). 
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Charness and Rabin (2002) present a model of social preferences in which they 
additionally include potential social welfare concerns. Social welfare concerns lead people to 
sacrifice own material payoff in order to increase th  payoffs of all members of the reference 
group, i.e. to increase efficiency. As there are more people in treatment TEAM compared to 
treatment IND who profit from one point contributed to the public good, the efficiency gains 
per contributed point are higher in treatment TEAM than in treatment IND. In particular, 
imagine a team in TEAM (compared to an individual in IND) increases their contribution to 
the public good by one point. This entails, on the on  hand, that the profit of two additional 
persons in TEAM (the other two team members) compared to IND is reduced by 0.5 points 
each. However, at the same time the profit of four additional persons (from the other two 
teams in the same unit) is increased by 0.5 points each. This yields in total an additional 
efficiency gain of 1 point for the whole unit in TEAM compared to IND. Hence, a model that 
takes into account social welfare predicts higher contributions in TEAM than in IND. 
To summarize, the theoretical predictions on cooperation of individuals versus teams 
based on standard assumptions and on widely used models f social preferences are almost as 
diverse as the empirical results so far: The standard g me-theoretical model of money-
maximizing preferences predicts no differences betwe n our two treatments, the model of 
inequity aversion predicts lower contributions in TEAM than in IND, and the model of social 
welfare predicts higher contributions in TEAM than in IND. 
 
 
1.3. Results 
In order to examine our research questions we use non-parametric and parametric 
methods. Among the parametric tests we calculate lin ar as well as non-linear regression 
models (tobit and probit). To control for panel effects we also calculate random effects panel 
regressions. None of the main effects that we observe depends on the specific parametric 
method used. In the following, we mostly report the results of OLS regressions, because they 
are based on minimal assumptions. As our dependent variables mostly have a minimum value 
of zero, which is chosen by a considerable number of participants, we also report hurdle 
models – sometimes called two-part models – if applicab e. For instance, in case of 
unconditional contributions as the dependent variable the hurdle model captures the decision 
to contribute (contribution decision) and the decision of how much to contribute (contribution 
level) in two separate parameters (Cragg, 1971; McDowell, 2003; see also Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). Hence, the hurdle model is a parametric generalization of the tobit model. It 
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usually captures the decision to contribute to the public good by a probit model and the 
decision on the level of the contribution using an OLS or a tobit regression.11 
To start with, we report the distributions of cooperative preferences elicited in the first 
part, which is identical in both of our treatments (based on the classification criteria in 
Fischbacher et al., 2001). The results are provided in table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1 - Distributions of cooperative preferences. 
 IND TEAM Total 
Conditional cooperators 
42 
(63.6%) 
120 
(66.7%) 
162 
(65.9%) 
Free riders 
12 
(18.2%) 
24 
(13.3%) 
36 
(14.6%) 
Others 
12 
(18.2%) 
36 
(20.0%) 
48 
(19.5%) 
Total 66 180 246 
 
In line with Fischbacher et al. (2001) we report a considerable degree of heterogeneity 
in cooperative preferences: Our largest group of subjects are conditional cooperators (65.9%), 
whose conditional contributions show a significant (Spearman rank correlation, p < 0.01) 
positive correlation with the average contributions by the other two unit members. 14.8% of 
these conditional cooperators are perfect conditional cooperators; they match the 
contributions by others perfectly. However, most of he conditional cooperators show a self-
serving bias, meaning that their conditional contributions are slightly lower than the average 
contributions by their unit members (see also Fischba er et al., 2001, for a similar result). 
14.6% of all our subjects fall into the category of free riders, who contribute nothing 
regardless of the contributions by the other unit members. 19.5% of our subjects cannot be 
classified in one of the two categories. We do not observe a significant difference in the 
distribution of cooperative preferences between treatm nts IND and TEAM (χ2 test, p = 
0.351) and can therefore assume that randomization int  the treatments was successful. 
We organize the presentation of the remaining results as follows: In section 1.3.1 we 
document differences in the unconditional contributions between individuals and teams, in 
section 1.3.2 and 1.3.3 we investigate the reasons and drivers behind our finding in 1.3.1, in 
particular with respect to beliefs and the proposals of team members. Section 1.3.4 
concentrates on the team decision-making process. Section 1.3.5 focuses on the team 
contributions and their determinants. In section 1.3.6 we present the main arguments 
                                                
11 For other papers in experimental economics that use a hurdle model to analyze contributions in a public goods 
game see Botelho et al. (2009) and Nikiforakis (2008). 
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exchanged within teams for high and low contributions. We conclude with the results of the 
questionnaire on the team interaction in section 1.3.7.  
 
1.3.1 Unconditional Contributions 
In the following we present the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests (unless 
otherwise noted), using matching groups, which consist of 6 (in case of condition IND) or 18 
subjects (in case of condition TEAM) each, as statitically strictly independent observation.  
 
RESULT 1.1: Teams compared to individuals are more willing to contribute a positive 
amount to the public good in the first half of the game.  
 
Support for result 1.1 is presented in figure 1.1 and table 1.2. Figure 1.1 shows the average 
contributions by individuals and teams over all periods (for a discussion of the belief data, 
see section 1.3.2). The contributions by individuals nd teams start at a similar level (p = 
0.771 for the first period), over the following seven periods team contributions seem to be 
higher than individual contributions, until they decr ase under the contribution level of  
  
Figure 1.1 - Contributions and beliefs by individuals and teams. 
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Contrib. 
level 
0.126 
(0.492) 
-0.110** 
(0.043) 
0.028 
(0.093) 
0.931*** 
(0.047) 
1.200** 
(0.484) 
825 
 
 
0.622 
(V) 
Periods 1 to 10 
Contrib. 
decision 
0.075 
(0.068) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.013) 
0.036*** 
(0.004) 
0.517*** 
(0.081) 
1258 
 
 
0.252 
Contrib. 
level 
0.130 
(2.464) 
-0.538** 
(0.257) 
 
 
11.850*** 
(2.420) 
324 
 
 
0.015 
(IV) 
Periods 6 to 10 
Contrib. 
decision 
-0.001 
(0.110) 
-0.083*** 
(0.015) 
 
 
 
629 
34.13*** 
-418.874 
 
Contrib. 
level 
1.146 
(1.389) 
-0.585** 
(0.240) 
 
 
11.502*** 
(0.895) 
501 
 
 
0.030 
(III) 
Periods 1 to 5 
Contrib. 
decision 
0.114* 
(0.072) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
 
 
 
629 
19.30*** 
-307.405 
 
Contrib. 
level 
1.406 
(1.152) 
-0.464* 
(0.226) 
-0.175 
(0.303) 
 
10.740*** 
(0.851) 
719 
 
 
0.067 
(II) 
Periods 1 to 10 
Contrib. 
decision 
0.165* 
(0.082) 
-0.047*** 
(0.010) 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
 
0.888*** 
(0.069) 
1258 
 
 
0.123 
Contrib. 
level 
0.7439 
(1.730) 
-0.546*** 
(0.155) 
 
 
11.601*** 
(1.054) 
825 
 
 
0.066 
(I) 
Periods 1 to 10 
Contrib. 
decision 
0.064 
(0.088) 
-0.059*** 
(0.009) 
 
 
 
1258 
55.82*** 
-731.430 
 
 
Dep. Var.: 
TEAM 
Period 
Period × 
TEAM 
Belief 
Constant 
N 
Wald χ2 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
R2 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of hurdle models, which consist of a regression of the contribution decision in the first part and an OLS regression of the 
contribution level (in case of positive contributions) in the second part each. The first part is calculated by a probit regression in specifications (I), (III) and (IV). We 
report the marginal effects at the mean in these specifications. As marginal effects and standard errors of interaction terms in non-linear models are not correctly 
specified (Ai and Norton, 2003), we report in specifications (II) and (V) the results of the OLS regressions of the contribution decision. Standard errors (clustered on 
matching groups) are reported in parentheses. Specifications (III) and (IV) are run with data from periods 1 to 5 and periods 6 to 10 respectively. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 1.2 – Hurdle models of unconditional contributions. 
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individuals in the last two periods. The difference in the last period however is not significant 
(p = 0.670 for the last period). Over all periods teams interacting with teams contribute on 
average 6.7 points, whereas individuals interacting with individuals contribute on average 5.6 
points to the public good (p = 0.291 over all periods). 
Table 1.2 shows the estimates of hurdle models of unconditional contributions. We use 
the following independent variables: The dummy variable TEAM taking the value 1 if the 
observation stems from treatment TEAM and 0 otherwise; The variable Period to control for 
time effects; The interaction term Period × TEAM to control for potential interaction effects; 
And the variable Belief to control for the expectations of the participants.12,13 Specification (I) 
shows that treatment TEAM does not have an overall ffect on contributions. It further 
outlines that the willingness and the contribution level both decrease over time, which is in 
line with numerous existing studies on cooperation in public goods games. Specification (II) 
reveals, however, a significant effect of the treatment variable TEAM on the contribution 
decision at the beginning: Teams are by 16.5% more likely to contribute a positive amount to 
the public good than individuals in the beginning. We run with specifications (III) and (IV) 
two separate hurdle models over the first and the second half of the game. We find that our 
treatment variable TEAM has an effect on the willingness to contribute in the first half of the 
game, but not in the second half anymore. In the first half, teams are by 11.4% more willing 
to make positive contributions than individuals. We observe again a clear trend for the 
willingness to contribute and the contribution level to decrease over time. If we include 
beliefs as an additional regressor in specification (V) the effect of the treatment variable 
TEAM disappears. It seems that our treatment variable has an effect on the beliefs, which 
serve as a mediating variable between the treatment variable and the contributions. We 
examine this question in the next section in greate detail. To summarize, we cannot confirm 
the existence of a discontinuity effect; we rather find a reverse discontinuity effect: Teams 
interacting with other teams in a public goods game act more cooperatively than individuals 
interacting with individuals, at least in the first half of the interaction. 
 
1.3.2 Beliefs 
Section 1.3.1 indicates that beliefs play an important role when it comes to differences 
between individual and team cooperation levels. Insko, Schopler, and their colleagues (e.g., 
                                                
12 In case of treatment TEAM we include the average beliefs of the three team members.  
13 The number of observations N in the first part of he hurdle models is N = 1258. This number consists of N = 
66 individuals in IND * 10 periods + 60 teams in TEAM * 10 periods – 2 teams in TEAM * 1 period = 1258. 
Two observations are subtracted, as two teams (once ea h) did not come to a unanimous decision on the 
unconditional contribution. 
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Schopler and Insko, 1992; Wildschut et al. 2003) explain the discontinuity effect with the 
outgroup schema-based distrust hypothesis, which stipula es that interacting with a team 
evokes more competitive expectations about the other team’s behavior than interacting with 
an individual. As we rather observe a reverse discontinuity effect, we also expect the opposite 
link to beliefs. 
 
RESULT 1.2: Teams are expected to make higher contributions than individuals in the 
beginning.  
 
Figure 1.1 displays the expectations of team members with regard to other teams and 
the expectations of individuals with regard to other individuals over time. Remember that 
also in the treatment TEAM the beliefs are collected individually.14, 15 Figure 1.1 shows that – 
analogous to the dynamics of unconditional contribuions – teams are expected to make 
higher contributions than individuals in the first eight periods, before in the last two periods 
teams are expected to make lower contributions thanindividuals (p = 0.573 for the last 
period). Over all periods teams are expected to contribute on average 7.7 points and 
individuals to contribute on average 6.8 points to the public good (p = 0.229 for the first 
period; p = 0.307 over all periods). Note that in line with other studies (e.g. Fischbacher and 
Gächter, 2010) that compare beliefs and contributions decision makers’ beliefs are over-
optimistic regarding the cooperation level of others. 
Table 1.3 shows the results of OLS regressions of beliefs. The variable Previous others’ 
contribution refers to the contribution by the other two unit members (teams in TEAM and 
individuals in IND) in the previous period. In line with the results on contributions, we find 
that teams are not expected to make higher contributions than individuals over all periods. 
However, they are correctly expected in the beginning of the game to make by 2.5 points 
higher contributions than individuals. Furthermore expectations decrease over time, which is 
not surprising, as contributions also decrease. Specification (III) further outlines that beliefs 
increase with the contributions of the other unit members in the previous period – despite the 
stranger matching protocol. Hence, we cannot confirm the outgroup schema-based distrust 
hypothesis. In contrast, our results indicate higher expectations with regard to teams than to 
                                                
14 Hoyle et al. (1989) find that the crucial element of the outgroup schema-based distrust hypothesis is not 
whether the self is in a group or alone, but whether t  opponent is a group or an individual. 
15 We cannot rule out that the individual belief elicitation in treatment TEAM might be influenced by the chat 
discussion within teams before the elicitation. 
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individuals at least at the beginning of the public goods game.16 Specification (IV) is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 1.3 - OLS regressions of beliefs. 
Dep. Var.: Beliefs (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
TEAM 
0.924 
(1.515) 
2.519** 
(1.134) 
1.553*** 
(0.393) 
-1.371 
(2.080) 
Period 
-0.844*** 
(0.108) 
-0.634*** 
(0.137) 
-0.102 
(0.072) 
-0.844*** 
(0.108) 
Period × TEAM  -0.288 (0.191) 
-0.269*** 
(0.077) 
 
Previous others’ contribution    
0.372*** 
(0.016) 
 
Conditional contributor    
-1.194 
(1.274) 
Others    
2.655 
(1.329) 
Conditional contributor × TEAM    2.654* (1.458) 
Others × TEAM    2.923* (1.626) 
Constant 
11.461*** 
(1.233) 
10.306*** 
(0.878) 
2.742*** 
(0.443) 
12.449*** 
(1.821) 
N 2460 2460 2214 2460 
R2 0.208 0.212 0.699 0.216 
 
Notes: This table shows the results of OLS regressions of beliefs. Specification (III) is calculated for data from 
periods 2 to 10. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
1.3.3 Individual Proposals of Team Members 
In each period we ask team members in condition TEAM to make an initial individual 
proposal for the team contribution. In the following we first examine whether there is an 
effect of the team situation on these individual proposals of team members. Therefore we 
compare the individual proposals of team members in treatment TEAM with the actual 
individual contributions in IND. We come to the following result: 
 
RESULT 1.3.1: The team setting has an effect on the individual proposals of team members: 
The individual proposals of team members are more often greater than zero than the actual 
contributions in IND. 
                                                
16 We also examine the question whether the team situation has an effect on the variance of beliefs within eams 
over time. An OLS regression of the standard deviations of beliefs within teams on the time periods shows that 
the beliefs within teams converge over time (p < 0.05). We will see in the next section that this result is in line 
with the progress of the variance of individual proposals within teams over time. 
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In order to illustrate result 1.3.1 we outline in figure 1.2 the average contributions in IND and 
in TEAM and the average individual proposals of team members in TEAM. The graph shows 
that the proposals and contributions in TEAM are close to each other, the contributions in 
IND seem to be lower than the proposals of team members in TEAM in each period (p = 
0.121 over all periods). In line with the team contributions the proposals of team members 
also decline over time.  
 
Figure 1.2 - Contributions and team members' proposals. 
 
 
Table 1.4 shows the results of hurdle models on the effect of the team situation on the 
individual proposals of team members. These results correspond heavily to the results on the 
effect of our treatment variable TEAM on contributions: According to specification (I) we do 
not find an overall effect of the team setting on the individual proposals of team members. 
However, specification (II) shows that there is an effect in the beginning, meaning that team 
members in TEAM are by 16.1% more likely to propose a contribution greater than zero 
compared to individuals. Note that the proposals of team members at the beginning of the 
game can not be influenced by the communication within eams. We run separate hurdle 
models and find an effect of the team setting on the proposals of team members in the first 8 
periods (see specification III). Only in the last two periods there are no differences anymore 
between team members’ proposals and individual contributions. 
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Notes: This table outlines the results of hurdle models, which consist of a regression of the contribution decision (likelihood of a positive proposal) 
in the first part and an OLS regression of the contribu ion (proposal) level (in case of positive contributions/ proposals) in the second part. Except for 
specification (II) the first part is calculated by a probit regression respectively. For the first part we report the marginal effects at the mean in these 
specifications. As marginal effects and standard errors of interaction terms in non-linear models are not correctly specified (Ai and Norton, 2003), 
we report in specification (II) the results of the OLS regression of the contribution decision (likelihood of a positive proposal). Standard errors 
(clustered on matching groups) are reported in parentheses. Specifications (III) and (IV) are run with data from periods 1 to 8 and periods 9 to 10 
respectively. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Table 1.4 - Hurdle models of contributions in IND and team members’ proposals in TEAM. 
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RESULT 1.3.2: The reverse discontinuity effect is driven by conditional cooperators, who – 
in comparison to free-riders – are more optimistic with respect to the contributions of other 
parties in the team setting and therefore intend to make even higher contributions in the team 
setting than in the individual setting.  
 
Figure 1.3 shows the individual contributions in IND and the proposals of team members in 
TEAM for the different types of cooperative preferenc s. First of all, we see that also among 
free riders there are subjects who make positive contributions or contribution proposals. This 
is in line with the findings by Dariel and Riedl (2010), who find that free riders do not 
necessarily contribute less than other cooperation types in the repeated PGG (with a stranger 
matching applied). Figure 1.3 indicates that in condition IND contributions are very similar 
between cooperation types (Kruskal Wallis rank testfor he first period, p = 0.264), whereas 
in condition TEAM proposals depend heavily on the cooperation type (Kruskal Wallis rank 
test for the first period, p = 0.035). The proposals of free riders in TEAM are slightly lower 
than the contributions in IND, whereas the proposals of conditional cooperators are higher 
than the corresponding contributions in IND (Mann-Whitney U-tests for the first period: 
among free riders p = 0.237; among others p = 0.192; among conditional cooperators p = 
0.042).  
 
Figure 1.3 - Contributions in IND and team members' proposals in TEAM for each 
cooperation type. 
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Table 1.5 displays the results of OLS regressions of contributions in condition IND and 
proposals of team members in condition TEAM. As regressors we insert: The dummy 
variable Conditional cooperator, which takes value 1 if the observation comes from a 
decision maker classified as conditional cooperator nd zero otherwise; A dummy variable 
for the residual category Others; And the interaction terms between each of these dummy 
variables and our treatment variable TEAM. Specification (I) confirms that conditional 
cooperators as well as subjects classified as others make by about 3 points higher 
contributions to the public good than free riders.  
 
Table 1.5 - OLS regressions of contributions in IND and indivi ual team members' proposals 
in TEAM 
Dep. Var.: Contributions in IND and 
team members’ proposals in TEAM 
(I) (II) 
TEAM 
1.239 
(1.511) 
-1.700 
(2.666) 
Period 
-0.840*** 
(0.077) 
-0.840*** 
(0.077) 
Conditional cooperator 
3.262*** 
(0.953) 
0.780 
(2.045) 
Others 
2.903*** 
(1.007) 
0.817 
(1.574) 
Conditional cooperator  × TEAM  3.645
# 
(2.236) 
Others × TEAM  3.108 (1.954) 
Constant 
7.633*** 
(1.849) 
9.593*** 
(2.476) 
Conditional cooperator - Others 0.359 -0.037 
Conditional ooperator  × TEAM - 
Others × TEAM  0.537 
N 2460 2460 
R2 0.174 0.182 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions f contributions in IND and individual proposals of 
team members in TEAM. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups) are reported in parentheses. *, **, **  
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, # denotes p = 0.119. 
 
Specification (II) shows that there are no significant differences between the different 
types in condition IND respectively (captured by the variables Conditional cooperator, 
Others and Conditional cooperator - Others). Variable TEAM indicates that there are no 
differences between the individual contributions and proposals of team members among free-
riders. However, we find a weak interaction effect be ween the treatment variable and the 
conditional contributors: Compared to free-riders the eam situation increases the proposals 
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of conditional cooperators. Hence, the effect of higher contribution proposals in TEAM in 
contrast to the individual contributions in IND – which leads to the reverse discontinuity 
effect – is driven by conditional cooperators. 
Why do conditional cooperators make higher contribuion proposals in the team setting 
than they actually contribute if they play as an individual? Specification (IV) in table 1.3 
suggests the following explanation: In contrast to he beliefs of free-riders the team setting 
has a positive effect on the beliefs of conditional cooperators: Other than free-riders, 
conditional cooperators are more optimistic in the team setting than in the individual setting 
with respect to the contributions of the other parties.17 
 
1.3.4 Team Decision-Making Process 
In the following we concentrate on the decision-making process within teams. We start 
by examining whether team members adapt to the other team members over time. 
 
RESULT 1.4.1: Over time the individual proposals of team members converge within teams.  
 
Support for result 1.4.1 is provided by figure 1.4 illustrating the mean standard deviations of 
individual proposals within teams for each period. It shows that the standard deviations of 
team members’ proposals decrease over time.  
In table 1.6 we present different team compositions with respect to cooperative 
preferences of team members. The abbreviation cc stands for conditional cooperator, fr for 
free rider and other for the residual category. We find that most teams either consist of three 
conditional cooperators (3cc), or of two conditional cooperators and one free rid r (2cc/1fr) 
or one person classified as other (2cc/1other). There are only few mixed teams 
(1cc/1fr/1other) or teams in which other types have the majority (at least 2others). Hence, 
conditional cooperators constitute a majority in most teams. Table 1.6 further outlines the 
decision rules that teams implicitly or explicitly apply to aggregate individual proposals and 
to come to a unanimous decision.  
 
RESULT 1.4.2: Teams mainly come to a decision concerning the team contribution by 
making a compromise or by deciding according to themajority rule if the individual 
proposals differ a priori. 
                                                
17 For an illustration of the beliefs in IND and TEAM for the different cooperation types see Figure A.1.1 in 
appendix A.1.4 
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Figure 1.4 - Standard deviations of individual proposals within teams. 
 
 
Only six teams determine a constant contribution in the first periods to which they stick 
until the last period. Most teams, however, bargain on the team contribution in each period. 
Hence, we report in the following the decision rules for each case, i.e. for each team in each 
period. Table 1.6 outlines the six categories of decision rules that we can distinguish in our 
data and the corresponding average contributions. I 30.6% of the cases teams find a 
compromise, meaning that they either take the average of individual proposals, the median or 
they decide to contribute another amount that lies b tween the highest and the lowest 
proposal within the team. In 27.3% of the cases two team members make the same proposal 
and the third team member agrees to this proposal. We define this as a decision under 
majority rule. Our third category of decision-making is a decision with identical proposals, 
meaning that all three team members make identical individual proposals and make this 
proposal the team decision. A decision with identical proposals occurs in 22.2% of all cases. 
In some cases the least cooperative proposal or the most cooperative proposal within a team 
is taken as the team decision. The residual category summarizes the cases that cannot be 
assigned to one of the decision rules so far. Table 1.6 shows that the average team 
contributions differ quite profoundly depending on which decision rule is applied. If one of 
the extreme proposals is chosen as the team contribution, the contribution levels are 
correspondingly rather high or low. Identical proposals also lead to rather low contributions, 
which at least partly might be related to the fact that identical proposals occur more often in 
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later periods in w
hich co
operation has alread
y de
ca
yed. W
e com
e to a m
o
re detailed an
alysis 
of the effect of different decision rules on team
 c
o
ntributions in section 1.3.5.  
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Note: cc stands for conditional cooperator, fr for free rider and other for a subject from the residual category.  
 
Table 1.6 - Team compositions, contributions and decision rules applied. 
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conditional cooperators are most willing to accept a compromise and are least likely to have 
identical proposals. 
 
Table 1.7 outlines the results of probit regressions which examine the effect of different team 
compositions on the likelihood of the three most frequently applied decision rules. Teams 
consisting of three conditional cooperators are most willing to make a compromise in their 
decision-making process compared to other teams. At the same time the proposals of their 
team members are least frequently identical. Pertaining to the majority rule we do not find 
any significant effects of different team compositions. In line with the results mentioned 
above table 1.7 outlines that the likelihood of identical proposals increases over time. 
 
Table 1.7 - Probit regressions of three decision rules. 
Dep. Var.: Likelihood of a 
compromise 
Likelihood of a 
majority 
Likelihood of 
identical proposals 
2cc/1fr 
-0.111*** 
(0.041) 
0.031 
(0.050) 
0.169*** 
(0.063) 
2cc/1other 
-0.178*** 
(0.031) 
0.061 
(0.043) 
0.127*** 
(0.059) 
1cc/1other/1fr 
-0.175* 
(0.070) 
-0.078 
(0.075) 
0.288*** 
(0.134) 
At least 2others 
-0.046 
(0.090) 
-0.016 
(0.061) 
0.025 
(0.055) 
Period 
-0.042*** 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.009) 
0.051*** 
(0.010) 
N 598 598 598 
Wald χ2 79.30*** 5.96 60.88*** 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
-340.410 -347.555 -268.050 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of probit regression  of the most often applied decision rules. We report 
the marginal effects at the mean. The team composition 3cc is used as base category. Specifications (II) are 
calculated over the periods 2 to 10 each. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups) are presented i  
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
1.3.5 Team Contributions 
What are the determinants that affect the final aggre ated team decision? We are 
especially interested in the effects of the team cop sition, of the different types of team 
members’ proposals, of the length of the chat communication and of the decision rules. We 
start with the effect of the team composition. 
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RESULT 1.5.1: The composition of cooperative preferences within teams has an effect on 
the team contributions: Teams with three conditional cooperators are more willing to make 
positive contributions and, if so, they make higher contributions compared to other teams.  
 
Result 1.5.1 seems plausible. Econometric support is provided by specification (I) in table 
1.8. Teams with three conditional cooperators are the ones with the highest contributions. 
They are by 26.8% or 55.4% more likely to make positive contributions than teams with two 
conditional cooperators and one free rider (2cc/1fr) or mixed teams (1cc/1resid/1fr) 
respectively. If they make positive contributions, their contributions are by 3.1 or 5.4 points 
higher than the ones made by teams with two conditional cooperators and one free rider 
(2cc/1fr) or mixed teams (1cc/1resid/1fr) respectively. 
Which types of proposals influence the team decision?  
 
RESULT 1.5.2: The lowest and the median proposals within teams have a significantly 
positive effect on the final team decision, while th  highest proposal does not. The final team 
decision is also affected by the first proposal that is made during the chat communication.   
 
In specification (II) of table 1.8 we insert the variables Lowest proposal, Median 
proposal and Highest proposal – that represent the lowest, median and highest proposal 
within teams in each period – and the variable First proposal in chat, which refers to the first 
specific proposal that is mentioned in the chat communication in each period. Each additional 
point of the lowest proposal in teams increases the willingness to contribute by 2.6%, each 
additional point of the median proposal increases th  contribution level in those teams who 
make a positive contribution by 0.6 points. Furthermo e, in teams who make a positive 
contribution the contribution level increases by 0.2 points with each additional point of the 
first proposal mentioned during the chat communication. The latter influence shows that 
teams often stick to the first proposal that was made by a team member in the chat. This is in 
line with the well-known anchoring effect in social psychology (Galinsky and Mussweiler, 
2001; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).  
Note that the highest proposal has no significant effect on team contributions. One 
explanation might be that the highest proposals are r ther made for social image concerns: 
team members pretend to be cooperative but quickly decline their proposal if they realize that 
other team members are less cooperative.  
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Specification (II) of table 1.8 also includes the variable Number of words in chat, which 
denotes the number of words team members exchange within one period in order to come to 
a team decision. 
 
RESULT 1.5.3: When teams make a positive team contribution, the contribution level 
increases with the length of the team discussion.    
 
On average teams use 86 words in the chat to come t a unanimous decision, whereas the 
range lies between zero words (which is possible if the individual proposals are identical) and 
372 words.18 Specification (II) of table 1.8 outlines that if teams make positive contributions 
the contribution level increases by 0.008 points with each word exchanged. Hence, teams 
make higher contributions if they discuss or reflect the situation more thoroughly.19 
 
RESULT 1.5.4: The applied decision rule has an effect on team contributions: In particular, 
decisions based on a compromise or on the majority rule lead to higher contributions than 
decisions based on identical proposals. 
 
Specification (III) of table 1.8 shows the results of an OLS regression of team 
contributions on decision rules.20 Teams that decide by compromise, majority rule or choose 
the most cooperative proposal in the team make by 1.5 to 6.2 points higher contributions than 
teams whose team members’ proposals concerning the team contribution are identical. The 
effect of choosing by compromise is not significantly different from the effect of applying the 
majority rule. As we control for time periods, the effect is not due to the fact that identical 
proposals within teams increase over time. The result indicates that if team members make 
identical proposals concerning the team contribution, these proposals are comparably low.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Not surprisingly, OLS regressions of the length of the team discussion show that the latter increases with the 
variance of the individual proposals within teams (p < 0.01). 
19A chat analysis shows that teams in the chat mainly discuss the team contribution and hardly ever drift to 
topics that have nothing to do with the team contribu ion. This behavior is incentivized by the time rest iction. 
20 We cannot run a hurdle model to examine the effect of decision rules on team contributions, as some rul s 
predict the probability of making a positive contribution perfectly.  
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Table 1.8 - Hurdle models and an OLS regression of team contributions. 
 (I) (II) 
 
(III) 
 
Dep. Var.: Contribution 
decision  
Contribution 
level 
Contribution 
decision 
Contribution 
level 
Contribution 
level 
2cc/1fr 
-0.268*** 
(0.092) 
-3.116** 
(1.250) 
   
2cc/1resid 
-0.137 
(0.108) 
0.578 
(1.744) 
   
1cc/1resid/1fr 
-0.554*** 
(0.063) 
-5.388*** 
(1.453) 
   
At least 2resid 
-0.106 
(0.164) 
-0.908 
(1.247) 
   
Lowest proposal   
0.026*** 
(0.016) 
0.033 
(0.043) 
 
Median proposal   
0.006 
(0.005) 
0.636*** 
(0.066) 
 
Highest proposal   
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.116 
(0.078) 
 
First proposal in 
chat 
  
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.204** 
(0.070) 
 
Number of words 
in chat 
  
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.008** 
(0.002) 
 
Compromise     
2.041* 
(1.013) 
Majority     
1.483* 
(0.770) 
Least cooperative 
proposal  
    
-2.045 
(1.236) 
Most cooperative 
proposal 
    
6.214*** 
(1.210) 
Others     
-0.032 
(1.972) 
Period 
-0.076*** 
(0.013) 
-0.706*** 
(0.170) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.084 
-0.873*** 
(0.092) 
Constant  
14.094*** 
(0.808) 
 
-0.074 
(0.594) 
10.356*** 
(1.102) 
Compromise - 
Majority 
    0.558 
N 598 410 598 410 598 
Wald χ2 229.15***  274.39***   
Log pseudo 
likelihood 
-290.310  -169.472   
R2  0.183  0.825 0.272 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of hurdle models and n OLS regression of team contributions. The hurdle 
models consist of a probit regression of the decision in the first part and an OLS regression of the contribution 
level in the second part each. For the first part we report the marginal effects at the mean. We apply 3cc and 
Identical proposals as base category. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups) are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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1.3.6 Arguments in Teams for High and Low Contributions  
In order to get further insights into the driving forces behind team decisions we conduct 
a qualitative content analysis (see also Cooper and Kagel, 2005). The procedure is the 
following: One researcher reads the whole chat communication and develops a category 
system in a deductive and inductive way on the reasons for high and low team contributions. 
We then train two undergraduate research assistants for the coding. Independently from each 
other the two research assistants read the whole team communication and code for each team 
in each period – hence, for all cases – whether an argument from the category system was 
mentioned or not. A significant kappa coefficient of 27.8% (p < 0.001) is reached, which 
indicates a fair inter-rater agreement according to Landis and Koch (1977). Results reported 
in the following are based on the average of the two codings. 
The arguments for low and high team contributions are enlisted together with their 
frequency in tables 1.9 and 1.10 respectively. Both tables also display the average 
contribution over all cases, in which the corresponding argument is mentioned. Not 
surprisingly, contributions are clearly higher (with a range from 9.8 to 12.3 points) if an 
argument for high contributions is mentioned than if an argument for low contributions is 
advanced (range from 3.7 to 7.1 points).  
Among the two most frequently used arguments for low c ntributions is the claim that 
other teams also make low contributions to the public good, which is mentioned in 18.3% of 
all cases. This argument is based on the fairness norm of inequity aversion (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 1999; see also Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) which states that teams have to bear a 
utility loss if they contribute more and therefore earn less than other teams (disadvantageous 
inequity aversion). The second most frequently used argument for low contributions – 
mentioned in 13.6% of all cases – is the standard game theoretic argument: Low 
contributions are the best response to maximize profits independent of what others do.  
Arguments most frequently discussed within teams in favour of high contributions are 
efficiency concerns, fairness concerns in the sense of advantageous inequity aversion and, 
interestingly, the reputation building argument (which can only indirectly apply). Most 
frequently, namely in 8.9% of all cases, teams discus  efficiency concerns in the sense of 
social welfare, which heavily supports the hypothesis that teams are more willing to 
cooperate than individuals because of efficiency reasons. Of course, we do not know, 
whether individuals thought about efficiency aspects to the same extent, but at least we can 
say that efficiency concerns are an important argument of teams in favour of high 
contributions. The argument that other teams make also high contributions – which reflects 
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the utility losses of teams if they make lower contributions than other teams (advantageous 
inequity aversion) – is mentioned in 6.5% of all cases. 
 
Table 1.9 - Arguments for low contributions in the within-team communication. 
Category Argument Explanation of Argument 
Frequency 
(relative 
frequency) 
Average 
contribution 
1a 
Disadvantageous 
inequity aversion 
Other teams also make low 
contributions 
109.5 
(18.3%) 
4.9 
1b 
Standard game 
theoretic approach 
Pure profit-maximization  
independent of what others do 
81.5 
(13.6%) 
4.0 
1c Loss aversion High contributions are  risky 
24 
(4.0%) 
7.1 
1d Trial and error 
Very low contribution proposed 
to examine consequences 
24 
(4.0%) 
4.9 
1e Stranger matching 
In each period other teams are 
matched 
11 
(1.8%) 
5.8 
1f 
Free-riding is not 
revealed 
Other teams only get feedback on 
the average of the other parties’ 
contributions and not on single 
team contributions 
13.5 
(2.25%) 
3.7 
 
Table 1.10 - Arguments for high contributions in the within-team communication. 
Category Argument Explanation of argument 
Frequency 
(relative 
frequency) 
Average 
contribution 
2a Efficiency Social welfare 
53.5 
(8.9%) 
10.0 
2b 
Advantageous 
inequity aversion 
Other teams also make high 
contributions 
39 
(6.5%) 
9.8 
2c Reputation building 
Building up a cooperative 
reputation for profit-
maximization of the own team in 
the long run  
30 
(5.0%) 
11.6 
2d Trial and error 
Very high contribution proposed 
to examine consequences 
25.5 
(4.3%) 
11.6 
2e Stranger matching 
Teams are rematched in each 
period. Hence, if the other 
assigned teams make low 
contributions in the previous 
period, the own team gets a new 
chance in each period and can 
motivate the other teams to make 
high contributions 
31.5 
(5.3%) 
12.3 
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1.3.7 Post-Experimental Questionnaire on Team Decisions 
After having finished part II subjects in condition TEAM individually answered a post-
experimental questionnaire on the team decision. Appendix A.1.5 lists the questions and the 
answers to four sets of questions. In the following we concentrate on the most interesting 
questions.  
The first set of questions focuses on the contributions by individuals and teams. 43.9% 
of the subjects accurately expect teams to contribute rather more to the public good than 
individuals. The most frequently stated reasons are the perception of peer pressure within 
teams to make higher contributions and the outvoting of low contributors within teams by 
means of the majority rule.  
The second set of questions concerns the atmosphere within teams. Question Q3 reveals 
that 54.5% of the subjects are rather satisfied with the decisions of their team. Among the 
reasons the soft factors – for instance, a similar strategy within the team, a quick agreement 
and a democratic decision-making process – are equally important compared to the hard 
factor of high profits. Q5 reveals that 89.0% of the eam members perceive the atmosphere in 
their team as positive. Only 20.0% of team members would change into another team, if they 
had the chance (Q6). A probit regression of Q6 on the team profits, the closeness between the 
individual proposal and the team contribution, the team atmosphere (Q5) and the subjective 
influence of the team member on the team decision (Q7) reveals that only the latter three soft 
factors have a positive effect on the wish of subjects to stay within their team (p < 0.05 
respectively). The team profit has no effect (p > 0.10). 
In the third set of questions subjects were asked about the team decision-making 
process. The mentioned decision rules in Q8 confirm the results in section 1.3.4. Q12 shows 
that 62.2% of the subjects would prefer to take decisions rather in teams than individually, if 
they could participate in a similar experiment again. A probit regression of Q12 on several 
regressors including the team profits and the subjective team atmosphere (Q5) shows that 
only the team atmosphere has a significant effect (p < 0.01), whereas the team profit has no 
effect on whether a subject prefers to decide within a team or on her own. 
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
We conduct a repeated public goods game with teams who interact with teams and 
individuals who interact with individuals. We further independently elicit individual 
cooperative preferences to examine their aggregation into team decisions. To date, the 
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empirical results on team and individual decisions in games with a social component are 
inconclusive: Several experiments suggest that teams are more competitive, more selfish and 
less cooperative than individuals. However, other studies stipulate the contrast. Furthermore 
the theoretical predictions on team versus individual decisions are very different depending 
on the specific (social preference) model applied. The results in our study do not confirm the 
discontinuity effect that has been a standing finding in social psychology. Instead we rather 
find a reverse discontinuity effect with teams to be more willing to cooperate than 
individuals, at least in the first half of the public goods game. Teams interacting with other 
teams are more cooperative and less competitive than individuals interacting with other 
individuals.  
We can speculate about the reasons for the finding of a reverse discontinuity effect 
based on some additional controls in our experiment. Firstly, contributions in the public 
goods game strictly increase social welfare. Furthermore our chat analysis strongly suggests 
that efficiency-concerns of teams might be an important reason for their enhanced 
willingness to cooperate. This interpretation is in line with Balafoutas et al. (2014), who find 
that teams are more efficiency-loving than individuals. A second explanation for the reverse 
discontinuity effect is related to the more optimistic expectations towards other teams than 
towards other individuals. Hence, we cannot corroboate the so-called schema-based distrust 
hypothesis that is a prominent explanation for the discontinuity effect in social psychology. 
Especially conditional cooperators (in contrast to free-riders) have more optimistic 
expectations towards other teams than towards other individuals. Our chat analysis suggests 
that these more optimistic expectations combined with advantageous inequity aversion might 
lead to an increased willingness to cooperate in the team setting. A third explanation that we 
cannot completely rule out might be an enhanced motivation of teams to (indirectly) build up 
a cooperative reputation, despite the stranger matching used in our experiment. 
In our study we further examine the team decision-making process. We find that the 
individual proposals of team members converge within eams over time. The aggregation of 
individual proposals within teams either happens by compromise, majority rule or the 
proposals are identical anyway, where the applied decision rule is affected by the distribution 
of cooperative preferences of team members: Teams consisting only of conditional 
cooperators decide more often by using compromise, and their team members’ proposals are 
less frequently identical than in other teams. The final team decision is not only affected by 
the team composition in terms of cooperative preferences and the implicit decision rules 
applied. It also depends on the first proposal verbalized in the team discussion (anchoring 
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effect) and increases with the length of the discusion. The latter result reflects that teams 
who deliberate on the social dilemma more thoroughly make higher contributions. 
Our results have relevant implications when thinking about the numerous public goods 
situations in reality in which decisions are not taken by individuals but by teams. However, it 
is important to highlight the stand-alone nature of our research in economics. There is much 
room for more studies. For instance, reputational concerns and efficiency concerns in teams 
should be analyzed comprehensively in the future. It would also be interesting to study team 
decision making “in the wild” by implementing field experiments that involve team decision 
making. Further, a careful study that varies the communication protocols and the 
communication media is desperately needed in economics. Finally, the effects of group size 
and asymmetric interaction (direct interaction of individuals and teams) have not been 
investigated in a social dilemma. 
C
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ppendix A
.1.1: Literature overview
 
 
Results: Decisions of teams compared 
to individuals 
In teams with different individual 
choices, the team choices are less self-
regarding than the individual choices 
Teams send smaller amounts 
Teams send and accept smaller amounts 
Teams trust less 
Teams are less trustworthy 
Teams exit earlier 
Teams with chat communication offer 
lower wages, teams with face-to-face 
communication make higher efforts 
No significant differences 
Teams cooperate less 
In the treatment with 15 periods: Teams 
act farther away from standard game 
theoretic predictions 
Teams are classified more frequently as 
efficiency-loving and less frequently as 
spiteful 
Communication 
within teams 
Face-to-face 
Chat 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face/ 
chat 
Face-to-face 
Face-to-face 
Chat 
Chat 
Time horizon 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
One-shot 
Typically 10 
periods in part-
ner matching 
One-shot / 15 
periods in 
stranger 
matching 
One-shot 
Game 
Dictator game 
Dictator game 
Ultimatum game 
Trust game 
Trust game 
Centipede game 
Gift exchange game 
Power-to-take game 
Prisoner’s dilemma 
game 
Stackelberg market 
game 
Kerschbamer’s 
double price-list 
technique 
Authors 
Cason and Mui (1997) 
Luhan et al., 2009 
Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) 
Kugler et al. (2007) 
Cox (2002) 
Bornstein et al. (2004) 
Kocher and Sutter (2007) 
Bosman et al. (2006) 
Psychological studies on 
the discontinuity effect by 
Insko and Schopler 
Müller and Tan (2013) 
Balafoutas et al. (2014) 
  Table A.1.1 – Studies on individual and team decisions. 
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Appendix A.1.2: Instructions for treatment TEAM (translated from German) 
 
 
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you very much for participating! 
From now on, please refrain from talking with the other participants! 
 
 
General information 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to study decision making. You can earn money during this 
experiment which you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. 
During the experiment you and the other participants will take decisions. Your own decisions as well 
as those of the other participants will affect your payment according to the rules explained in the 
following. 
The duration of the experiment is 120 minutes. If you should have any questions, please raise your 
hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and nswer your question in private. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment your 
earnings in points will be converted into Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
 
1 point = 0.33 Euros (3 points = 1 Euro) 
 
For your punctual arrival you receive 100 points (4 Euros). At the end of the experiment you will be 
paid your total earnings from the experiment as well as the 4 Euros in private and in cash. For 
linguistic simplicity we only use male notations in these instructions.  
 
Anonymity  
Your input over the course of the experiment is anonymous. You will not receive personal 
information about the other participants. We will not link your name to data from the experiment. At 
the end of the experiment you will sign a confirmation which says that you have received the 
payment. This confirmation only serves accounting purposes for our sponsor. Our sponsor will not 
receive any data from the experiment either. 
 
Utilities  
For this experiment you are given a pen. We kindly ask you to leave the pen at your place after the 
experiment. While you take your decisions a clock will count down at the upper right corner of the 
computer screen. This countdown serves as an orientatio  for how much time you should need to take 
the decision. However there is no strict time limit. You can take more time in order to make your 
decision, especially in the beginning this will be the case. Only the purely informational screens 
without any decisions to be taken will close after the countdown. 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of three parts. You will receive the instructions for the second and third part
after completion of the first and second part respectiv ly. The parts are independent of each other; 
decisions in one part have no influence on your income in another part. The sum of your incomes 
from the first two parts yields your total income from the experiment. You receive information about 
your total income after completion of the second part.   
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Part I 
 
The general decision situation 
 
First we explain you the general decision situation. Afterwards you will find some sample exercises 
on the screen which serve to increase your familiarity with the decision situation. Then we will 
outline the procedure of part I in detail.  
 
You are a member of a 3-person-group. Each member of the group has to decide on the division of 20 
points that you receive at the beginning of part I. You can either allocate the 20 points on a private 
account or you can assign them completely or parts of hem on a public account. Each point that you 
do not allocate to the public account is automatically assigned to the private account.  
 
Income from the private account 
For each point that you allocate to the private account you earn exactly one point. For example, if 
you allocate 20 points to the private account, you earn exactly 20 points from the private account. If 
you assign, for example, 6 points on the private account, you receive an income of 6 points from the 
private account. Nobody except you receives an income from your private account.  
 
Income from the public account 
From the amount that you allocate to the public account all group members profit in the same way. 
Hence, you also earn money from the contributions of the other two group members to the public 
account. The income from the public account, that each group member receives, is determined in the 
following way:  
 
Individual income from the public account =  
Sum of contributions of all three group members to the public account * 0.5 
 
 
For example, if the sum of contributions in your group is 60 points, then you and the other two group 
members receive 60 * 0.5 = 30 points each from the public account. If the three group members 
allocate a total of 10 points to the public account, you and the other two group members receive 10 * 
0.5 = 5 points each from the public account.  
 
Total income 
Your total income results from the sum of your income from the private account and your income 
from the public account. Thus: 
 
Income from the private account (= 20 – contribution t  the public account) 
+ Income from the public account (= 0.5 * sum of contributions to the public account) 
= Total income 
 
 
Control questions 
Before starting the experiment we ask you to complete the sample exercises on the screen. If you need 
to do any calculations, you can click on the calculator symbol in the lower part of the screen, which 
will open the Windows calculator. If you have any questions please raise your hand, one of the 
experimenters will then come to your cubicle and answer your questions in private. 
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Procedure of part I 
 
Part I includes the decision situation as described above. You make your decision in part I only once.  
 
Your input  
As described above, you possess an endowment of 20 points, which you can allocate to your private 
account or to the public account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions. 
In the following, these two decisions are called the unconditional contribution  and the contribution 
table.  
• If you decide about your unconditional contribution t  the public account, you simply determine 
how many points out of the 20 points you would like to assign to the public account. You can only 
enter integers in the predetermined input field on the screen. The allocation to your private 
account is automatically given by the difference betwe n 20 and your contribution to the public 
account. When you have chosen your unconditional contribution, please click on “OK”.  
• In the next step you are asked to fill in a contribution table. For each possible (rounded) 
average contribution by the two other group members to the public account you are asked to
indicate how much you would like to allocate to the public account, i.e. you are asked to 
determine your own contribution as a function of the other members’ average contribution. The 
contribution table looks as follows:     
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
The numbers in the respective left column are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the 
two other group members to the public account, i.e. the contribution that is allocated to the 
public account on average by the other group members. In each input field you have to enter the 
number of points that you would like to assign to the public account – given the other members’ 
average investment as denoted by the column. You have to make an entry in each field. For 
example, you are asked how much you would like to contribute to the public account if the other 
group members invest on average 0 points to the public account; how much you would contribute, 
if the others contribute on average 1 or 2 or 3 etc. points. You have to enter an integer 
contribution between 0 and 20 in each field and, of course, it is also possible to enter the same 
contribution several times. Once you have filled in all fields on the screen, please click “OK”.  
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Your conditional contribution to the public good (contribution table) 
 
0   7  14  
1   8  15 
2   9 16 
3 10 17 
4 11 18 
5 12 19 
6 13 20 
 
 
OK 
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Payoff-relevance of the contribution table 
As soon as all participants have made their decisions, ne member in each group is randomly chosen. 
The contribution table is payoff-relevant only for the randomly chosen group member. For the 
other two group members who are not chosen, it is only the unconditional contribution that is payoff-
relevant. Of course, you do not know whether you get chosen when making your contribution 
decision and filling in the contribution table. Therefore you have to think carefully about both types of 
contribution decisions as both can become relevant for you. Two examples help for illustration.  
 
Example 1: Image you are chosen by chance and your contribution table is therefore payoff-relevant. 
For the other two group members their unconditional contributions are payoff-relevant. Imagine that 
their unconditional contributions are given by 2 and 6. The rounded average contribution by these two 
members is therefore 4 ((2 + 6) / 2 = 4).  
If you have now indicated in your contribution table that you enter 1 point to the public account if the
others contribute on average 4 points, then the total c ntribution of the group to the public account is 
given by 2 + 6 + 1 = 9. All group members therefore earn 0.5 * 9 = 4.5 points from the public account 
plus the respective income from their private accounts. If instead you have indicated in your 
contribution table that you invest 19 points to the public account if the others contribute on average 4 
points, then the total contribution of the group to the public account is 2 + 6 + 19 = 27. All group 
members therefore earn 0.5 * 27 = 13.5 points from the public account plus the respective incomes 
from their private accounts.  
 
Example 2: Imagine you are not chosen by chance and for you and another member of your group 
the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant. Imagine your unconditional contribution to the 
public account is 16 and the unconditional contribuion of the other group member is 18. The average 
unconditional contribution from both of you is therefore 17 = (16 + 18) / 2.  
If the randomly chosen group member has indicated in the contribution table that she will allocate one 
point to the public account if the other two members contribute on average 17, then the total 
contribution of the group to the public account is 16 + 18 + 1 = 35. All group members therefore earn 
0.5 * 35 = 17.5 points from the public account plus their respective incomes from their private 
account.  
If instead the randomly chosen member has indicated in the contribution table that she will assign 19 
points to the public account if the other two members contribute on average 17 points, then the total 
contribution of the group to the public account sum up to 16 + 18 + 19 = 53. All group members 
therefore earn 0.5 * 53 = 26.5 points from the public account plus their respective incomes from their 
private accounts.  
 
The random choice of the group member for whom the contribution table is payoff-relevant happens 
in the following way: Every group member is given a umber between 1 and 3. Once all participants 
have chosen their unconditional contributions and filled in their contribution table, one participant, 
who is randomly chosen by the PC, will dice a number between 1 and 3 (the six-sided dice possesses 
the numbers 1 to 3 twice). Afterwards he enters the number in the PC under the surveillance of the 
experimenter. The diced number is finally compared with your group number. If your group number 
is identical with the diced number, your contribution table is payoff-relevant for you and the 
unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant for the other two group members. If the numbers are not 
identical, the unconditional contribution is relevant for you. As you do not know in advance which of 
your decisions will be payoff-relevant, it is optimal for you to think about all decisions carefully.  
 
The following graphic visualizes the decision situation. You are the person on the right side with the 
number 3. Number 3 is diced; therefore, your conditional contribution is payoff-relevant. For the two 
other group members the unconditional contribution is payoff-relevant.  
 
 
 
page 4 of 8 
Chapter 1 
 
 44 
 
 
You make your decisions only once. At the end of part II you are informed about how much you 
earned in part I.  
 
 
Part II 
(Parts and instruction were presented sequentially) 
 
Team membership 
Part II of the experiment consists of 10 periods. The structure of the decisions is similar to that in part 
I. In each period, you have to determine an unconditional contribution to the public account. This 
time, however, you cannot determine the contribution on your own, but you have to come to an 
agreement concerning the unconditional contribution within your team, which consists of three team 
members (see graphic below this paragraph). A group now consists of three teams, whereby each 
team consists of three team members (hence, in total there are 9 persons in one group). Each team 
determines a common contribution to the public account, i.e. team 1 determines a contribution, team 2 
determines a contribution, and team 3 determines a contribution to the public account. The team 
membership is randomly assigned and remains constant throughout part II. Therefore, you have to 
come to an agreement concerning the contribution in all 10 periods with the same team members. In 
contrast, the group membership is randomly assigned a d changes in each period. Hence, your team 
interacts in each period with other teams. There are five other teams in total. In each period your team 
is randomly matched to two of the five other teams.   
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Contr. 
Of 
Others 
Cond. 
Contri. 
0 x 
1 x 
2 x 
3 x 
… x 
20 x 
 
Number 1 
 
 
Contr. 
Of 
Others 
Cond. 
Contri. 
0 x 
1 x 
2 x 
3 x 
… x 
20 x 
 
Number 2 
 
 
Unconditional 
contribution: 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 2 
 
Unconditional 
contribution: 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number 1 
Your 
unconditional 
contribution:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
Contri. 
of  
others 
Cond. 
Contri. 
0 x 
1 x 
2 1 
3 x 
… x 
20 x 
 
Number 3 
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Your decision 
Each team has an endowment of 20 points at the beginnin  of each period. Please make the following 
decisions in part II: 
• The private account and the public account are assigned to your whole team in part II. The 
income of a team member equals the income of the whole team (for details on this see below). 
Within your team you have to reach a unanimous decision regarding the distribution of the 20 
points to the private account and to the public account. A unanimous decision in your team 
means that all three team members enter an identical number for the unconditional 
contribution to the public account on their screens. To do so you can communicate with the 
other team members before each decision via chat (for he chat rules see below).  
• Before you make the decision on the unconditional contribution to the public account within 
your team, each team member is individually asked at the beginning of each period to indicate 
her individual, non-binding proposal concerning the contribution. This proposal is 
communicated to all team members before the chat.  
 
Income per period 
As in part I the team can decide to allocate the 20 points on the private account or to assign some or 
all of them to the public account. Each point that t e team does not allocate to the public account, is 
automatically assigned to the private account of the team. Your income per period is determined 
analogously to part I: 
 
Income from the private account (= 20 – contribution t  the public account) 
+ Income from the public account (= 0.5 * sum of contributions of all three teams to the public 
account) 
= Total income 
 
The total income of a team member in one period is identical with the total income of her team 
in this period. Hence, the total income of your team is not divided by 3, but each team member 
receives the full amount of the income of the team.  
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Team 3 
Team 1 
Team 2 
One group consists of three 
teams 
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If, for example, all three teams decide to contribue 20 points to the public account, your team and, 
therefore, each member of your team receives 60 * 0.5 = 30 points from the public account and 0 
points from the private account. Each member of the ot r two teams also receives 30 points. If the 
teams decide to allocate altogether 10 points to the public account, you and each member of your 
team receives 10 * 0.5 = 5 points from the public ac ount and the respective income from the private 
account. Each member of the other two teams receives also 5 points each from the public account and 
the respective income from the private account.  
 
If a team is not able to reach an agreement on the unconditional contribution within 5 minutes, the 
team (and, therefore, each member of the team) earns 0 points in this period. To determine the total 
contribution to the public account for the two other teams, one member of the team will be randomly 
chosen by the PC and her individual proposal will be used as contribution by her team.  
 
Payoff-relevance of one period 
At the end of each period you receive feedback on hw much the other two teams contributed 
together to the public account and on your income in this period. At the end of part II one period is 
randomly chosen and the income in this period is paid out at the end of the experiment. As you do not 
know in advance which period is payoff-relevant, it is optimal for you and your team to carefully 
think about your decisions in all periods.  
 
Rules for the chat communication 
You have the possibility to discuss with your team members via electronic chat in order to come to a 
unanimous common decision. During the chat you have an ID (identification letter). The ID remains 
constant during the whole part II of the experiment. At the beginning of each communication line, the 
ID of the respective communicating team member is shown. The content of the chat communication is 
generally not restricted. However, it is not allowed to communicate personal information such as your 
name, age, address, gender (please use gender-neutral formulations), course of studies (including 
lecturers, courses or content that allows to draw conclusions on your course) or similar statements 
which could reveal your identity (e.g. your seat number in the laboratory). Furthermore, it is not 
allowed to insult other participants or to arrange side payments of any kind (in terms of gratifications 
or disciplines outside the experiment) of any kind. If you violate these communication rules you do 
not receive any payoff.  
Each team member can send as many messages as she wishes to the other team members. Each 
message simultaneously appears on the screens of the ther two team members. Selective messages to 
exclusively one team member are not possible. As soon as the three team members agree on the 
contribution to the public account, they enter the respective number in the input field on their 
individual screens. Please remember that e inputs of all team members must be identical. If they 
are not – or if a team or a team member did not make a contribution after 5 minutes – the payoff for 
this team will be 0 points in this period. Please be aware that the screen for the chat communication 
will be turned off after 5 minutes.  
 
The screen for the decision on the unconditional contribution within your team looks as follows: 
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As soon as the 10 periods of part II are completed, you are informed on how much you have earned in 
part I and part II. The payment is carried out after part III.  
 
 
Part III 
 
In the last part of the experiment we ask you to fill in three short questionnaires. They are an 
important element of our research. Please answer the questions honestly and spontaneously. Your 
answers are certainly anonymous.  
 
 
Payment 
Once all participants have filled in the questionnaires, the experiment is finished and you receive your 
income individually and in cash. Your income consists of:  
    Your income from the first part 
+  Your income from the second part 
 
= Total income from both parts  
+ 4€ for your punctual appearance  
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Remaining time:       
Your ID is 
Proposal by team member A: 
Proposal by team member B: 
Proposal by team member C: 
Please decide within your team about the common contribution to the public 
account. You have 5 minutes to come to a unanimous decision within your team. 
Please use the chat box below. 
 
 
 
Your team’s contribution to the public account:  
OK 
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Appendix A.1.3: Control questions  
 
 
Please answer the following sample exercises.  
The purpose of these exercises is to familiarize you with the income calculations in the experiment. 
The sample exercises are not part of the actual experiment! 
 
If you have questions concerning the sample exercises or do cannot find the right solution, please 
raise your hand. The experimenter will come to your cubicle and help you.  
 
Exercise 1 
You are a member of a 3-person group in which each group member possesses an endowment of 20 
points.  
Imagine no group member (including you) makes a contribution to the public account.  
a) What will be your total income? 
b) What will be the total income of each of the other group members? 
 
Exercise 2 
You are a member of a 3-person-group in which each group member possesses an endowment of 20 
points. 
Imagine you allocate 20 points to the public account. Each of the other group members also assigns 
20 points to the public account.  
a) What will be your total income? 
b) What will be the total income of each of the other group members? 
 
Exercise 3 
You are a member of a 3-person-group in which each group member possesses an endowment of 20 
points. 
The other group members contribute in total 20 points to the public account. What will be your total 
income if 
a) you contribute – in addition to the 20 points – 0 points to the public account? 
b) you contribute – in addition to the 20 points – 8 points to the public account? 
c) you contribute – in addition to the 20 points – 16 points to the public account? 
 
Exercise 4 
Consider a 3-person-group in which each group member possesses an endowment of 20 points. 
Imagine you allocate 8 points to the public account. What will be your total income if 
a) the other two group members contribute together – in addition to your 8 points – further 6 
points to the public account? 
b) the other two group members contribute together – in addition to your 8 points – further 14 
points to the public account? 
c) the other two group members contribute together – in addition to your 8 points – further 22 
points to the public account? 
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Appendix A.1.4: Figures 
 
 
Figure A.1.1 - Beliefs in IND and TEAM for each cooperation type. 
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Appendix A.1.5: Post-experimental questionnaire in condition TEAM 
 
Set 1: Contributions by individuals and teams 
 
Q1. Imagine Part II was not played by teams but by individuals. Do you think that individuals 
or teams contribute more to the public account?  
Individuals contribute more Teams contribute more 
56.1% 43.9% 
 
 
Q2. Why do you think so? (Open question) 
Statement Argument 
Number of 
subjects who 
mention 
argument 
…teams think task better through, which 
leads to lower contributions 
6 
Cautious shift of 
teams because… …of the responsibility for other team 
members 
4 
Majority rule in teams forces high contributors to adjust to 
other team members 
8 
Stingy team members influence whole team 3 
Individuals 
contribute 
more  
There is social support in teams to contribute less  2 
There is a peer pressure within teams to make higher 
contributions 
8 
Majority rule in teams forces low contributors to adjust to 
other team members 
7 
Team members encourage each other to take more risky 
decisions (= higher contributions) 
4 
Teams 
contribute 
more  
Teams think tasks better through, which leads to higher 
contributions 
2 
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Set 2: Team atmosphere 
 
Q3. How satisfied have you been with the decisions of your team on the contributions in part 
II?  
Very unsatisfied Unsatisfied Neutral Satisfied Very satisfied 
25.0% 7.2% 13.3% 36.7% 17.8% 
 
Q4. Why? 
Satisfied/ 
Unsatisfied 
Argument 
Number of 
subjects who 
mention 
argument 
Team members had a similar strategy  18 
Team earned a high income 13 
Team quickly came to an agreement 12 
The decision-making process was democratic  7 
Teams contributions were close to own proposal 7 
Team behaved towards other teams in a fair way 2 
Satisfied  
There was a team spirit 2 
Team contributions were very different from own proposal 8 
Team earned a low income 3 
There was no team spirit 2 
Team acted towards other teams in an unfair way 1 
Unsatisfied  
One team member did not accept majority rule 1 
 
Q5. How was the atmosphere in your team?  
Very bad Bad 
Neither good 
nor bad 
Good Very good 
2.2% 1.1% 7.8% 41.7% 47.2% 
 
Q6. Image you had to play part II again. Would you wish to change into another team (which 
is determined randomly)?  
Yes No 
20.0% 80.0% 
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Set 3: Decision-making process within teams 
 
Q7. To what extend did you influence the team decisions in part II?  
Not at all Hardly To some extend Rather heavily Heavily 
1.7% 3.3% 24.4% 56.7% 14.0% 
 
Q8. Did your team take a vote on the contributions?  
No Partly Yes 
20.0% 43.9% 36.1% 
 
Q9. If your team did not take a vote, how did your team come to a unanimous decision?  
Decision-making process 
Number of subjects who 
mention this kind of process 
The team discussed arguments/ pros and cons 17 
The team took the average 7 
The proposals of team members were similar from the 
beginning on 
7 
The team chose at the beginning a long-term strategy  3 
One team member made a proposal and the others agreed 3 
The team took the median 1 
 
Q10. Did all members of your team have equal rights?  
No Yes 
6.7% 93.3% 
 
Q11. Was there a person in your team who decided for the whole team?  
No Yes 
92.8% 7.2% 
 
Q12. Given your experience in today’s experiment, would you prefer to take decisions rather 
on your own or within a team, if you could participate in a similar experiment again? 
On my own Within a team 
37.8% 62.2% 
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Set 4: Further comments 
 
 Q13. Please write down, if you have further comments concerning the experiment, your 
strategy, the reasons for your decisions or the difference between team and individual 
decisions.  
Comments 
on the… 
Comments 
Number of 
subjects who 
mention 
comment 
Taking decisions in teams was interesting 5 
Positive 
The chat communication was interesting 1 
The examples in instructions affect decisions 1 
The earnings in part II should be the average of 
all period incomes 
1 
The time for the chat (5 minutes) was too long 1 
Experiment 
Negative 
The experiment was too long 1 
The strategy of free-riding/ contributing little was efficient 3 
Strategy The strategy of free-riding is not efficient, as all other teams 
then also free-ride 
1 
Deciding within a team saves you from carelessness and 
extreme contributions 
2 
Effect of 
team 
decisions Deciding within a team leads to higher contributions and 
higher outcomes 
1 
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Chapter 2 
 
What doesn’t kill you makes you stronger.  
Cooperation and Efficiency in Public Goods Games under 
the Threat of Peer Punishment and Group Extinction 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Social dilemmas, like the private provision of a public good, are plagued by individual 
incentives to free ride, despite the existence of a socially optimal outcome that involves 
cooperation of agents. Over the last decades, in the li erature many institutions and 
mechanisms have been proposed that intend to sustain high levels of cooperation. One of the 
most successful mechanisms for achieving cooperation despite the free riding incentives, at 
least in laboratory studies, is peer punishment (Yamagashi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; Andreoni et al., 2003; Masclet et al., 2003; Anderson and Putterman, 
2006; Gürerk et al., 2006; Carpenter, 2007; Sefton et al., 2007; Nikiforakis et al., 2012). A 
costly punishment option for members of the public good provision unit does not require 
formal authority (hence, the alternative term informal punishment) and it increases 
contributions to the public good dramatically. However, it comes at a cost: Efficiency is often 
affected negatively because punishment is costly to bo h the punisher and the punished (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; 2002; Sefton et al., 2007; Egas and Riedl, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ertan et al., 2009)21. 
More recent laboratory experiments show that overall the availability of peer 
punishment can increase efficiency over a situation with purely voluntary contributions, i.e., 
without punishment, but it requires a long-term interaction in order to balance the cost of 
punishment with its benefits (Gürerk et al., 2006; Gächter et al., 2008), and it has to exclude 
the option to retaliate on punishment. Retaliation or a counter-punishment option leads to an 
extremely bad efficiency balance, even in long-term interactions (Denant-Boemont et al., 
2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2013). Compared to equilibrium 
predictions, regardless of whether they stipulate standard assumptions or invoke social 
                                                
21 Surveys are provided by Chaudhuri (2011) and Guala (2012). 
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preferences, peer punishment is overused and there is anti-social (or, misdirected) 
punishment of cooperators (Herrmann et al., 2008). One puzzling observation, however, is 
that field studies show a surprisingly low level of peer punishment in the real world 
(Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012; Balafoutas et al., 2014). 
In this paper, we study one promising observation for the low level of peer punishment 
observed in the field. We argue that – besides the fear of retaliation that plays a role and that 
we can control for – efficiency concerns could be much more important than conventionally 
believed. We implement a particular but realistic way to make efficiency concerns salient, 
drawing on evolutionary ideas. More specifically, exogenously composed provision units for 
public goods have to surpass a specific threshold of group earnings (from the consumption of 
the private good and of the public good subtracted by the sanctioning cost) every period in 
order not to get extinct. Such a setup can be motivated by evolutionary selection arguments. 
More often than not, groups dissolve or are dissolved in the real world (depending on 
performance), whereas in the laboratory studies it i assumed so far that the group always 
exists until the end of the game, regardless of howmuch money they actually burn. Results 
from our laboratory experiment based on this group extinction mechanism confirm our main 
hypothesis. More generally, the combination between th  availability of peer punishment and 
the fear of extinction mainly leads to higher levels of cooperation combined with lower levels 
of punishment. In essence, the combination makes sure that the threat of punishment is 
sufficient to enforce cooperation within a group, and the actual act of punishment is not 
necessary anymore. The psychological mechanism behind t e effect could be salience. 
Social dilemmas are an almost ubiquitous phenomenon in human interaction. There are 
several examples for social dilemmas in which peer punishment and fear of group extinction 
play a particularly important role: Work groups in companies or organizations often fight for 
survival as a group (i.e., they can easily be dissolved if unsuccessful). Thereby peer 
punishment is available and the effort provision for a joint project is costly and a social 
dilemma.22  Thus, the situation satisfies the conditions that are present in our study. Most 
importantly, the extinction threat can be adapted an  possibly fine-tuned by the organization 
itself. More generally, tribal groups or societies that have to reach a certain level of benefits 
from the interaction in order to survive face similar incentives as the ones that are present in 
our experiment. Naturally, when talking about real-world implications one has to take the 
limitations of experimental studies in terms of external validity into account, but they allow 
                                                
22 It almost goes without saying that peer punishment does not necessarily have to take the form of a monetary 
fine. Social disapproval, social exclusion, or similar forms of punishment are, however, almost always available 
(see also Rege and Telle, 2004; Cinyabuguma et al., 2005). 
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gathering controlled evidence for specific incentive effects that are hard to study when using 
real-world data. 
More specifically, our setup implements a repeated linear public goods game (the 
voluntary contribution mechanism) with punishment opp rtunities. It features four 
experimental treatments in a 2x2 factorial between-subjects design. Within the first 
dimension, we vary whether peer punishment is availble with or without a retaliation option 
(standard punishment, or often referred to in the following simply as punishment, versus 
counter-punishment). The second dimension that is varied is the existence of a survival 
threshold. If the survival threshold is present, groups have to reach a certain level of group 
income in order not to get extinct as a group. Labor tory sessions include four parts with five 
periods each. If a group is extinct in one part, group members are excluded from the public 
goods game – and therefore get an income of zero – in the following periods of that part. 
However, they restart the public goods game in the following part. Note that there are 
theoretical and behavioral links between the idea of survival threshold in each provision 
unit, a contest between provision units, and, more generally, competition among provision 
units (e.g., Tan and Bolle, 2007; Strasser, 2012). Our focus in the current paper is on the 
survival threshold, which is a new element in the design of a public goods experiment. Future 
studies will have to look at the links between the different mechanisms in greater detail. 
Our experiment allows addressing several questions regarding punishment and the 
negative effects of counter-punishment. Firstly, if efficiency concerns become more salient 
(in our case, through the survival threshold), the availability of counter-punishment is much 
less of a problem than when there is no survival thres old. Secondly, in our setup the total 
punishment cost and/or the total punishment impact are uncertain. If a punisher is pivotal in 
dragging the group below the survival threshold the punishment impact is very high. Hence, 
it is probably not (only) the fear of retaliation per se that leads to very low levels of peer 
punishment in the field. Given our results, the uncertainty involved in punishment plays an 
important role. The effects of uncertain punishment, uncertain outcomes of alternative 
cooperation decisions and imperfect monitoring of cntributions have been analyzed in 
public goods games (Grechenig et al., 2010; Sousa, 2010; Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Xiao 
and Kunreuther, 2012), but deserves more attention. 
In the remainder of this paper, we present an overview of the relevant literature (section 
2.2) and our experimental design as well as the theoretical predictions (section 2.3). Section 
2.4 provides the empirical results, and section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
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2.2 Related Literature 
The literature on punishment in the public goods game is vast. An authoritative 
overview is provided by Chaudhuri (2011). In the following overview of the relevant 
literature, we focus on efficiency aspects in public goods experiments. 
Whereas the cooperation-enhancing effect of altruistic, i.e. costly, punishment has been 
widely confirmed (e.g. Yamagashi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
Masclet et al., 2003; Page et al., 2005; Bochet et al., 2006; Sefton et al., 2007; Egas and 
Riedl, 2008; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Ertan et al., 2009; Fudenberg and Pathak, 
2010; Sutter et al., 2010; Nikiforakis et al., 2012), the empirical evidence on efficiency, i.e. 
earnings, is rather mixed. Most studies, however, find either no efficiency-enhancing effect 
of the punishment mechanism (e.g. Page et al., 2005; Bochet et al., 2006; Sutter et al., 2010) 
or an average efficiency loss (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Sefton et al., 2007; Egas 
and Riedl, 2008; Herrmann et al., 2008; Ertan et al., 2009).23 Nikiforakis and Normann 
(2008) find that at least a punishment effectiveness of 1:3 is necessary to achieve a welfare 
improvement compared to the VCM without punishment (see also Egas and Riedl, 2008). In 
the standard experiments on the punishment mechanism players typically interact for ten 
periods. The relative efficiency mostly increases over time in the treatment with a 
punishment option compared to a standard public goods game without punishment. Gächter 
et al. (2008) find for short interaction terms (ten periods) of groups a relative efficiency loss 
of the punishment mechanism. Only for the long interaction terms of 50 periods, the 
punishment mechanism leads to a relative efficiency gain. These results indicate that 
introducing a punishment mechanism often causes efficiency problems, unless the interaction 
horizon is very long. 
Nikiforakis (2008) confirms the efficiency problem in a more realistic setting, namely 
in a public goods game with two-sided punishment, i.e. when there is a costly retaliation or 
counter-punishment option. The counter-punishment opportunity reduces contributions and 
the willingness to punish compared to the treatment with a one-sided punishment option. The 
level of earnings is slightly, but not significantly, ower. Therefore we also examine the effect 
of the group extinction mechanism in case of a two-sided punishment option.24 Engelmann 
                                                
23 There are some experimental studies showing that peer unishment can have an efficiency-enhancing effect, 
especially in combination with some form of communication (e.g. Ostrom et al., 1992; Bochet and Putterman, 
2009; Masclet et al., 2013). However, in real life communication among group members might not always be 
feasible, especially in large groups.  
 
24  More studies explore the effect of two-sided punishment in a public goods game (e.g. Denant-Boemont et al., 
2007). They confirm the main results of Nikiforakis (2008). 
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and Nikiforakis (2013) extend the Gächter et al. (2008) design for long-term interactions by a 
treatment, in which all forms of punishment, i.e. fuds, are possible. They do not find any 
relative efficiency gain in this case.   
The focus on the effect of survival thresholds connects our work to the literature on the 
provision point mechanism or step-level public goods games (e.g. Isaac et al., 1989; Bagnoli 
and McKee, 1991; Suleiman and Rapoport, 1992; Marks nd Croson 1998; Cadsby and 
Maynes, 1999; Croson and Marks 2000; Rondeau et al., 2005; Spencer et al. 2009; Abele et 
al., 2010; Freytag et al., 2014; Fischbacher et al., 2011; Ye et al., 2013), but there are obvious 
differences. The provision point mechanism typically uses a step-level function that requires 
the group to reach a certain contribution threshold f r the public good to be provided. Our 
group extinction mechanism differs from the provision point mechanism in at least two 
respects: Firstly, the threshold in our experiment is based on earnings and not on 
contributions alone. More specifically, our threshold concerns both contributions and 
(counter-) punishment. Secondly, the group extinctio  mechanism implies no consequences 
in the current period if the threshold is not reached, but leads to group extinction in future 
periods. 
Our group extinction mechanism draws on evolutionary ideas. However, there is a clear 
difference to the term group selection used in evolutionary models to explain the evolutin of 
reciprocity or human morality (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Gintis et al., 2008; van den Bergh 
and Gowdy, 2009): The term group extinction means that a certain performance threshold 
needs to be reached by the group to ensure its further existence. We do not model the inter-
group competition, i.e., earnings do not depend on the behavior of other groups. This is also 
why there is no direct link between our study and several empirical studies on the effect of 
inter-group competition on cooperation (e.g. Tan and Bolle, 2007; Puurtinen and Mappes, 
2009; Burton-Chellew et al., 2010; Strasser, 2012).25 
 
 
2.3. Experimental Design, Procedures and Predictions 
2.3.1 Experimental Design 
Our experiment consists of four treatments, formed by a 2x2 factorial between-subjects 
design:  
(1) A public goods game with a one-sided punishment option (P):  
                                                
25 Cinyabuguma et al. (2005) allow group members in the public goods game to expel individual group 
members. Excluded group members potentially earn less in future periods. In contrast, in our experiment the 
whole group gets extinct and the extinction is determined by the group performance.  
Chapter 2 
 60 
A standard linear public goods game (PGG), also known as the voluntary contribution 
mechanism (VCM), followed by a single punishment stage;  
(2) A PGG with a one-sided punishment option and the possibility of group extinction 
(P_E):  
A PGG followed by a single punishment stage with the threat of group extinction;  
(3) A PGG with a two-sided punishment option (PCP):  
A PGG followed by a punishment stage and a counter-punishment stage; and  
(4) A PGG with a two-sided punishment option and the possibility of group extinction 
(PCP_E):  
A PGG followed by a punishment stage and a counter-punishment stage with the 
threat of group extinction. 
Each treatment – and therefore each session – consists of four parts which are identical within 
each treatment. Each part consists of five identical periods; hence, altogether 20 identical 
periods are implemented within each treatment. At the beginning of the first part we assign 
subjects randomly to 4-member-groups. We use a partner design within each part. If one part 
is finished, however, subjects are randomly reassigned to new groups at the beginning of the 
next part, and this is common knowledge. Hence we re-match groups between the parts. If 
applicable, group extinction takes place from the period on after the threshold is not met and 
it is valid throughout the remainder of the part. In the subsequent part, all participants are 
assigned to new groups and can participate in the game again. We implement several parts to 
allow for learning. 
Each period in each treatment consists of several stage . The first stage is always the 
contribution stage, in which the standard linear PGG is played (see Marwell and Ames, 1981; 
Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and Walker, 1988). Each group member receives an endowment of 
20 tokens in each period. Group members, then, decide s multaneously and without 
communication how much of their endowment to contribute to the public good, ci, where 0 ≤ 
ci ≤ 20, and how much to keep for themselves (the rest). In each period the payoff function 
for this stage is given by 
∑
=
+−=
4
1
*3.020
h
hii ccπ  (2.1), 
where the public good is equal to the sum of contribu ions of all group members. Payoffs 
during the experiment are calculated in Guilders. If a participant contributes one token to the 
public good, the private marginal return (MPCR) is 0.3 Guilders and the social marginal 
benefit is 1.2 Guilders. So the inequality MPCR < 1 < MPCR*4 holds and implies a social 
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dilemma: If we assume pure money-maximizing preferences, there is a dominant strategy for 
each group member to free ride, that is ch = 0 for all h. However, this leads to a socially 
inefficient outcome. Note that we deliberately chose the MPCR to be rather low compared to 
other public goods experiments in order to increase the relevance of the group extinction 
mechanism. 
At the end of the contribution stage subjects receive feedback on their own contribution, 
the group’s total contribution, their earnings from the public good and from their private 
account, and their entire earnings in the contribution stage. In the following we explain each 
of the treatments in detail. The treatments P and PCP are based on Fehr and Gächter (2000, 
2002) and Nikiforakis (2008) respectively. 
 
PGG with a one-sided punishment option (P) 
In treatment P a punishment stage is added after the contribution stage. At the beginning of 
the punishment stage subjects get information on the individual contributions of their group 
members and have the opportunity to punish any other member of their group simultaneously 
and without communication. If group member i wants to punish group member j, she has to 
assign punishment points to group member j, pij, i ≠ j, where 0 ≤ pij ≤ 10. Subjects cannot 
punish members of other groups. Punishment reduces the first stage income of both players i 
and j in different ways: For each punishment point that j receives, her first stage income, j,1π , 
is reduced by 3 Guilders, with a lower boundary at zero if player j’s cost of receiving 
punishment points is higher than her first stage income. The latter rule avoids that subjects 
receive a negative payoff without being able to control it. Subject i faces a cost of 1 Guilder 
for each allocated punishment point.26 The total cost of distributing punishment points are
shown at the bottom of the screen. Thus, the income f subject i at the end of the second 
stage, π2,i, is calculated according to equation (2.2): 
∑∑
≠≠
−






−=
ij
ij
ij
jiii pp )*3(,0max ,1,2 ππ  (2.2) 
Eq. (2.2) implies that the period payoff of a participant i can be negative, if subject i is 
punished heavily and punishes herself. Participants re explicitly warned of this possibility.27 
At the end of the second stage subjects receive feedback on their income from the first stage, 
                                                
26 We implement the linear cost function of Fehr and Gächter (2002) and later studies instead of the nonlinear 
cost function used in Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Nikiforakis (2008). The linear cost function is easier to 
understand for participants. 
27 Our data shows that this happened only in 0.6% of all possible cases. Losses in a single period can be 
balanced by a show-up fee of 4€ and gains from other periods. 
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the total punishment points received, the total cost of punishment points assigned, their 
period earnings as given by eq. (2.2), as well as the sum of incomes they earned so far within 
the current part. 
 
PGG with a one-sided punishment option and the possibility of group extinction (P_E) 
In treatment P_E we expand treatment P by a group extinction mechanism. In order to 
survive, i.e., in order to reach the next period, the sum of the period incomes within a group 
(after the punishment stage) has to reach or exceed 80 Guilders. Obviously, this is exactly 
equal to the sum of the endowments of the four group members. We set the threshold at 80 
Guilders in order to equalize the game-theoretic contribution predictions based on pure 
money-maximizing preferences among all four treatments (see section 2.3.3). At the end of 
the second stage subjects are additionally informed about the group’s period income. In case 
the threshold of 80 Guilders is reached or surpassed, th  group participates in the game in the 
next period. If not, the group does not participate in the PGG in the following periods within 
the current part, and all group members simply have to wait until the next part starts. In the 
periods in which the group does not participate the group members earn no further income. 
Group members participate in the next part again within a newly assembled group. 
 
PGG with a two-sided punishment option (PCP) 
In the treatment PCP a third stage, namely the counter-punishment stage, is added after the 
contribution and the punishment stage of treatment P. At the beginning of the counter-
punishment stage subjects are informed about the number of punishment points each of the 
other group members assigned to them in the second stage. Then each subject i has the 
opportunity to counter-punish those group members j ≠ i who punished them in the second 
stage by assigning counter-points. Analogous to the punishment stage, the cost of each 
counter-point received is 3 Guilders. The second stage income is reduced to zero and not 
further, if the cost of receiving counter-points is higher than the second stage income, π2,i.
The cost for each counter-point that i assigns to j, zij, is 1 Guilder. The period income of 
subject i in the treatment PCP is therefore given by equation (2.3): 
∑∑
≠≠
−






−=
ij
ij
ij
jiii zz )*3(,0max ,2,3 ππ  (2.3) 
In order to avoid very negative payoffs participants with a non-positive second stage 
income are not allowed in the third stage to counter-punish or to be counter-punished. Subject 
i can only counter-punish those group members j that punished her in the second stage, in 
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order to avoid that punishment in the second stage is delayed to counter-punishment in the 
third stage. At the end of each period subjects are informed about their income from the 
second stage, the total number of received counter-points, the total cost of distributed 
counter-points, the period income as given by Eq. (2.3), as well as the sum of period incomes, 
they earned so far within the current part.   
 
PGG with a two-sided punishment option and the possibility of group extinction (PCP_E) 
Treatment PCP_E is the expansion of treatment PCP by the group extinction mechanism. 
After the counter-punishment stage, group members additionally receive feedback on the 
group period income (after the punishment and counter-punishment stage). Group members 
whose group is extinct (according to the same general rule as in treatment P_E), cannot 
participate in the following periods of the current part and earn no additional money in these 
periods.   
 
In all four treatments subjects know the endowment, the return from the public good, 
the number of group members, the payoff functions, the cost for assigning and receiving 
points, the number of parts and periods, and (if applicable) the possibility of group extinction. 
To ensure thoughtful decisions, we do not impose a time limit. 
Subjects further know that they are given an identifica ion letter (A to D) at the 
beginning of each period in order to distinguish their actions from those of the other players 
within a period. However, as subjects should not be a l  to identify actions of another player 
over periods, the identification letters are reassigned in each period. In the two treatments 
P_E and PCP_E a post-experimental questionnaire follows after the four identical parts to 
investigate the effects of group extinction.28 An incentivized Ring-test or social value 
orientation questionnaire (Liebrand, 1984; Liebrand  McClintock, 1988) is added. Results 
of this test are not reported here. All treatments finish with a questionnaire on socio-
economic variables.  
The total income of a subject is equal to the sum of all period incomes and earnings 
from the Ring-test. Subjects are informed that they are given a show-up fee of 4€ to pay for 
any negative payoffs generated during the experiment. 
 
 
 
                                                
28 The post-experimental questionnaire on group extinctio  is given in appendix A.2.3. 
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2.3.2 Procedures 
We run 12 sessions at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of the University of 
Munich between December 2010 and March 2011. Each session lasted on average 1 hour 45 
minutes. Without telling the participants we divided the 24 subjects of each session into two 
matching groups of 12 participants, who are re-matched in groups of 4 at the beginning of a 
new part. So we have 6 independent observations per treatment (Table 2.1). The experiment 
was conducted anonymously. 
 
Table 2.1 - Treatments and number of sessions. 
Treatments Punishment option Group extinction Session  and subjects 
P One-sided No 3 sessions à 24 subjects 
P_E One-sided Yes 3 sessions à 24 subjects 
PCP Two-sided No 3 sessions à 24 subjects 
PCP_E Two-sided Yes 3 sessions à 24 subjects 
 
At the beginning of each session the experimenter read the neutrally-written 
instructions for the four identical parts aloud.29 Instructions for the Ring-test and the 
following questionnaires only followed after the first four parts were accomplished. 
Participants knew that there would be a test and questionnaire(s) after the four identical parts 
and that those would be unrelated to the first fouridentical parts. Instructions are written in 
neutral language. In order to test the understanding of the mechanics and the incentive 
structure participants were asked to answer control questions.30 We did not proceed until all 
participants had answered all questions correctly. We can thus safely assume that the 
participants understood the game. 
A total of 288 participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) from a list of 
voluntary participants. Subjects were German-speaking, mostly students, of different 
academic backgrounds. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the experiment 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At the end of the experiment we exchanged the payoffs 
at an exchange rate of 1Guilder = 0.04€, which yielded an average payoff of 21€.  
 
2.3.3 Predictions 
In this section we derive hypotheses for the differences between the treatments with and 
without group extinction. We start with the predictions under pure profit-maximizing 
preferences. Under this assumption neither punishment nor counter-punishment will occur in 
                                                
29 The instruction for the treatment PCP_E is given in appendix A.2.1. 
30 Control questions for treatment PCP_E are given in appendix A.2.2.  
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the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as they are costly for the punisher. By backwards 
induction in the sequential game individuals’ dominant strategy in the contribution stage of 
the treatments P and PCP is therefore a contribution of zero to the public good. In the 
treatments with the group extinction mechanism the PGG resembles a step-level PGG (see 
section 2.2). The difference is that if a group does not reach the threshold the group members 
do not earn an income from the next period on. In the step-level game all patterns of 
decisions that minimally satisfy the provision point are Nash equilibria (for a game-theoretic 
analysis see, e.g., Abele et al., 2010). Given that punishment and counter-punishment do not 
take place contributions of zero provided by all group members minimally satisfy the 
threshold of 80 Guilders. To summarize: Under profit-maximizing preferences contributions, 
punishment, and counter-punishment will be equal to zero and no differences between 
treatments with and without group extinction are prdicted.  
As we have mentioned in section 2.2 the empirical studies on the VCM with 
punishment show that punishment takes place and contributions are high, especially in 
comparison with the VCM without punishment. This empirical regularity can be better 
explained if we assume other-regarding preferences (for a survey see Fehr and Schmidt, 
2003), as e.g. inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999, see also Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000, for a similar approach). According to their theory an inequity averse person tries to 
avoid inequality of individual payoffs between herself and other persons in her reference 
group. Hence, the threat that group members who contribute less than others in the group are 
punished by the more cooperative group members in order to equalize earnings is credible. 
Using efficiency as refinement argument Fehr and Schmidt (1999) predict very high 
contributions in treatment P, especially in comparison to the VCM without punishment. As 
further outlined in section 2.2, Nikiforakis (2008) shows for the PGG with two-sided 
punishment (treatment PCP) that counter-punishment takes place and, compared to treatment 
P, reduces punishment and contributions. Nikiforakis (2008) suggests that counter-
punishment takes place for strategic considerations over periods and for a desire to revenge 
punishment. The reduced punishment and cooperation in PCP compared to P can be 
explained by increased cost of punishment. 
Our research interest lies in the comparison between th  treatments with and without 
group extinction. Charness and Rabin (2002) present a model in which they mainly include 
social welfare concerns and reciprocity. Based on recip ocity their model also allows for 
punishment. The social welfare concerns lead people to sacrifice own material payoff in 
order to increase the payoffs for all recipients, i.e. to increase efficiency. In line with the 
Chapter 2 
 66 
theories on social preferences one can reason as follows: With our group extinction 
mechanism we make the social welfare concern more sali nt. Counter-punishment and 
punishment strictly decrease efficiency. Hence, they are probably reduced in the treatments 
with group extinction compared to the ones without the mechanism. On the other hand, 
contributions strictly increase the efficiency and therefore the chance to meet the threshold. 
Furthermore high contributions counter-balance the risk of efficiency- reducing punishment. 
Hence, we predict contributions to be higher in thereatments with the group extinction 
mechanism than in the treatments without. In other wo ds: Because of the threat of group 
extinction the cost of (counter-) punishment and low contributions increase, as they increase 
the risk of not reaching the threshold. The decreased demand for punishment and counter-
punishment in the treatments with group extinction as well as the increased contributions 
imply higher payoffs than in the treatments without group extinction.31 
We summarize our main hypotheses: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The introduction of the group extinction mechanism will increase 
contributions. Hence contributions will be higher in P_E and PCP_E than in P and PCP, 
respectively. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: The introduction of a group extinction possibility will decrease 
punishment, i.e., ceteris paribus, punishment will be ower in P_E and PCP_E compared to P 
and PCP, respectively. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3: The group extinction mechanism will decrease counter-punishment in 
PCP_E compared to PCP. 
 
 
2.4 Results 
We start the results section with the analysis of the cases of group extinction in 
treatments P_E and PCP_E (section 2.4.1). Then the effects of the group extinction 
mechanism on contributions, punishment, counter-punishment and efficiency follow (section 
2.4.2). In section 2.4.3 we give an overview of potential motives behind the behavior in 
treatments P_E and PCP_E. 
                                                
31 Apart from these economic considerations, the threat of group extinction might also have a psychological 
effect: The common aim of reaching the threshold might increase the team spirit and therefore increase 
cooperation and reduce punishment (e.g. Aubé and Rousseau, 2005; Senécal et al., 2008). 
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2.4.1 Group Extinction 
As we use in the following the matching group of 12 subjects as the unit of statistically 
independent observations and calculate probabilities of participation within these units, we 
apply non-parametric tests for continuous and not discrete variables.  
Figure 2.1 shows the number of participating groups – groups that are not extinct – over 
parts and periods within parts. We find a learning effect over the parts: Whereas only 4 and 
11 out of 18 groups participate in P_E and PCP_E in the last period of part 1, 10 and 17 
groups still participate in the last period of part 4 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 
0.030 for P_E; p = 0.053 for PCP_E; p = 0.004 for both P_E and PCP_E). This shows that 
over time participants adapt their behavior more and more to the threshold. It is especially 
striking that for both treatments P_E and PCP_E in part 1 many more groups are extinct than 
in the following parts: The participation rate is only 26.4% for P_E and 61.1% for PCP_E in 
periods 2 to 5 of part 1. In contrast, in parts 2 to 4 in P_E on average 66.2% and in PCP_E 
83.8% participate in periods 2 to 5 (two-sided Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.028 for P_E; 
p = 0.293 for PCP_E; p = 0.011 for both P_E and PCP_E). This result indicates learning to 
coordinate across phases at the beginning of the exp riment. 
 
Figure 2.1 - Number of participating groups in the treatments with group extinction 
mechanism over time. 
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It is further noteworthy that if groups get extinct within a part, they usually get extinct 
already after the first period of this part: The participation rate decreases between period 1 
and period 2 of each part on average by 37.5 and 19.4 percentage points in P_E and PCP_E, 
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respectively. In contrast, between periods 2 and 5 of each part, the participation rate only 
decreases by 20.0 and 5.2 percentage points, respectively.  
Over periods 2 to 5 of all parts, we find a participat on rate of 56.3% in treatment P_E 
and 78.1% in treatment PCP_E. Hence, more groups participate in PCP_E than in P_E (two-
sided Mann-Whitney U-test, p = 0.025), which is quite surprising. One could have expected a 
higher participation rate in P_E than in PCP_E, as the additional counter-punishment stage in 
PCP_E offers a further possibility to decrease the group income. Furthermore Nikiforakis 
(2008) shows that the income is slightly worse in his treatment PCP compared to treatment 
P. However, participants in PCP_E seem to anticipate the increased risk of going extinct and 
therefore seem to increase their contributions and decrease their punishment compared to 
P_E in order to ensure to reach the threshold (for details see section 2.4.2).  
Table 2.2 outlines the results of a probit regressions of participation for the treatments 
P_E and PCP_E. As regressors we introduce the following variables: A dummy variable for 
the two-sided punishment option, taking value 1 in case of treatment PCP_E and 0 in case of 
P_E; And a control variable for the four parts and the five periods within each part, 
respectively; The variable Previous Extinction takes the value 1 if a person has been extinct 
in one of the previous parts and 0 otherwise. The results of the probit regressions confirm the 
results of the non-parametric tests: There is a learning effect over parts, as the fraction of 
participating groups increases with each part by about 10 to 12%. Of course, over the periods 
within each part the participation rate decreases. However, the insignificance of the variable 
Previous Extinction indicates that the experience of being extinct in a previous part does not 
have an extra effect on participation in later parts. We further find that more groups are 
extinct in treatment P_E than in PCP_E. 
 
RESULT 2.1: In treatments P_E and PCP_E there is a substantial number of groups that 
are extinct. The participation rate is 56.3% in treatment P_E and 78.1% in treatment PCP_E 
in periods 2 to 5 of each part. However, we observe a significant decrease in the number of 
extinct group over the course of the experiment. 
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Table 2.2 - Determinants of participation in treatments P_E and PCP_E. 
 
 
Notes: This table reports probit marginal effects of participation in treatments P_E and PCP_E in periods 2 to 5 
of each part. Robust standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.   
 
2.4.2 Contributions, Punishment, Counter-punishment and Earnings 
Next we analyze the effect of the group extinction mechanism on contributions, 
punishment, counter-punishment and earnings. Obviously, we cannot apply a conventional 
regression analysis, as we would not be able to differentiate between selection effects and 
incentive effects of the extinction mechanism. Instead we use a three-step analysis for each 
dependent variable: Firstly we analyze the effects of the group extinction mechanism only for 
the first period of each part, as in the first period no extinction has taken place, and we thus 
can use data from all groups. In order to analyze the effect of the group extinction mechanism 
over all periods we secondly calculate the Heckman two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979; see 
also Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), which takes the sel ction bias into account. The Heckman 
two-step procedure is a generalization of the tobit model and comprises two equations, the 
participation equation and the outcome equation. It assumes that the error terms of both 
equations are correlated. In the first step the liklihood of participation (of not being extinct) 
is estimated, in the second step the effects on the level of contributions, punishment, counter-
punishment or earnings are estimated for those subjects who participate – corrected for the 
selection bias. We use an OLS regression for the selection equation and for the outcome 
equation.32 We include the inverse of Mill’s ratio in the outcome equation to control for the 
potential selection bias and bootstrap the standard errors. Thirdly, in addition to the Heckman 
two-step procedure we run a robustness check with the data of all periods, by dropping in 
                                                
32 Usually the first step of the Heckman selection model is calculated with a probit regression. As in the 
treatments without group extinction the prediction f r the likelihood of participation was 100%, we calculate an 
OLS regression instead.  
Dep. Var.: Participation Participation 
Two-sided punishment 
0.234*** 
(0.063) 
0.255*** 
(0.079) 
Part 
0.123*** 
(0.034) 
0.102** 
(0.040) 
Period 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
-0.032*** 
(0.008) 
Previous Extinction  
0.084 
(0.074) 
N 2304 2304 
Wald χ2 88.79*** 106.05*** 
Pseudo log likelihood -1296.475 -1291.187 
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each period the same number of groups in treatments P and PCP as are actually going extinct 
in treatments P_E and PCP_E, respectively. In order to make the data in the treatments with 
and without group extinction mechanism comparable, w  drop the observations with the 
lowest group earnings in treatments P and PCP. 
For all three steps we conduct several parametric tests: We calculate OLS and tobit 
regressions as well as random effects panel regressions to control for panel effects. The 
different regression models yield similar results. In the following we report the results of 
OLS regressions, as they are based on minimal assumptions. 
 
Contributions 
Figure 2.2 presents mean contributions, mean number of punishment points and 
counter-points distributed and average earnings by treatment in the first period of each part. It 
shows that average contributions seem to be slightly higher in P_E than in P in the first 
period of each part (13.7 versus 12.4 tokens). However the difference is not significant (p = 
0.262)33. In contrast, contributions in PCP_E are significantly higher than in PCP (14.3 
versus 11.0 tokens, p = 0.056) even in period 1 of each part, which supports our hypothesis 1.  
 
Figure 2.2 - Mean contributions, punishment, counter-punishment and earnings in the first 
period of each part. 
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Note: (Counter-) punishment refers to the average sum of punishment points (counter-points) that subjects 
distribute to their group members. Earnings refer to the income after (counter-) punishment. 
 
                                                
33 In the following we present the results of two-sided Mann-Whitney U-tests, using the unit of 12 subjects as 
independent observation. Reported p-values are based on this test unless otherwise noted. 
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If we pool over the two extinction and the two no-extinction treatments, we find a clear effect 
of the group extinction mechanism on contributions (11.7 versus 14.0 tokens, p = 0.030). 
Furthermore, in line with Nikiforakis (2008), contributions in P seem to be higher than in 
PCP (12.4 versus 11.0 tokens), however the difference is not significant here (p = 0.336).  
 
Table 2.3 - Determinants of contributions in period 1 of each part. 
Dep. Var.: Contributions (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Observations from: P and P_E 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
Group extinction 
1.392 
(1.094) 
3.316* 
(1.696) 
2.354** 
(1.007) 
1.392 
(1.070) 
Two-sided punishment   
-0.434 
(1.007) 
-1.385 
(1.414) 
Group extinction ×  
Two-sided punishment 
   
1.924 
(1.974) 
Part 
1.060*** 
(0.220) 
0.184 
(0.338) 
0.622*** 
(0.217) 
0.622*** 
(0.217) 
Constant 
9.703*** 
(0.846) 
10.509*** 
(0.773) 
10.318*** 
(0.782) 
10.799*** 
(0.921) 
N 576 576 576 576 
R2 0.054 0.068 0.050 0.056 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions f contributions in period 1 of each part. Standard 
errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 2.3 outlines the results of OLS regressions of contributions in period 1 of each 
part. As regressors we include the following furthe variables: A dummy variable for the 
group extinction mechanism, taking value 1 in case of treatment P_E or PCP_E and 0 
otherwise; A dummy variable for two-sided punishment which takes value 0 in case of 
treatments P or P_E and value 1 in case of PCP or PCP_E; And a variable for the interaction 
effect of the group extinction possibility and the two-sided punishment option. The results of 
the regressions confirm the results of the non-parametric tests: The group extinction 
mechanism leads to by 3.3 points higher contributions in PCP_E compared to PCP in period 
1 of each part. For the comparison between P_E and P the effect goes in the anticipated 
direction, but is not significant.  
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Figure 2.3 - Mean contributions over time. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
C
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 (
to
ke
ns
)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Periods
P P_E
PCP PCP_E
Contributions
 
 
Note: Observations of extinct group members are not included. 
 
Figure 2.3 shows the dynamics of contributions over time for all treatments. If a group 
is extinct in a certain period, the observation is ot included in the average. Contributions in 
the treatments with group extinction mechanism show a reversed U-form within each part: In 
early periods contributions increase, in the last period of each part contributions decrease 
sharply. Contributions might increase at the beginning of each part, as those groups with low 
contributions get extinct rather at the beginning of each part. The strong “end-part effect” is 
presumably based on the fact that there is no threat of extinction in the last period of each 
part and that there are no reputational concerns (as groups are re-shuffled after each part). We 
further find a typical restart effect at the beginning of each part in treatments P_E and 
PCP_E: Contributions are higher in the first period of one part than in the last period of the 
previous part. In line with Nikiforakis (2008) figure 2.3 further shows that contributions 
increase in treatment P over the periods of each part, whereas in PCP contributions decrease 
and show a typical restart effect at the beginning of each part.  
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Contri-
butions 
8.225 
(8.610) 
-3.724* 
(1.997) 
-0.326 
(4.869) 
-0.729 
(0.954) 
0.640 
(0.952) 
-54.159 
(59.093) 
29.233* 
(16.547) 
5004 
0.082 
23.40***  
(IV)  
All treatments 
Partici-
pation 
-0.350*** 
(0.034) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
 
1.007*** 
(0.030) 
5760 
0.235 
 
Contri-
butions 
19.635* 
(11.738) 
-7.767* 
(4.005) 
 
-2.691 
(1.848) 
2.391 
(1.707) 
-162.400 
(105.449) 
62.173** 
(31.630) 
5004 
0.067 
12.72** 
(III)  
All treatments 
Partici-
pation 
-0.262*** 
(0.031) 
0.088** 
(0.031) 
 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
 
0.963*** 
(0.029) 
5760 
0.218 
 
Contri-
butions 
1.433 
(13.363) 
 
 
0.291 
(2.631) 
-0.948 
(1.771) 
39.998 
(174.197) 
0.578 
(51.102) 
2628 
0.106 
25.32*** 
(II)  
PCP and PCP_E 
Partici-
pation 
-0.175*** 
(0.038) 
 
 
0.042 
(0.024) 
-0.026** 
(0.010) 
 
0.973*** 
(0.040) 
2880 
0.140 
 
Contri-
butions 
13.414* 
(6.983) 
 
 
-0.823 
(0.856) 
2.111** 
(1.021) 
-89.953* 
(48.036) 
35.421*** 
(12.853) 
2376 
0.039 
14.19*** 
(I) 
P and P_E 
Partici-
pation 
-0.350*** 
(0.035) 
 
 
0.049** 
(0.020) 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
 
1.040*** 
(0.044) 
2880 
0.274 
 
 
Observations from: 
Dep. Var.: 
Group extinction 
Two-sided punishment 
Group extinction × 
Two-sided punishment 
Part 
Period 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio 
Constant 
N 
R2 
Wald χ2 
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Table 2.4 - Determinants of contributions (Heckman two-step selection model). 
Notes: This table outlines the results of the Heckman two-step selection model of contributions. The model consists of an OLS 
regression of participation and of contributions. Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported 
in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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extinction mechanism increases contributions, in particular if one-sided punishment is 
available. In line with Nikiforakis (2008) contributions are higher in P than in PCP.  
Figure 2.4 displays the mean contributions, mean distributed punishment points, 
counter-points and earnings in the balanced data set (excluding observations with low group 
income in P and in PCP), which we create for the robustness check. We find in the balanced 
data set that subjects contribute 14.8 tokens in treatment P and 14.2 tokens in P_E (p = 
0.631). In treatment PCP_E they make by 3.8 tokens higher contributions than in PCP, 
however the difference is not significant when we us  non-parametric tests (p = 0.150; 12.3 
versus 14.2 tokens over all treatments, p = 0.419). We analyze these data with OLS 
regressions (table 2.5). The effect of the group extinction mechanism is close to significant in 
case of a two-sided punishment option. However, we do not find a significant positive effect 
in case of a one-sided punishment option. This could be due to the fact that the contributions 
are already quite high in treatment P. Comparing the results on contributions in the different 
analyses, we can state the following result:  
 
RESULT 2.2: The group extinction mechanism increases contributions – at least in the first 
period of each part. 
 
Figure 2.4 - Mean contributions, punishment, counter-punishment and earnings in a balanced 
data set. 
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Notes: Observations of extinct group members are not included. (Counter-) punishment refers to the average 
sum of punishment points (counter-points) that subjects distribute to their group members. Earnings refer to the 
income after (counter-) punishment. 
 
Chapter 2 
 75 
Table 2.5 - Determinants of contributions in a balanced data set. 
Dep. Var.: Contributions (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Observations from: P and P_E 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
Group extinction 
-0.608 
(1.657) 
3.814♦ 
(2.136) 
1.865 
(1.458) 
-0.607 
(1.621) 
Two-sided punishment   
-2.133 
(1.426) 
-4.344** 
(1.898) 
Group extinction ×  
Two-sided punishment 
   
-4.422● 
(2.651) 
Part 
0.594* 
(0.308) 
-0.425 
(0.363) 
0.002 
(0.260) 
0.002 
(0.258) 
Period 
0.330 
(0.229) 
-0.508*** 
(0.128) 
-0.130 
(0.150) 
-0.130 
(0.148) 
Constant 
12.285*** 
(1.351) 
12.965*** 
(1.532) 
13.863*** 
(1.328) 
15.100*** 
(1.420) 
N 1872 2376 4248 4248 
R2 0.023 0.094 0.049 0.078 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions of contributions in a balanced data set. Standard errors 
(clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, ♦ and ● denote 10.2% and 10.9% respectively. 
 
Punishment 
We proceed with the analysis of punishment in the same way. Figure 2.2 reveals the 
average sum of punishment points that subjects distribute to their three group members in 
period 1 of each part. The number of distributed punishment points seems to be lower in 
treatment P_E compared to P (0.8 versus 1.2 punishment points). However the diff rence is 
not significant (p = 0.200). For the treatments with two-sided punishment the group 
extinction mechanism has a significant effect in the first period of each part (p = 0.025): 
Subjects in PCP distribute on average 0.8 punishment points, subjects in PCP_E distribute 
0.4 punishment points. Including period 1 data from all four treatments, we find a clear 
negative effect of the group extinction mechanism on punishment (1.0 versus 0.6 punishment 
points, p = 0.030). These findings strongly support ou  hypothesis 2.  
Table 2.6 outlines the results of OLS regressions of distributed punishment points. We 
add two additional control variables (see also Nikiforakis, 2008): Own_Neg_Diffj = max{0, ci 
– cj} – where ci denotes the contribution of subject i and cj denotes the contribution of group 
member j in a given period – as we assume that i punishes j more severely, the higher the 
difference between i’s and j’s contribution (justified punishment); Group_Neg_Diffj = 
max{0, (Σh≠j ch / (n – 1)) − cj}, as we assume that i punishes j more severely, the more j 
deviates from the group norm (pro-social punishment). Both assumptions are confirmed by 
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the results in table 2.6. Controlling for these two variables, we find a clear negative effect of 
the group extinction mechanism on punishment in the first period of each part. Subjects 
distribute by 0.14 punishment points less in case of a group extinction option. The effect on 
punishment exists in case of one-sided as well as in case of two-sided punishment 
possibilities. 
 
Table 2.6 - Determinants of punishment and counter-punishment in period 1 of each part. 
Dep. Var.: Punishment 
Counter-
punishment 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) 
Observations from: 
P and P_E PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
Group extinction 
-0.162* 
(0.089) 
-0.135** 
(0.057) 
-0.142** 
(0.051) 
-0.155* 
(0.085) 
-0.295 
(0.207) 
Two-sided punishment   
-0.142** 
(0.051) 
-0.155** 
(0.072) 
 
Group extinction × 
Two-sided punishment 
   
0.026 
(0.102) 
 
Part 
-0.023 
(0.029) 
-0.040* 
(0.021) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
0.072 
(0.094) 
Own_Neg_Diffj 
0.060*** 
(0.018) 
0.026* 
(0.013) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.011) 
 
Group_Neg_Diffj 
0.027* 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.015) 
0.026** 
(0.009) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
 
pij     
0.067 
0.060 
Own_Pos_Diffj     
0.005 
(0.028) 
Group_Pos_Diffj     
-0.018 
(0.044) 
Constant 
0.226* 
(0.109) 
0.230** 
(0.090) 
0.296*** 
(0.072) 
0.302*** 
(0.079) 
0.301 
(0.264) 
N 1728 1728 3456 3456 151 
R2 0.169 0.080 0.128 0.128 0.040 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions of punishment points distributed by subject i to j and of 
counter-points distributed by subject j to i in period 1 of each part. For the regression of counter-punishment we 
include only cases, in which counter-punishment is po sible. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 
12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the dynamics of punishment over time. It illustrates the average sum 
of punishment points that subjects distribute to their three group members over the periods of 
each part. If groups are extinct in a certain period the observation is again not included. In the 
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treatments with group extinction punishment follows a U-form over periods within parts: 
Punishment drops at the beginning of a part – which might be at least partly due to the 
extinction of groups with severe punishment – and then shows a strong end-part-effect if 
group extinction is no threat anymore. In accordance with the contributions we find a restart 
effect for punishment in treatments P_E and PCP_E: Punishment is lower in the first period 
of each part than in the last period of the previous part.  
 
Figure 2.5 - Average sum of distributed punishment points over time. 
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Notes: This figure outlines the average sum of punishment points that subjects distribute to their group 
members over time. Observations of extinct group members are not included.  
 
In the next step we present the results of the Heckman two-step procedure for 
punishment (table 2.7). Punishment incentives seem to be not significantly affected by the 
extinction mechanism. 
We also run a robustness check for punishment with the balanced data set. Figure 2.4 
shows that in the balanced data set on average 0.5 points are distributed per subject in 
treatment P as well as P_E (p = 1.000). For two-sided punishment on average 0.4 punishment 
points in treatment PCP versus 0.2 punishment points in treatment PCP_E are distributed (p 
= 0.109; 0.462 versus 0.347 punishment points over all treatments, p = 0.273). Table 2.8 
displays the results of OLS regressions of distribued punishment points in the balanced data 
set, which mainly confirm the results of the period 1 analysis: In the balanced data set group  
C
ha
pt
er
 2
 
 
78
 
   
Wald χ2 
R2 
N 
Constant 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio 
Group_Neg_Diffj 
Own_Neg_Diffj 
Period 
Part 
Group extinction × 
Two-sided punishment 
Two-sided punishment 
Group extinction 
Dep. Var.: 
 
 
 
0.274 
8640 
1.040*** 
(0.043) 
 
 
 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.049** 
(0.020) 
 
 
-0.350*** 
(0.035) 
Partici-
pation 
140.59*** 
0.202 
7128 
-0.903 
(0.978) 
3.891 
(3.498) 
0.034** 
(0.015) 
0.069*** 
(0.021) 
-0.087 
(0.074) 
0.066 
(0.073) 
 
 
-0.765 
(0.514) 
Punish-
ment 
P and P_E 
(I) 
 
0.140 
8640 
0.973*** 
(0.040) 
 
 
 
-0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.042 
(0.024) 
 
 
-0.175*** 
(0.038) 
Partici-
pation 
80.60*** 
0.154 
7884 
0.853 
(2.457) 
-2.738 
(8.160) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.037*** 
(0.009) 
0.045 
(0.085) 
-0.058 
(0.138) 
 
 
0.064 
(0.567) 
Punish-
ment 
PCP and PCP_E 
(II) 
 
0.218 
17280 
0.962*** 
(0.029) 
 
 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.045*** 
(0.015) 
 
0.088*** 
(0.031) 
-0.265*** 
(0.031) 
Partici-
pation 
112.35*** 
0.175 
15012 
0.380 
(1.118) 
-0.799 
(3.605) 
0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.052*** 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.057) 
-0.027 
(0.069) 
 
-0.113 
(0.145) 
-0.067 
(0.381) 
Punish-
ment 
All treatments 
(III) 
 
0.235 
17280 
1.007*** 
(0.030) 
 
 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.045*** 
(0.015) 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.034) 
Partici-
pation 
138.97 
0.175 
15012 
-0.661 
(0.986) 
2.844 
(3.403) 
0.041*** 
(0.010) 
0.052*** 
(0.010) 
-0.037 
(0.055) 
0.038 
(0.064) 
0.281 
(0.064) 
-0.111* 
(0.061) 
-0.600 
(0.509) 
Punish-
ment 
All treatments 
(IV) 
   
Table 2.7 - Determinants of punishment (Heckman two-step selection model). 
Notes: This table outlines the results of the Heckman two-step selection models of punishment points distribu ed by subject i to j. The model consists 
of OLS regressions of participation and of punishment. Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
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Table 2.8 - Determinants of punishment and counter-punishment in a balanced data set. 
Dep. Var.: Punishment 
Counter-
punishment 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (I) 
Observations from: P and P_E 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
Group extinction 
-0.087* 
(0.046) 
-0.054 
(0.033) 
-0.063** 
(0.028) 
-0.077* 
(0.045) 
-0.200 
(0.118) 
Two-sided punishment   
-0.067** 
(0.028) 
-0.079** 
(0.037) 
 
Group extinction × 
Two-sided punishment 
   
0.024 
(0.054) 
 
Part 
-0.015 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.009) 
0.067 
(0.066) 
Period 
-0.023 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
-0.026 
(0.040) 
Own_Neg_Diffj 
0.055*** 
(0.015) 
0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.008) 
0.039*** 
(0.008) 
 
Group_Neg_Diffj 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
 
pij     
0.090 
(0.058) 
Own_Pos_Diffj     
0.024 
(0.044) 
Group_Pos_Diffj     
-0.038 
(0.053) 
Constant 
0.170** 
(0.064) 
0.018 
(0.053) 
0.123** 
0.129** 
(0.050) 
0.284 
(0.190) 
N 5616 7128 12744 12744 352 
R2 0.183 0.129 0.152 0.152 0.036 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions of punishment points distributed by subject i to j and of 
counter-points distributed by subject j to i in a balanced data set. For the regression of counter-punishment we 
include only cases, in which counter-punishment is po sible. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 
12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
extinction decreases punishment, in particular in case of one-sided punishment possibilities. 
In line with hypothesis 2 we can summarize the following result for punishment: 
 
RESULT 2.3: The group extinction mechanism leads to less severe punishment – at least in 
the first period of each part. 
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Counter-punishment 
Figure 2.2 shows the average sum of counter-points that participants distribute to their 
group members in the first period of each part. In the following we include only those cases, 
in which counter-punishment is possible, i.e. when the period income of the punishing and 
punished subject at the beginning of the third stage is positive and when the punished person 
punished the punisher in the second stage. There ar significantly more cases in treatment 
PCP than in PCP_E, in which counter-punishment is possible in the first period of each part 
(101 versus 50 cases, p = 0.010), due to more frequent punishment in PCP than in PCP_E. 
Subjects distribute on average 0.8 counter-points in reatment PCP and 0.3 counter-points in 
PCP_E in the first period of each part (p = 0.121). This result goes in the direction of 
hypothesis 3.  
Table 2.6 outlines the results of OLS regressions of distributed counter-points in period 
1 of each part. We add the following control variables following Nikiforakis (2008): pij, the 
number of punishment points that subject i distributes in the second stage to group member j; 
Own_Pos_Diffj = max{0, cj − ci}, the positive difference in contributions between subject j 
and subject i; and Group_Pos_Diffj = max{0, cj − (Σh≠j ch / (n − 1))}, the positive  
 
Figure 2.6 - Average sum of distributed counter-points over time. 
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Notes: This figure outlines the average sum of counter-points that subjects distribute to their group members 
whenever possible over time. Observations of extinct group members are not included. In period 3 of part 3, no 
possible case of counter-punishment exists. 
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deviation of subject j’s contribution from the group norm. We include thelast two variables 
to control for unjustified and anti-social punishment. Table 2.6 indicates that the effect of the 
group extinction mechanism on counter-punishment goes in the direction of our hypothesis, 
but is not significant in the first period of each part.  
Figure 2.6 illustrates the mean number of distributed counter-points per subject over 
time. Note that if a group is extinct in a certain period the observation is not included in the 
average. As we further include only those cases, in which counter-punishment is possible, the 
number of participants on which the period averages are based varies heavily between 
periods. Hence it is difficult to find particular regularities in the dynamics.  
Table 2.9 shows the results of the Heckman two-step procedure for counter-
punishment. The effect of the group extinction mechanism goes again in the direction of our 
hypothesis, but is not significant. 
 
Table 2.9 - Determinants of counter-punishment (Heckman two-step election model). 
Dep. Var.: Participation Counter-punishment 
Group extinction 
-0.819*** 
(0.023) 
-3.299 
(2.227) 
Part 
0.039* 
(0.021) 
0.219** 
(0.111) 
Period 
-0.047** 
(0.017) 
-0.116 
(0.130) 
pij  
0.095 
(0.067) 
Own_Pos_Diffj  
0.063 
(0.055) 
Group_Pos_Diffj  
0.005 
(0.044) 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio  
7.373 
(5.721) 
Constant 
1.041*** 
(0.063) 
-1.831 
(1.537) 
N 1238 482 
R2 0.673 0.060 
Wald χ2  16.89** 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of the Heckman two-step selection model of counter-points distributed by 
subject j to i. The model consists of an OLS regression of participation and of counter-punishment. We include 
only cases in which counter-punishment is possible. Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered on matching groups 
of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, *  denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% leve 
respectively.  
 
Chapter 2 
 82 
Figure 2.4 shows the average sum of counter-points distributed by subjects to their 
group members in the balanced data set. Subjects dis ribute by 0.4 counter-points less in 
treatment PCP_E compared to treatment PCP in the balanced data set (0.3 versus 0.7 
counter-points, p = 0.065). However, if we control for several variables as outlined in table 
2.8 the effect of the group extinction mechanism is not significant anymore.  
 
RESULT 2.4: We find a slight effect of the group extinction mechanism on the counter-
punishment level; however it is not significant. 
 
Earnings 
Figure 2.2 reveals higher earnings after (counter-) punishment in the treatments with 
than in the treatments without the group extinction mechanism in period 1 of each part: In 
treatment P_E subjects earn by 2.0 Guilders more than in treatmen  P (19.7 versus 17.7 
tokens, p = 0.078), in PCP_E they earn on average 3.1 Guilders more than in PCP (21.3 
versus 18.2, p = 0.010). If we include period 1 data from all four treatments, the group 
extinction mechanism has a very significant effect on earnings (20.5 versus 17.9 Guilders; p 
= 0.002). These findings strongly support our main hypothesis, i.e. the group extinction 
mechanism increases efficiency.  
 
Table 2.10 - Determinants of profits in period 1 of each part. 
Dep. Var.: Profits (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Observations from: P and P_E 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
Group extinction 
1.981* 
(0.942) 
3.058*** 
(0.872) 
2.518*** 
(0.637) 
1.981** 
(0.921) 
Two-sided punishment   
1.068 
(0.637) 
0.529 
(1.014) 
Group extinction ×  
Two-sided punishment 
   
1.077 
(1.255) 
Part 
0.899** 
(0.308) 
0.787** 
(0.253) 
0.843*** 
(0.195) 
0.843*** 
(0.195) 
Constant 
15.426*** 
(1.145) 
16.235*** 
(1.128) 
15.297*** 
(0.834) 
15.566*** 
(0.893) 
N 576 576 576 576 
R2 0.053 0.072 0.068 0.070 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions of final profits after (counter-) punishment in period 1 
of each part. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, **, 
*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Chapter 2 
 83 
The regression results in table 2.10 confirm the non-parametric results. Table 2.10 
further reveals that earnings increase over parts, which is in line with the learning effect that 
we reported in section 2.4.1. Similar to the contributions, average earnings in the treatments 
with the group extinction possibility show a reversed U-form within each part (groups that 
are extinct are not included in the averages, see figure 2.7). 
 
Figure 2.7 - Mean earnings over time. 
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Notes: This figure illustrates the earnings after (counter-) punishment over time. Observations of extinct group 
members are not included.  
 
According to the results of the Heckman two-step procedure (Table 2.11) the group 
extinction mechanism increases profits, in particular in the case of the one-sided punishment 
options.  
Figure 2.4 shows no differences between treatment P and P_E for the earnings in the 
balanced data set (20.9 Guilders in both treatments, p = 0.873). However, we find that 
subjects make higher profits in treatment PCP_E compared to PCP in the balanced data set 
(21.8 versus 20.0 Guilders, p = 0.016). If we include the data of all four treatments, we can 
also confirm that the group extinction mechanism has a significant effect on earnings (20.4 
versus 21.4 Guilders, p = 0.050). Specifications (I) to (IV) in table 2.12 show that the group 
extinction mechanism increases earnings by about 1 Guilder in the balanced data set. The 
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Wald χ2 
R2 
N 
Constant 
Inverse of Mill’s ratio 
Period 
Part 
Group extinction × 
Two-sided punishment 
Two-sided punishment 
Group extinction 
 
Observations from: 
 
 
0.274 
2880 
1.040*** 
(0.044) 
 
-0.054*** 
(0.017) 
0.049** 
(0.020) 
 
 
-0.350*** 
(0.034) 
Partici-
pation 
64.78*** 
0.053 
2376 
43.981*** 
(13.417) 
-100.489** 
(48.1222) 
2.547** 
(1.015) 
-1.311 
(0.993) 
 
 
16.198** 
(6.915) 
Earnings 
P and P_E 
(I) 
 
0.140 
2880 
0.973*** 
(0.040) 
 
-0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.042 
(0.024) 
 
 
-0.175*** 
(0.038) 
Partici-
pation 
21.43 
0.074 
2628 
8.671 
(28.771) 
31.167 
(95.816) 
-0.358 
(1.025) 
0.844 
(1.629) 
 
 
0.945 
(6.583) 
Earnings 
PCP and PCP_E 
(II)  
 
0.218 
5760 
0.963*** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.088** 
(0.031) 
-0.263*** 
(0.031) 
Partici-
pation 
44.02*** 
0.058 
5004 
47.402*** 
(16.326) 
-99.099* 
(53.284) 
1.724** 
(0.857) 
-1.301 
(1.000) 
 
-3.416 
(2.149) 
12.898** 
(5.719) 
Earnings 
All treatments 
(III)  
 
0.235 
5760 
1.007*** 
(0.030) 
 
-0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.045*** 
(0.016) 
0.175*** 
(0.050) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.350*** 
(0.034) 
Partici-
pation 
45.07*** 
0.061 
5004 
39.819*** 
(14.829) 
-77.491 
(51.110) 
1.369* 
(0.814) 
-0.905 
(0.951) 
-4.380 
(3.935) 
-0.627 
(1.007) 
12.831* 
(7.294) 
Earnings 
All treatments 
(IV)  
 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of the Heckman two-step selection model of earnings after (counter-) punishment. The model consists of OLS 
regressions of participation and of earnings. Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
Table 2.11 - Determinants of earnings (Heckman two-step selection model). 
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Table 2.12 - Determinants of profits in a balanced data set. 
Dep. Var.: Profits (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
Observations from: P and P_E 
PCP and 
PCP_E 
All 
treatments 
All 
treatments 
Group extinction 
-0.001 
(0.430) 
1.781*** 
(0.489) 
0.996** 
(0.373) 
-0.001 
(0.423) 
Two-sided punishment   
-0.012 
(0.390) 
-0.903 
(0.527) 
Group extinction ×  
Two-sided punishment 
   
1.783** 
(0.638) 
Part 
0.543** 
(0.184) 
0.035 
(0.142) 
0.248* 
(0.123) 
0.248* 
(0.121) 
Period 
0.621** 
(0.251) 
0.205 
(0.154) 
0.393** 
(0.144) 
0.393** 
(0.143) 
Constant 
17.770*** 
(0.840) 
19.369*** 
(0.725) 
18.673*** 
(0.569) 
19.172*** 
(0.618) 
N 1872 2376 4248 4248 
R2 0.052 0.035 0.027 0.035 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of OLS regressions f final profits after (counter-) punishment in a 
balanced data set. Standard errors (clustered on matching groups of 12 subjects) are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
2.4.3 Results of the Questionnaire on Group Extinction  
With the post-experimental questionnaire in the treatments P_E and PCP_E we 
examine the driving motivational forces behind the behavior in the treatments with group 
extinction. The detailed questions and results are presented in appendix A.2.3.  
Subjects generally state that group extinction has an effect on their decisions (see 
statement 4). Subjects in the treatments with group extinction declare that group extinction 
induces them to contribute more and punish less (statements 2 and 3). This shows again that 
higher contributions and less punishment in the treatm nts with group extinction are based on 
a real behavioral change.  
Subjects in the treatments with group extinction declar  to make rather high 
contributions in order to reach the threshold and not to run the risk of being punished for low 
contributions, which would have increased the likelihood of extinction (see question 1 and 
statements 2 and 8). This is in line with our reasoning in section 2.3.3 and in particular 
hypothesis 1. 
In line with our hypotheses 2 and 3 subjects agree that the threshold induces them to 
punish and counter-punish less (see question 1 and st tement 3). The results of statements 5 
to 7 show that punishment and counter-punishment take place also in the treatments with 
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group extinction for emotional reasons like revenge for low contributions or revenge for high 
punishment, and for strategic reasons. 
 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In our study we examine experimentally whether a survival threshold, often naturally 
applied in practice, has an effect on the efficiency i  the context of a public goods game with 
(counter-) punishment. In particular we hypothesize that the group extinction mechanism 
increases contributions, decreases punishment and counter-punishment and therefore 
increases efficiency.  
 
Table 2.13 - The effects of group extinction on contributions, (counter-) punishment, and 
earnings. 
   Treatments P 
versus P_E 
Treatment 
PCP versus 
PCP_E 
Treatments P and 
PCP versus P_E 
and PCP_E 
First 
period  +    +*     +** 
Selection 
model 
  +*  
(+) 
+  
(–) 
  +*  
(+) 
Contributions 
All periods 
Balanced 
data 
–  
(–) 
  +♦  
  (+*) 
+  
(+) 
First 
period 
   –*     –**   –* 
Selection 
model 
–  
(–) 
+  
(+) 
–  
(+) 
Punishment 
All periods 
Balanced 
data 
  –*  
   (–**) 
–  
    (–**) 
    –**  
     (–***) 
First 
period 
  –  
Selection 
model 
 
–  
(+) 
 
Counter-
punishment 
All periods 
Balanced 
data 
 
– 
  (–*) 
 
First 
period 
   +*       +***       +*** 
Selection 
model 
    +**  
(+) 
+  
(–) 
    +**  
(+) 
Earnings 
All periods 
Balanced 
data 
–  
(+) 
      +***  
      (+***) 
    +**  
      (+***) 
 
Notes: This table summarizes our results on the effect of the group extinction mechanism on contributions, 
punishment, counter-punishment, and earnings in case of one-sided and two-sided punishment separately nd all 
together. The results are presented for the first period of each part and over all periods – measured with the two-
step selection model as well as with an OLS regression with a balanced data set. +, (–) denotes a positive 
(negative) effect of group extinction. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively, ♦ 
denotes p = 10.2%. In parentheses we list the results for periods 1 to 4 in each part, i.e. as long as the threat of 
extinction really exists. 
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We find that group extinction takes place and that groups learn to adapt their behavior 
to the survival threshold over time. Table 2.13 summarizes our results on the effects of the 
group extinction mechanism and shows that we can largely confirm our hypotheses. We 
apply several different statistical methods, and they all point in the same direction (even if 
not every analysis is significant on conventional levels). First of all, we can clearly confirm 
our main hypothesis: The group extinction mechanism increases efficiency. Our main result 
is a consequence of both a positive effect of the possibility of group extinction on 
contributions and a negative effect of the group extinction mechanism on punishment. The 
effect on counter-punishment goes in the direction of our hypothesis. However it is not 
significant – which might be due to the low number of cases in which counter-punishment 
can take place. 
We might even under-estimate the effects of extinctio , as groups learn to adapt to the 
group extinction mechanism over time. In recent papers punishment options are extended to 
the possibility of feuds (Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; 
Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2013). The effect of group extinction might even be enhanced in 
such a setting. We leave this question for further research. As our idea of a survival threshold 
theoretically and behaviorally links to the idea of c mpetition among groups (e.g., Tan and 
Bolle, 2007; Strasser, 2012) we further recommend examining these links in greater detail. 
Our results may provide a further explanation – among thers – why in field studies in 
contrast to laboratory studies low levels of peer punishment have been observed (e.g. 
Balafoutas and Nikiforakis, 2012). Often in the field – e.g. in working teams, tribal groups or 
societies – efficiency concerns naturally exist and therefore may lead to a decrease in 
punishment. Furthermore our results imply that the t r at of group extinction can also be 
applied, adapted or made salient in the field in order to increase contributions and decrease 
peer punishment, e.g. in working groups. A field exp riment taking up this idea would be an 
interesting extension of our results. 
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2.6 Appendix A.2 
Appendix A.2.1: Instructions for treatment PCP_E (translated from German) 
 
Welcome to the experiment! Thank you very much for participating! 
From now on, please refrain from talking with the other participants! 
 
 
General information 
 
The purpose of this experiment is the study of decision behavior. You can earn money during this 
experiment which you will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment. 
During the experiment you and the other participants will take decisions. Your own decisions as well 
as those of the other participants will affect your payment according to the rules explained in the 
following. 
The duration of the experiment is 120 minutes. If you should have any questions, please raise your 
hand. One of the experimenters will come to you and nswer your question in private. 
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment 
your earnings in Guilders will be converted into Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
 
1 Guilder = 0.04 Euro (25 Guilders = 1 Euro) 
 
For your punctual arrival you receive 100 Guilders (4 Euros). These can be used to pay for eventual 
losses during the experiment. However you can always prevent losses by deciding accordingly. At 
the end of the experiment you will be paid your total earnings from the experiment as well as the 4 
Euros in private and in cash. 
While you take your decisions a clock will count down at the upper right corner of the computer 
screen. This countdown serves as an orientation for how much time you should need to take the 
decision. However there is no strict time limit. You can take more time in order to make your 
decision, especially in the beginning this will be the case. Only the purely informational screens 
without any decisions to be taken will close after the countdown. 
 
Anonymity  
Your input over the course of the experiment is anonymous. You will at no time receive personal 
information about the other participants. We will not link your name to data from the experiment. At 
the end of the experiment you will sign a confirmation which says that you have received the 
payment. This confirmation only serves accounting purposes for our sponsor. Our sponsor will not 
receive any data from the experiment either. 
 
Utilities  
For this experiment you are given a pen. We kindly ask you to leave the pen at your place after the 
experiment. 
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of five parts and two questionnaires. You receive specific instructions for 
each segment of the experiment. We start with the ident cal parts I to IV. Then the first questionnaire 
follows. You will receive the instructions for part V and the second questionnaire after completion of 
the first questionnaire. 
Your total earnings in this experiment consist of the sum of the earnings from parts I to V. Parts I to 
IV and part V are independent of one another, i.e. decisions in parts I to IV have no influence on the 
earnings in part V. 
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Part I to IV and first questionnaire 
 
We will conduct four identical parts. The following paragraphs describe the rules of one f those 
four parts. 
 
Every part consists of five periods. You are a member of a 4-member-group, i.e. you are in one 
group together with three other members who will be chosen randomly from the other participants. 
The group consists of the same four members in all five periods. 
 
Every period consists of three stages. In the first stage you decide how many points youwant to 
contribute to a project. In the second stage you will be informed about the contributions of the other 
three group members. You can then decide, whether and by how much you want to reduce the 
earnings of the other group members by allocating points to the other group members. In the third 
stage you are informed about how many points you have received from the other group members. 
You can then decide whether and by how much you want to reduce the earnings of those group 
members who allocated points to you in the second stage by allocating counter-points. You should 
keep in mind however, that the total earnings of your group shouldn’t fall below a certain threshold. 
Now we will describe the rules in detail. Directly afterwards we ask you to complete some sample 
exercises on the screen that help to make you comfortable with the decisions you have to take. 
 
First stage 
 
Your decision 
You are a member of a 4-member-group. Every member of the group receives 20 points at the 
beginning of the stage and has to decide how to allocate these 20 points. The 20 points can either be 
kept for oneself or contributed fully or in parts to a project . Every point that is not contributed to 
the project is automatically kept for oneself. At the beginning of every period the following screen 
appears: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You decide how many points you want to contribute to the project by typing an integer between 0 and 
20 (whereby 0 and 20 are also possible) into the input box. This number is your contribution to the 
project. After clicking the “OK” button you cannot change your decision. 
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Remaining Time:     1 
Period 1 – First stage 
 
 
Your Endowment:  20 
 
Your contribution to the project:  
OK 
HELP 
Please enter an integer between 0 and 20. As soon as you have 
taken your decision, please click „OK“.  
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Your income in the first stage 
Once all members of your group have taken their decision, the following screen shows you your 
contribution to the project and, in the second line, th  total amount of contributed points of all four 
group members, i.e. including your contribution. Furthermore the last lines show you your earnings in 
Guilders in the first stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Your earnings consist of two parts: 
a) Earnings from the points you kept for yourself ( = 20 – points contributed to the project): 
For each point you kept for yourself you earn exactly one Guilder. No one else will receive 
any earnings from the points you kept for yourself. Conversely you will not receive any 
earnings from the points the other group members kept for themselves. Your earnings from 
the points you kept for yourself are shown on the scr en in the third line. 
b) Earnings from the project ( = 0.3 * sum of all group members’ contributions): All group 
members receive earnings from your contribution to the project. Conversely you also receive 
earnings from the other group members’ contributions to the project. For every point 
contributed to the project you and the other group members receive 0.3 Guilders. Your 
earnings from the project, which are equal to those of the other group members, are shown on 
the screen in the forth line. 
 
In the first stage of every period your earnings result from the sum of both components: 
Your earnings (in Guilders) in the first stage  =  
 
 (20 – „your contribution to the project”) + 0.3*”s um of all group members’ contributions” 
 
            Earnings from points you kept          Earnings from the project 
 
The earnings from the project are calculated in exactly the same way for each group member, i.e. 
every group member receives the same earnings from the project. For example, assume that the sum 
of all contributions amounts to 60 points. You and the other three group members will receive 0.3 * 
60 = 18 Guilders each from the project. If the total contributions amount to 9 points, every group 
member receives 9 * 0.3 = 2.7 Guilders from the project. 
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Remaining Time:     1 
Period 1 – First stage 
 
Your contribution to the project:  
 
Sum of contributions to the project in your group  
(your contribution included): 
 
Your income from the points you kept for yourself:  
 
Your income from the project: 
 
Your income in the first stage: 
 Continue 
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For every point you keep for yourself you receive exactly one Guilder. Assume instead of having 
kept the point for yourself you had contributed this point to the project. Your earnings from the 
project would rise by 0.3 Guilders. At the same time the earnings of every other group member would 
also rise by 0.3 Guilders. The total earnings of the group would increase by 1.2 Guilders. Your 
contribution to the project also increases the earnings of other group members. Conversely your 
earnings also increase if the other group members contribute more to the project. Every point that a 
group member contributes to the project increases your earnings by 0.3 Guilders independent of 
whether you contributed it to the project or another group member. For example if you contribute 5 
points to the project the earnings of every group member increase by 0.3 * 5 = 1.5 Guilders. If another 
group member contributes, for example, 10 points your earnings as well as all other group members’ 
earnings increase by 0.3 * 10 = 3 Guilders independent from your contribution or the contributions of 
the other group members. 
 
Your earnings from the points you kept for yourself automatically result from the difference 
between your initial 20 points and your contribution to the project. For example, if you contribute 
8 points to the project you receive 20 - 8 = 12 Guilders from the points you kept for yourself. If you 
contribute 13 points to the project your earnings from the points you kept for yourself amount to 20 - 
13 = 7 Guilders. 
 
Second stage 
Your decision 
In the second stage you are shown the contributions of every member in your group. In this stage you 
can reduce the earnings of each group member or leave them unchanged by allocating points. 
The other group members can reduce your earnings in the same way.  
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Remaining Time:      1 
Period 1 – Second stage 
 
                       You     Group member A  Group member B  Group member C 
 
Endowment           20       20                    20                          20 
 
Contributions 
to the project 
 
Contributions in %  
of the endowment 
 
Your decision in 
the second stage 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Your overall cost of distributing points amount to: 
OK 
HELP 
Please indicate on the three scales, how many points you want to distribute to your 
three group members. As soon as you have taken your decisions, please click „OK“. 
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On this screen you are shown the other group members’ contributions to the project in the first stage 
(third line on the previous screen). Your contribution is shown in the left column, the contributions of 
the other group members are shown in the other columns. In addition the contributions are shown as a 
percentage of the initial endowment of 20 points. 
 
For identification purposes each group member randomly receives a unique ID at the beginning of 
each period. This ID remains the same over the whole period such that you can distinguish the group 
members’ individual actions. Hence group member B in stage two of a certain period is exactly the 
same person as group member B in stage three. However this ID changes between periods, i.e. group 
member B from period one might receive the ID C or D in period two. This change of member IDs 
ensures that individual decisions cannot be linked over several periods. In the first line on this screen 
you are shown the IDs of the three other group members for this period. 
 
Then you decide for each group member, whether and how many points you want to allocate to this 
group member. In the fifth row you select on a scale the number of points you want to allocate to each 
individual group member. You can allocate any number of integer points in the range between 0 and 
10 (including 0 and 10). The three scales refer to your three group members and belong to the group 
member, whose contribution is outlined in the third line, respectively. If you do not want to reduce the 
earnings of a group member, you have to click on 0 points. 
 
Cost of your decision 
Allocating points is costly, these costs depend on the amount of points you all cate. Each point you 
allocate costs you one Guilder, e.g. if you allocate two points to some group memb r this costs you 
two Guilders. Allocating another 4 points to some other group member costs you additional 4 
Guilders. Allocating another point to the third group member costs you another Guilder such that the 
total allocation of 7 points costs you 7 Guilders. Your total costs are shown directly below the three 
scales in row six. Be aware that you cannot change your decision once you’ve clicked the OK button. 
 
Earnings of each group member 
If you allocate 0 points to a group member, her earnings remain unchanged. If you allocate one point 
(by clicking “1” on the scale) her earnings are reduced by 3 Guilders. If you allocate two points (by 
clicking “2” on the scale) her earnings are reduced by 6 Guilders. Every point you allocate to a group 
member reduces her earnings by 3 Guilders. Likewise each point that was allocated to you by another 
group member reduces your earnings by 3 Guilders. 
 
Costs due to received points (in Guilders)  =  3 * sum of received points 
 
Hence the sum of received points determine by how much earnings are reduced. For example if a 
group member receives a total of 3 points from the ot r group members her earnings are reduced by 
3 * 3 = 9 Guilders. If she receives a total of 4 points her income is reduced by 12 Guilders. 
 
The only exception to this rule is that if the costs due to received points are higher than the first stage 
income of the group member her earnings are only reduc d to 0 points and not further. The group 
member must however bear the costs of the points that s e herself allocated to the other group 
members. 
 
Earnings at the end of the second stage are calculated as follows: 
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Earnings (in Guilders) at the end of the second stage =  
Earnings from stage 1 – 3 * (sum of points received) – sum of points allocated 
if the cost of receiving points < earnings from stage 1 
 
OR 
 
= 0 – sum of points allocated 
if the cost of receiving points ≥ earnings from stage 1 
 
For example, imagine your earnings at the end of stage 1 amount to 20 Guilders, you further receive a 
total of 3 points from the other group members and llocate one point to another group member in 
stage 2, then your earnings at the end of stage 2 amount to 20 – 3 * 3 – 1 = 10 Guilders. If your 
earnings at the end of stage 1 amount to 12 Guilders, and you receive a total of 5 points and allocate 
two points in stage 2, then your earnings at the end of stage 2 amount to 0 – 2 = -2 Guilders. 
 
The latter example shows that your earnings at the end of stage 2 can become negative if the cost due 
to allocated points are higher than the (reduced) earnings from stage 1. You can prevent losses with 
certainty by not allocating any points yourself. Possible losses are covered by the 100 Guilders that 
you received at the beginning of the experiment for arriving punctually. 
 
After all participants have taken their decisions your earnings at the end of stage 2 are shown on the 
following screen: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Third Stage 
 
At the beginning of the third stage you are shown the amount of points you received from each of the 
other group members in stage 2: 
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Remaining Time:     1 
Period 1 – Second stage 
 
Your income from the first stage: 
 
You received the following number of points in the second stage: 
 
Your cost of distributing points: 
 
Your income at the end of the second stage:  
Continue 
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Then you have the option to allocate counter-points to the group members from whom you have 
received points in the second stage. You can only allocate counter-points to group members from 
whom you have received points in the second stage and whose earnings after stage 2 are positive. 
Further you can only allocate counter-points if your earnings after stage 2 are positive. If all three 
conditions are met, the scales appear on screen. 
 
The costs due to counter-points are identical to those from allocating and receiving points in stage 2. 
Earnings at the end of stage 3 are calculated as follows: 
 
Earnings (in Guilders) at the end of the third stage =  
Earnings from stage 2 – 3 * (sum of counter-points received) – sum of counter-points allocated 
if the costs of receiving counter-points < earnings from stage 2 
 
OR 
 
= 0 – sum of counter-points allocated 
if the costs of receiving counter-points ≥ earnings from stage 2 
 
Analogously to stage 2: Imagine your earnings from stage 2 amount to 20 Guilders and you receive a 
total of 3 counter-points from the other group membrs and allocate one counter-point to another 
group member in stage 3, then your earnings at the end of stage 3 amount to 20 – 3 * 3 – 1 = 10 
Guilders. If your earnings from stage two amount to 12 Guilders, and you receive a total of 5 counter-
points and allocate two counter-points in stage 3, then your earnings at the end of stage 3 amount to 0 
– 2 = -2 Guilders. 
 
 
 
page 7 of 10 
Period 1 – Third stage 
 
Your group members Group member A    Group member B    Group member C 
 
The number of points  
you received in the  
second stage 
 
 
Your decision in  
the third stage 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Your overall cost of distributing counter-points amount to:  
OK 
HELP 
Please indicate how many counter-points you would like to distribute to each of the 
other group members. You can only distribute counter-points to those group 
members, from whom you received points in the second stage and whose income is 
positive at the end of the second stage.   
As soon as you have taken your decisions, please click „OK“. 
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After completion of stage 3 you are informed of theotal amount of received counter-points and your 
earnings in this period: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As your earnings in this period can become negative, possible losses are covered by the 100 Guilders 
that you received at the beginning of this experiment. Your total earnings in this part result from the 
sum of earnings from all five periods. 
 
Additional rule 
 
Please be aware of the following additional rule: If your group’s total earnings in a period are 
below 80 Guilders after completion of stage 3, your group will not be playing in the part’s 
subsequent periods. Thus if in one period the sum of individual earnings in your group is below 80 
Guilders your group is excluded from the subsequent p riods of the part. You receive the earnings 
from that period but you will not receive any earnings in the part’s subsequent periods i.e. each 
group member’s earnings in these periods will amount to 0. The following screen shows you 
whether your group’s total earnings were above or below 80 Guilders in the current period. In the case 
below the total earnings surpassed 80 Guilders. 
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Period 1 
 
The overall income of all four members in your group (you included) 
amounts in this period to: 
 
 
Hence, the group’s income amounts to at least 80 Guilders. Therefore 
you are allowed to participate in the following period.   
Remaining time:     1 
Period 1 – Third stage 
 
 
Your income from the second stage: 
 
You reveived the following number of  
counter-points in the third stage: 
 
Your cost from distributing counter-points:  
 
Hence, your period income amounts to: 
 
Your income so far in part I (the income of this period included): 
Continue 
Continue 
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The procedure of the parts II, III and IV will be exactly as in part I. Each part consists of five periods 
with three stages. In the first stage you decide how many of your 20 points of endowment to 
contribute to a project and how many you want to keep for yourself. In stage 2 you can reduce the 
earnings of the other group members by allocating points. In the third stage you can reduce the 
earnings of those group members from whom you receiv d points in the second stage. As in part I you 
have to keep in mind that your group will be excluded from the part’s subsequent periods if your 
group’s earnings fall below the threshold of 80 Guilders. 
 
The group composition within a part is constant, i.e. during one part you interact with the same 
three other group members. Between parts however the group composition will be changed at 
random, i.e. in part II you will interact with other group members than in part I, and in part III you 
will again interact with other group members. Between the different parts the experimenter announces 
that a new part begins. 
 
If your group was excluded in a part because the total earnings in a period were below 80 Guilders, 
you will still be assigned to a new randomly chosen 4-member-group in the next part. The additional 
rule thus only applies within a part . 
 
Your total earnings after part IV amount to the sum of the earnings from part I to IV. The earnings in 
each individual part as well as your total earnings are shown to you after completion of part IV. 
 
Afterwards you have to fill in a short questionnaire. The experimenter announces the beginning of 
the questionnaire. 
 
 
Control questions 
 
Before starting the experiment we ask you to complete the sample exercises on the screen. If you need 
to do any calculations, you can click on the calculator symbol in the lower part of the screen, which 
will open the Windows calculator. If you have any questions please raise your hand, one of the 
experimenters will then come to your place and answer your questions privately. 
 
 
 
Part V and second questionnaire 
(Instructions for part V and the second questionnaire re only distributed after the 
accomplishment of parts I to IV and the first questionnaire) 
 
In part V all participants will be randomly assigned to one partner. Nobody is informed about the 
identity of her partner. In part V you have to answer 24 questions: you can choose one of two options 
A or B. Every option results in a positive or negative payoff for you and your partner. Your partner 
answers exactly the same questions. Your payoff in part V depends on your decision and the decision 
of your partner. 
 
An example: 
 Option A Option B 
Your Payoff 10.00 7.00 
Partner’s Payoff -5.00 4.00 
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• If you choose option A you receive 10 Guilders and your partner’s payoff is reduced by 5 
Guilders. If your partner also chooses option A, then your payoff is reduced by 5 Guilders and 
your partner’s payoff is increased by 10 Guilders such that you both receive 5 Guilders (10 
from your own choice and -5 from your partner’s choi e). 
• If you choose option B and your partner chooses option A, then you earn a total of 2 Guilders 
(7 from your own choice and -5 from your partner’s choice). Your partner then earns 14 
Guilders (10 Guilders + 4 Guilders). 
 
If you take your decisions 24 values for “your payoff” from option A or option B are summed up. If 
your partner takes her decisions 24 values for “partner’s payoff” from option A or option B are 
summed up. The sum of these two sums determines your earnings in Guilders, which are converted 
into Euro according to the exchange rate: 
 
1 Guilder = 0.10 Euro (10 Guilders = 1 Euro) 
 
You are not given any information about the individual decision of your partner. You are only 
informed about the sum of values from your partner’s decisions and your resulting payoff in Guilders. 
 
After part V we ask you to fill in another short questionnaire. The experimenter informs you once 
the questionnaire starts. 
 
Total payoff 
As soon as all participants have filled in the second questionnaire the experiment is finished and you 
are paid your earnings in cash individually and privately. These earnings result from: 
Your earnings from the identical parts I to IV 
+  Your earnings from part V 
+ The rest of the 4 Euros for arriving punctually 
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Appendix A.2.2: Control questions for treatment PCP_E (translated from 
German) 
 
Please answer the following exercises.  
These exercises serve to make you familiar with the calculation of the incomes in the experiment. 
They are not part of the actual experiment! 
 
If you have questions concerning the exercises or do not come the right solution, please raise your 
hand. The experimenter will help you with answering the questions.  
 
Exercise 1 
You are a member of a 4-person group, in which each group member owns an endowment of 20 
points.  
Imagine no group member (you included) makes a contribution to the project in the first stage.  
a) What will be your income in the first stage? 
b) What will be the income of each of the other group members in the first stage? 
 
Exercise 2 
You are a member of a 4-person-group, in which each group member owns an endowment of 20 
points. 
Imagine you invest 20 points to the project. Each of the other group members also invests 20 points in 
the project.  
a) What will be your income in the first stage? 
b) What will be the income of each of the other group members in the first stage? 
 
Exercise 3 
You are a member of a 4-person-group, in which each group member owns an endowment of 20 
points. 
The other group members contribute together 30 points to the project. What will be your income at 
the end of the first stage, if 
a) you contribute – additionally to the 30 points – 0 points to the project? 
b) you contribute – additionally to the 30 points – 10 points to the project? 
c) you contribute – additionally to the 30 points – 20 points to the project? 
 
Exercise 4 
Consider a 4-person-group, in which each group member owns an endowment of 20 points. 
Imagine you invest 8 points to the project. What will be your income at the end of the first stage, if 
a) the other three group members contribute together – additionally to your 8 points - further 12 
points to the project? 
b) the other three group members contribute together – additionally to your 8 points – further 22 
points to the project? 
c) the other three group members contribute together – additionally to your 8 points – further 32 
points to the project? 
 
Exercise 5 
Imagine you distribute in the second stage the following points to the other group members: 9, 5, 0.  
What are your total costs of distributing points? 
 
Exercise 6  
Imagine you distribute in the second stage zero points to the other three group members.  
What are your total costs of distributing points? 
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Exercise 7 
Imagine you have earned 25 Guilders in the first stage. Furthermore imagine you distribute zero 
points to the other group members in the second stage. What will be your income at the end of the 
second stage,  
a) if you receive from the other three group members in the second stage 0 points? 
b) if you receive  from the other three group members in the second stage 4 points? 
c) if you receive  from the other three group members in the second stage 15 points? 
 
Exercise 8 
Imagine you distribute in the third stage the following counter-points to the other group members: 2, 
0, 1.  
What are your total costs of distributing counter-points in the third stage? 
 
Exercise 9 
How many Guilders must your group earn altogether, so that your group can participate in the 
following periods? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 100 
Appendix A.2.3: Post-experimental questionnaire in treatments P_E and 
PCP_E (supplements of PCP_E are underlined) 
Numbers in square brackets indicate over both treatm nts P_E and PCP_E the average 
agreement with the statements on a 5-point Likert scale from “-2 (completely disagree)” to 
“2 (completely agree)” respectively.  
 
1) Which strategic reflections determined your decision  in this experiment? Which factors do you 
think were important? 
 
2) The threshold of 80 Guilders group income induced me to make a higher contribution  to the 
project than I would have done without the threshold. [0.4] 
3) The threshold of 80 Guilders group income induced me to distribute less points and counter-
points in the second and third stage to other group members than I would have don without the 
threshold. [0.5] 
4) The threshold of 80 Guilders had no effects on my decisions. [-1.2] 
5) I distributed many points in the second stage to other group members who contributed little to 
the project hoping that our group falls below the 80 Guilders group income and that these group 
members suffer a preferably high loss. [1.7] 
6) I distributed many counter-points in the third stage to other group members hoping that our 
group falls below the 80 Guilders group income and that group members who distributed points 
to me in the second stage, suffer a preferably highloss. [1.9] 
7) I distributed many points in the second stage to other group members who contributed little to 
the project in order to make sure that the 80 Guilders will be reached by my group also in later 
periods within the part. [1.2] 
8) I made high contributions to the project so that in the second stage no points are distributed and 
our group does not fall below the 80 Guilders. [0.7] 
9) I made low contributions to the project, as I assumed that the other group members would not 
distribute any points in the second stage (so that our group does not fall below the 80 Guilders).  
[-0.8] 
Strategy Reason for strategy 
Number of 
nominations 
…to maximize the group income  43 
…in order not to be punished in the second stage  4 High contributions 
…to induce others to make also high contributions in the 
next periods 
5 
…because one expects not to be punished 1 
…to maximize one’s own profit 18 Low contributions 
…because other group members also made low 
contributions in previous period 
6 
…because of small contributions of others (although 
group might fall below the threshold)  
10 
Heavy punishment 
…to induce others to make higher contributions in the
next periods 
5 
…to reach the threshold 33 
Weak punishment 
…because of costs of distributing points 9 
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Chapter 3 
 
Norm Enforcement in the Lab and in the Field.  
A Within-Subjects Comparison 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The enforcement of social norms is crucial for their existence in the long run. Social 
norms are customary behavioral rules that govern human interactions (Bicchieri, 2006; 
Young, 2008). They often enhance efficiency by reducing externalities or transaction costs. 
The enforcement of social norms in real life frequently happens by peer punishment, 
although it may bear some cost for the punishing party:34 For instance, the exclusion of team 
members by their colleagues for little work morale, the complaints of pedestrians towards a 
person littering in a public place or the insults of queuers in a waiting line to a queue-jumper. 
Numerous laboratory experiments in behavioral economics (starting with Yamagashi, 1986; 
Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2000) show that norm enforcement by peer 
punishment is one of the most successful mechanisms to enhance cooperation in social 
dilemmas.   
Laboratory experiments have for a long time been the fundament of behavioral 
economics and they undoubtedly have several advantages in comparison to standard 
empirical methods: They allow a high degree of control, including a controlled variation of 
certain independent variables, a randomized assignment of subjects to treatments and a 
context-free elicitation of preferences. Hence, labor tory experiments usually possess a high 
internal validity by allowing causally attributing differences in behavior to differences in 
treatments. However, the main criticism of laboratoy experiments is their external validity, 
i.e. it is put into question whether the results of laboratory experiments are valid in real life 
(List, 2006; Levitt and List, 2007a; 2007b). This criti ism is especially pronounced in the 
domain of social preferences, as their elicitation is particularly prone to an experimenter 
                                                
34 One could also think of the enforcement of legal norms by formal punishment or of the enforcement of social 
norms by reward. However, we focus in this study on the enforcement of social norms by costly peer 
punishment and therefore use the terms norm enforcement and peer punishment, second-party punishment or 
informal punishment as synonyms. 
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demand effect. In the light of this criticism a great number of field experiments emerged that 
examine on aggregate level whether effects found in the lab persist in the field. In contrast, 
there are only a few studies that examine on individual level whether the behavior of people 
in the lab can be extrapolated to the field. For the latter a within-subjects comparison of 
behavior in the lab and in the field is necessary. Regardless of whether pure money-
maximizing or social preferences (for instance Rabin, 1993; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton 
and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002) are assumed – the latter state that 
individuals do not only care about their own well-being but also about their social 
environment – all these models predict stable preferences within subjects between the lab and 
the field. 
In our study we examine whether the norm enforcement b havior in the lab translates to 
the field. Therefore we conduct a within-subjects comparison of norm enforcement between 
lab and field. We carry out a natural field experiment (according to the classification of 
Harrison and List, 2004) near the University of Munich, in which we observe queuers when a 
norm violator cuts in line in front of them. In order to minimize the possibility of an 
experimenter demand effect we invite the subjects from the field to the lab without revealing 
that they participated in a field experiment. In the lab we implement three treatments dealing 
with second-party punishment: The standard treatment to examine norm enforcement in the 
lab – a three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-sided punishment option (see Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000; 2002; Falk et al., 2005) – and a tre tment additionally allowing for 
counter-punishment, meaning that this treatment includes a two-sided punishment option 
(Nikiforakis, 2008). Moreover we apply a newly created game with which we try to represent 
the situation in the queue in an abstract way. This so-called “queuing game” includes a one-
sided punishment option. In a forth treatment we elicit the cooperation types of subjects. 
Our study makes several contributions: Firstly, we carry out a natural field experiment 
on norm enforcement, which is scarce so far35 – although heavily requested, for instance by 
Guala (2012). Additionally we ex-post collect socio-demographic data of the subjects and 
examine their link to norm enforcement in the field. Secondly, to our knowledge we are the 
first ones to make a within-subjects comparison betwe n lab and field with respect to norm 
enforcement. Thirdly, in the lab subjects play several conomic games which allows us to run 
a “horse race” between different institutions. Fourthly, additionally to the behavioral data 
from the field and the lab experiment, we elicit of the same subjects the intended norm 
enforcement behavior stated in a survey. The latter pr sents three scenarios of real life 
                                                
35 Exceptions in economics are Noussair et al. (2011) and Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012). 
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situations, which describe different violations of c ncrete social norms. In addition to being 
able to investigate the external validity of intendd norm enforcement stated in the 
questionnaire, we examine whether a so-called norm enforcing type exists, i.e. someone who 
generally behaves in a norm enforcing way across several social norms.36  
Our main finding says that norm enforcement in the field correlates with decisions in 
the lab treatment including a counter-punishment option, but not with decisions in the 
treatments in which only a one-sided punishment option exists. Specifically we find that the 
likelihood of norm enforcement in the field increass with the willingness to cooperate and 
with the sanctioning of defectors in a prisoners’ dilemma game with a two-sided punishment 
option. Our lab-field comparison is a first examinat on of the external validity of norm 
enforcement in the lab. Therefore generalizations rega ding the interpretation and implication 
of our main result have to be made with care. However it suggests the following: Firstly, with 
respect to norm enforcement our main result confirms prior survey evidence that weighing up 
the danger of being counter-punished is crucial for norm enforcement decisions in the field. 
Secondly, concerning the methodological aspect, our main result reveals that more evidence 
from the field is necessary to establish the external validity of the standard treatment with a 
one-sided punishment option. Overall our main finding s encouraging with respect to the 
generalizability of lab behavior to the field. However, it also illustrates that the relevant 
institutional factors of the field need to be incorp rated in the lab to allow for external 
validity.  
Our further findings are the following: We find a norm enforcement rate of 32.1% in 
the field. The likelihood of norm enforcement in the field increases with age and with the 
cooperation type elicited in the lab. We find a high external validity of the norm enforcement 
intentions stated in the survey, as long as the same social norm is affected in the survey 
scenario and in the field. We do not find evidence for a norm enforcing type. Instead our 
questionnaire data suggest that the likelihood of norm enforcement varies with the concrete 
social norm affected, and specifically with the negative externality of the norm violation.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 3.2 we present the 
relevant literature, before we describe in section 3.3 our experimental design. Section 3.4 
outlines our results. We discuss our findings in section 3.5 and provide a conclusion in 
section 3.6. 
 
                                                
36 See also Fischbacher et al. (2001) defining several types in the domain of cooperation or De Oliviera t al. 
(2011) finding in the domain of charity a so-called “giving-type”, i.e. donors who donate across several 
unrelated organizations. 
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3.2 Related Literature  
In the following we give an overview on norm enforcement in lab experiments and in 
field experiments and then review the literature on within-subjects lab-field comparisons in 
the domain of social preferences. 
 Starting with Yamagashi (1986), Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Gächter (2000; 
2002) several laboratory experiments show that norm enforcement by peer punishment is one 
of the most successful mechanisms to enhance cooperation in social dilemmas. A large 
number of laboratory experiments on peer punishment followed investigating for instance the 
influence of monetary versus non-monetary punishment (Masclet et al., 2003; Rege and 
Telle, 2004), the effect of punishment versus reward (Andreoni et al., 2003; Sefton et al., 
2007), the influence of the punishment effectiveness (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; 
Carpenter 2007; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Egas and Riedl, 2008), the impact of 
endogenous versus exogenous choice of punishment (Gürerk et al., 2006; Ertan et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al., 2010), the influence of counter-punishment or feuds (Denant-Boemont et al., 
2007; Nikiforakis, 2008; Nikiforakis and Engelmann, 2011; Nikiforakis et al., 2012; 
Engelmann and Nikiforakis, 2014), the influence of uncertainty involved in punishment 
(Grechenig et al., 2010; Sousa, 2010; Ambrus and Greine , 2012; Xiao and Kunreuther, 
2012) or the driving forces behind punishment (Falk et al., 2005).37  
In contrast to this huge bulk of laboratory experiments on norm enforcement, field 
experiments on the enforcement of social norms are scarce.38 Exceptions in economics are 
Noussair et al. (2011) and Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012). The former carry out a framed 
field experiment with recreational fishermen in theN therlands. They implement incentives 
similar to a linear voluntary contribution mechanism (see Chaudhuri, 2011), but closely 
framed to a repeated common pool resource problem. A ong other treatments they 
implement one with a one-sided punishment option. As the game is repeated, strategic 
motives of punishment might play a role. The results show that non-cooperators are punished 
in 35.1% of all possible cases. In contrast to most laboratory findings a cooperation-
enhancing effect of punishment cannot be confirmed. The authors assume that the 
fishermen’s norm is rather to catch as much fish as possible than to cooperate. Balafoutas and 
Nikiforakis (2012) conduct a natural field experiment in Athens (Greece). They examine the 
                                                
37 For an overview on norm enforcement in lab experimnts see, for instance, Chaudhuri (2011). 
38 There are several studies outside the lab on the enforcement of legal norms: For instance, in the domain of TV 
licence fee evasion (Fellner et al., 2013) and tax evasion (Blumenthal et al., 2001; Slemrod et al., 2001; Kleven 
et al., 2011) the effects of audit-threats and normative appeals on compliance are investigated in field 
experiments. Traxler and Winter (2012) provide survey evidence on the negative relation between the 
willingness of people to sanction law violations and their belief about the frequency.  
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enforcement of two social norms in the field, the universal norm not to litter in public places 
and the environment-specific norm to walk on the left side of escalators. In contrast to the 
field experiment by Noussair et al. (2011) strategic motives of norm enforcement are 
minimized, as the norm violator interacts with the p destrians only once. Balafoutas and 
Nikiforakis (2012) find a norm enforcement rate of 4.0% for the universal norm and of 19.3% 
for the environment-specific norm. Questionnaire data suggest that the rather low rates are 
based on the fear of counter-punishment. The authors further find that men are more likely to 
enforce norms than women, while the norm violator’s gender and height have no effect on 
norm enforcement. 
Psychologists conducted natural field experiments on n rm enforcement in case of 
queue-jumping, which are closest to our field experim nt. Schmitt et al. (1992) and Milgram 
et al. (1986) observe people in waiting lines in New York City, mostly at the ticket counter of 
the Grand Central Station. As the queue-jumpers and the queuers only interact once, strategic 
motives are minimized. Counter-punishment is theoretically possible. Schmitt et al. (1992) 
find that people in waiting lines are more likely to react to a queue-jumper, if there are other 
queuers behind her, which manifests a social obligation. In contrast, the closeness to the 
counter does not have any effect on norm enforcement. Both studies demonstrate that queuers 
directly behind the queue-jumper have a special obligation to react and are therefore most 
likely to respond to a queue-jumper. In both studies the authors discuss an “individual cost”  
versus a “moral outrage” position regarding norm enforcement in the line and confirm both: 
This means that norm enforcement in the waiting line occurs for individual reasons of saving 
time but also because of social concerns triggered by the violation of a social norm. When the 
experimental conditions are comparable to ours, these field experiments yield enforcement 
rates of 43.3% and 54.0%. In contrast to our study, none of the specified field experiments on 
norm enforcement conducts a lab-field comparison.39  
Recently there is a quickly growing number of studies conducting within-subjects 
comparisons between lab measures and field behavior, especially in the domain of social 
preferences. The majority of these studies support the generalizability of lab behavior. For 
instance, Karlan (2005) shows that people who are more trustworthy in the trust game are 
more likely to repay microfinance loans. Baran et al. (2010) demonstrate that the behavior of 
MBA students in a trust game is positively related o their donations as alumni to their 
business school a few years later. In the study by Rustagi et al. (2010) conditional 
cooperation correlates with successful forest commons management. Fehr and Leibbrandt 
                                                
39 There is an economic field experiment on queue-jumping (Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), which examines whether a 
market for time exists. However, in this study the queue-jumper offers money to cut in.    
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(2011) demonstrate that contributions to a public goods game and patience in a simple time 
preference game predict limited common pool resource extraction of Brazilian fishermen. 
Carpenter and Seki (2011) find that several measures of social preferences of Japanese 
fishermen are positively linked with their productivity and the adoption of a team institution 
in the field.40 In the experiment by Franzen and Pointner (2013) subjects giving in the lab 
dictator game send misdirected letters containing money more often back than subjects 
giving nothing in the lab. Englmaier and Gebhardt (2013) link a lab public goods game with 
three treatments in the field, whereas only one treatm nt shares the free-riding incentive. In 
this free-riding treatment they find correlations between the contributions in the lab and the 
effort in the field, but not in the two placebo treatments. They conclude that extrapolation 
from the lab to situations which share the game form but not necessarily the frame is 
possible.  
However, there are also some within-subjects comparisons that do not – or at least do 
not completely – support the generalizability of lab experiments: For instance, in the study by 
Benz and Meier (2008) donations in the lab correlate with donations of the same people in 
the field, however donations in the lab are more accentuated. Carpenter and Myers (2010) 
find that giving in a dictator game correlates with the time spent volunteering as a fire fighter, 
but not with the amount of firefighting operations. Gurven and Winking (2008) find no 
correlation between the behavior of Bolivian indigenous inhabitants in a dictator and an 
ultimatum game and their observed everyday sharing of food.41 In contrast to all these 
specified lab-field comparisons we conduct in our study a within-subjects comparison 
regarding norm enforcement.  
 
 
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures  
3.3.1 Experimental Design 
We first conduct the natural field experiment and then invite the participants to the lab 
without revealing that they have just participated in a field experiment.   
 
 
                                                
40 Strictly speaking Rustagi et al. (2010) and Carpenter and Seki (2011) compare the behavior of groups 
between the lab and the field. Thus, one could speak of  within-groups comparison. 
41 Recently there are many more studies that relate lab to field behavior, also in other domains than social 
preferences. However, these studies often make comparisons on aggregate level without conducting a within-
subjects comparison (e.g. Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2008; Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009; Levitt et al., 2010; 
Stoop et al., 2012). See Camerer (2011) for an extensiv  survey on the lab-field generalizability. 
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3.3.1.1 Natural Field Experiment 
We conduct the field experiment in front of a bakery at the subway station of the 
University of Munich, which is frequented by roughly one thousand clients each day during 
the semester. Most clients frequent the bakery in the morning. Hence, the field experiment is 
predominantly carried out between 7.30 am and 10.30 am. The location of the field 
experiment has multiple advantages: Firstly, the majority of the clients are students, which is 
favorable, as the majority of laboratory experiments are conducted with university students 
and as students are most likely to come to the lab. Secondly, the lines in front of the bakery 
are clearly defined and mostly consist of about five to ten clients, which ensures a quick run-
through. Thirdly, after having paid clients leave th  bakery and therefore do not realize that 
the queue-jumping is repeated.  
The process of cutting in line is carried out in the following way: The norm violator 
approaches the line and cuts in so that several persons – usually two to three queuers – stand 
behind her in the line. The norm violator cuts in line without trying to give the impression 
that the norm violation happens accidentally. In order to register the individual behavior of 
the queuers without any uncontrollable influence from other people, the norm violator cuts in 
line in front of individuals standing alone in the line. As participants interact with the norm 
violator only once, strategic motives of norm enforcement are reduced.42 The role of the 
norm violator is played by the authoress. She jumps the queue whenever at least five persons 
wait in the line. We exclude queuers obviously older than 60 years, mothers with children, 
handicapped persons and obviously not German looking people as these characteristics 
presumably influence the likelihood of norm enforcement in the waiting line and of coming 
to the lab.  
A research assistant (RA) who stands near the line,but in the back of the clients, 
observes the behavior of the queuers behind the norm violator. The behavior of a queuer is 
evaluated as norm enforcing if she directly addresses the norm violator and asks her to go to 
the end of the line. In this case the norm violator pologizes, goes back to the end of the line 
and leaves it approximately 10 seconds later. If nobody asks the norm violator to queue up at 
the end of the line, she also leaves the line after approximately 10 seconds. Non-verbal 
signals of disapproval (e.g. harrumphing loudly, looking to other clients), talking to other 
                                                
42 However, we can not completely exclude the possibility that a queuer has already seen the queue-jumper in 
the days before. Furthermore there is in general a strategic element in norm enforcement decisions in the field, 
as norm enforcers usually pursue the goal to revers the norm violation. 
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clients about the queue-jumper without addressing her directly or comments on the side are 
not evaluated as norm enforcing.43  
If one of the queuers enforces the norm, the RA asks this norm enforcer to participate in 
the laboratory experiment. In case that several queuers enforce the norm, the RA invites the 
one who first enforced the norm. If no norm enforcement takes place, the RA invites the 
client directly behind the norm violator, as she has best seen the norm violation and is 
therefore the main responsible person (according to Milgram et al., 1986; Schmitt et al., 
1992) to enforce the norm. We call the queuer who is invited to the lab the observer.44  
As soon as the observer has left the bakery the RA follows her for a while in order not 
to make the observer link the invitation to the queue-jumping. When contacting the observer, 
the RA explains that we search for participants fulfilling certain criteria to participate in a 
paid laboratory experiment on decision-making approximately one or two weeks later in the 
laboratory MELESSA.45 We ensure that the participants speak German properly. At that 
point in time we do not reveal that the person has just participated in a field experiment. If the 
observer agrees to participate in the laboratory experiment we collect her name, email-
address and a personal code. The latter consists of letters and numbers that only the subject 
knows. It allows us later in the data analysis to combine the behavioral data from the lab and 
the field. We tell the subjects that we need the code later to make the lab data anonymous and 
that the subject can already give us the code rightnow (what they usually do). At the end we 
hand out to the participant an adapted version of the MELESSA statement of participation 
with general information on the laboratory experiment. As soon as the observer has left, the 
RA records her behavior in the waiting line, the estimated age, gender and, in case of norm 
enforcement, whether the norm enforcer stood directly behind the norm violator in the 
waiting line or further behind. A few days before the laboratory session the subjects from the 
field receive a short reminder and further subjects from the MELESSA subject pool – i.e. 
                                                
43  One might argue that being in a hurry might affect the norm enforcement behavior in the field. Although we 
cannot completely exclude this point, we think that it is rather unlikely to play a major role in the fi ld. Firstly, 
the field experiment is carried out at a point in time, namely at the beginning of the semester, when our main 
subjects, i.e. students, have a rather relaxed time. Secondly, as clients take on average only about 20 seconds to 
order and pay, the time gain from sending a queue-jumper to the end of the line is restricted. Thirdly, the clients 
mostly order rather “non-essential” food like coffee or cookies. If they were really in a hurry, they would 
presumably not even line up. 
44 In about 15% of all cases the norm violator does not manage to completely get into the line and the qu uer 
next to her pushes herself in front of the norm violator without addressing her. We do not evaluate this as norm 
enforcing, as the queuer only solves the problem for herself (in the sense of the individual costs pers ctive) but 
not for the other queuers following her (in the sense of the social perspective according to Milgram et al., 1986, 
and Schmitt et al., 1992). In this case the norm violator stays in the queue directly behind this queuer and we 
observe the behavior of the queuers behind the norm violator. 
45 MELESSA is the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and Social Sciences. 
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who did not participate in the field experiment – are invited to the laboratory sessions to fill 
them up.  
 
3.3.1.2 Laboratory Experiment 
So that the observers in the lab do not link the quue-jumping in the field to the 
laboratory experiment, the latter is conducted by another researcher than the authoress. 
Participants in the lab know that the sessions consist of four parts and several questionnaires. 
They are informed that the parts are independent of each other and that instructions for one 
part only follow if the preceding part is finished. We implement four treatment conditions, 
which consist of one period each. Three treatments deal with norm enforcement: In order to 
examine whether the standard treatment matters in the field, we implement the three-person 
prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-sided punishment option (see Fehr and Gächter, 2000; 
2002; Falk et al., 2005). To investigate the importance of potential counter-punishment in the 
field, we additionally implement a three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a punishment 
and counter-punishment option (see Nikiforakis, 2008). Furthermore, we apply a newly 
created game with which we try to represent the situation in the queue in an abstract way. 
This so-called queuing game includes a one-sided punishment option. In a forth treatment we 
elicit the cooperation types of subjects similar to Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
At the beginning of each treatment subjects learn that they are randomly and 
anonymously matched to units of three members, whereby we implement a perfect stranger 
matching between treatments.46 The incomes during the experiment are calculated in 
Guilders. At the beginning of the experiment subjects are informed that the total earnings are 
calculated as the sum of incomes in each of the four parts, the questionnaires and the show-up 
fee of 4€. The latter also serves to pay for any negative payoffs generated during the 
experiment. In the following we describe the treatments in detail.  
 
Three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-sidd punishment option (PDG+P) 
This treatment is based on Falk et al. (2005). Subjects know that the PDG+P consists of 
two stages: The first stage includes a prisoners’ dilemma game. In the second stage 
participants receive information on the individual first stage decisions of their unit members 
and can punish them, i.e. reduce their income, which is ostly also for the sanctioning person. 
In the fist stage subjects play a three-person prisoners’ dilemma game, i.e. they 
simultaneously decide whether to cooperate or defect. In table 3.1 we present the payoff 
                                                
46 As in two sessions only 9 subjects participated, we could only implement a stranger matching instead of a
perfect stranger matching in these sessions. No subject addressed this point.   
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matrix of the first stage which implies a social diemma: If we assume pure money-
maximizing preferences the dominant strategy of player i is to defect, independent of how the 
other unit members decide. However, the socially effici nt outcome is achieved by 
cooperation of all players. We implement the prisoners’ dilemma game instead of a 
continuous public goods game (Marwell and Ames, 1981; Isaac et al., 1985; Isaac and 
Walker, 1988) for two reasons: The binary version better corresponds to the situation in the 
field, where only two types of actions exist, namely to adhere to the social norm or to jump 
the queue. Secondly, the prisoners’ dilemma game allows us to implement the strategy vector 
method and therefore to avoid learning effects in the lab.  
 
Table 3.1 - Payoffs in the first stage of the PDG+P (Falk et al., 2005). 
 
In the second stage, the punishment stage, subjects are informed about each of the other 
unit members’ first stage decision. They are told that they can simultaneously sanction each 
of the other unit members by assigning punishment points. Subjects cannot punish members 
of other units. Players can assign at most 10 punishment points to each of their unit members. 
If player i assigns punishment points pij to unit member j, i ≠ j, player i’s first stage income, 
i,1π , is reduced by pij. Player j’s first stage income is then reduced by 3 * pij with a lower 
boundary at zero if player j’s cost of receiving punishment points is higher than er first stage 
income.47 The latter avoids that subjects receive negative payoffs without being able to 
control them. Hence, player i’s income at the end of the second stage, i,2π is given by 
∑∑
≠≠
−






−=
ij
ij
ij
jiii pp )*3(,0max ,1,2 ππ  (3.1) 
Participants are informed about the payoff structure in Eq. (3.1). We elicit the 
punishment decisions with the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967). Thus we ask subjects 
how many punishment points they want to distribute to ach other unit member for each out 
of four possible combinations of first stage decision  made by the other two unit members. 
Subjects know that they receive feedback at the end of the experiment on the actual first stage 
                                                
47 For the sake of simplicity we implement the linear cost function by Fehr and Gächter (2002) and later studies 
instead of the nonlinear cost function used for insta ce by Fehr and Gächter (2000). 
 Both other unit 
members defect 
One of the other unit members 
defects, the other one cooperates 
Both other unit 
members cooperate 
Player i defects 20 32 44 
Player i cooperates 12 24 36 
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decisions of their unit members, their own first stage income, the number of punishment 
points received by the other unit members and theirown total earnings in the PDG+P.   
 
Three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a two-sided punishment option (PDG+PCP) 
The PDG+PCP builds on Nikiforakis (2008). Subjects know that this part includes the 
PGP+P and an additional third stage, the counter-punishment stage. In the counter-
punishment stage each player i has the opportunity to counter-punish each of her unit
members j ≠ i by assigning at most 10 counter-points to each of them. Analogous to the 
second stage, the cost of each counter-point that i assigns to j, zij, is 1 Guilder. The cost of 
each counter-point received is 3 Guilders. The second stage income is reduced to zero and 
not further, if the cost of receiving counter-points is higher than the second stage income, π2,i. 
The period income i,3π  of subject i is given by  
∑∑
≠≠
−






−=
ij
ij
ij
jiii zz )*3(,0max ,2,3 ππ  (3.2) 
This payoff structure and the following rules are common knowledge: In order to avoid 
very negative payoffs participants with a non-positive second stage income are not allowed to 
counter-punish or to be counter-punished. In order to avoid that punishment in the second 
stage is delayed to the third stage, subject i can only counter-punish those unit members j 
who punished her in the second stage. We elicit the punishment decisions in the second stage 
with the strategy vector method. The counter-punishment decisions in the third stage are 
elicited with the direct response method, as otherwise e would have to differentiate between 
too many possible cases. Therefore subjects receive f edback in the counter-punishment 
stage on the individual first stage decisions of their unit members, the individual first stage 
incomes of all members of their unit and the number of punishment points received by and 
assigned to each of the other unit members. Subjects further know that they receive feedback 
on the number of counter-points received by the unit members and their own final profit in 
the PDG+PCP at the end of the experiment.    
 
Queuing game with one-sided punishment option (QG+P) 
The QG+P is a newly created game in which we try to reflect the field conditions in the 
queue in an abstract way: It consists of three stage : In the first stage in each three-person 
unit a ranking is established based on the number of correctly solved mathematical tasks. In 
the second stage the person on the last position of the ranking can decide to “jump the 
queue”, i.e. to establish an alternative order thatputs herself in the first and most prosperous 
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position. In the third stage the person who originally reaches the first position in the first 
stage can sanction the “queue-jumper”, whereby sanctioning is costly also for the sanctioning 
person. Thus, in contrast to the PDG+P we create a ranking of subjects and allow only one 
player to violate the norm. Based on the results by Milgram et al. (1986) we further reverse 
the second-order public goods problem in the punishment stage of the PDG+P by allowing 
only the person “directly behind the queue-jumper” to sanction her. 
In order to create a ranking in the QG+P similar to the one in the queue, subjects in the 
first stage have five minutes of time to calculate sums of five different two-digit numbers (see 
also e.g. Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). We choose this addition task, as it is easy to 
explain, it does not yield any gender effects and it is influenced by effort and skill and 
therefore is very suitable to create a sense of entitlement among subjects. Subjects know that 
the number of correct answers determines their position in a ranking A, B, C, whereby the 
first stage income is ranked according to this order: The person on position A (whom we call 
unit member A) earns the highest first stage income, namely 40 Guiders. The person on 
position B (unit member B) receives the second highest first stage income, namely 30 
Guilders, and the person on position C (unit member C) earns the lowest income of 20 
Guilders. Subjects are told in the first stage that it is advantageous for them to correctly 
calculate as many sums as possible. They only receiv  the instructions for the second and 
third stage when the first stage is finished. 
In the second stage participants are informed that unit member C decides whether to 
retain the first stage order or to choose an alterna ive order. The latter assigns unit member C 
position A with the highest income of 40 Guilders. The other two unit members then slip to 
the positions B and C and therefore receive the lower incomes of 30 and 20 Guilders 
respectively. If unit member C retains the first stage order, there is no third stage and the unit 
members earn their first stage income.  
Participants know that, in case unit member C chooses the alternative order, unit 
member A can sanction the “queue-jumper” in the third stage by assigning punishment points 
to her. Unit member A can only sanction unit member C if the latter actually “cuts in line”, 
i.e. if unit member C chooses the alternative order in the second stage. Participants further 
know that unit member A can assign at most 10 punishment points to unit member C. If unit 
member A assigns punishment points p to unit member C, her second stage income of 30 
Guilders is reduced by p, while unit member C’s second stage income of 40 Guilders is 
reduced by 3 * p. Subjects are informed about the payoff structure,iπ , that arises for the three 
unit members i in case unit member C jumps the queue:  
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pA −= 30π  (3.3) 
20=Bπ  (3.4) 
pC *340−=π  (3.5) 
We elicit the second and third stage decisions withthe strategy vector method. Subjects 
know that they receive feedback at the end of the exp riment on their own first stage position 
in the ranking, on unit member C’s decision in the second stage, if applicable, on unit 
member A’s decision in the third stage, and on their own total income in the QG+P.   
 
Elicitation of cooperation types 
We elicit the individual cooperation types applying a simplified version of the 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) method.48 Subjects know that they play the three-person prisoners’ 
dilemma game with the payoff structure of table 3.1. Using the strategy vector method we ask 
participants to decide between cooperation and defection for each possible combination of 
choices of the other two unit members. In order to incentivize these conditional decisions, we 
ask participants to make an unconditional choice before. Subjects know that at the end of this 
part one unit member is randomly drawn for whom the conditional choice, based on the 
unconditional choices of the other two unit members, is payoff-relevant. For each of the other 
two unit members the unconditional choice is payoff-relevant. Subjects are told that they 
receive feedback on the payoff-relevance of their choices, on the payoff-relevant choices of 
the other two unit members and on their own total income in this part only at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
We start half of the laboratory sessions with treatment QG+P followed by the PDG+P, 
and the other half with the PDG+P followed by the QG+P. The elicitation of cooperation 
types always constitutes the third part. The PDG+PCP is always carried out as the last part in 
order to avoid learning effects from the counter-punishment stage. At the end of each 
laboratory session we conduct five questionnaires. For filling them in we pay the subjects 2€ 
altogether. The first questionnaire includes three sc narios of real life situations each 
describing the violation of a concrete social norm. This questionnaire conduces to examine 
whether subjects show a similar norm enforcement behavior across different social norms, 
i.e. whether a norm enforcing type exists. Appendix A.3.3 outlines the questionnaire. For 
each scenario subjects rate their emotions anger and fe r towards the norm violator, indicate 
whether they would confront the norm violator and the reasons for their decision. The latter 
                                                
48 Fischbacher et al. (2001) elicit the cooperative preferences applying a continuous public goods game.  
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are presented in random order. The order of the scenarios is changed between sessions. In 
order to be able to compare the elicited emotions with a baseline, subjects rate their emotions 
anger and fear at the beginning of the questionnaire. One of the scenarios describes the field 
situation in the waiting line, when another person cuts in. This scenario conduces to measure 
the external validity of the scenario method. The participants fill in further questionnaires, 
that are not reported here, and a questionnaire on socio-demographic variables. Finally 
subjects indicate their personal codes.  
 
3.3.2 Procedures 
The experiment was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Economics at 
the University of Munich. It was run in April and May 2014. The field experiment was 
carried out over 5 weeks. Appendix A.3.4 shows some photos of the field experiment. We 
conducted 7 laboratory sessions at the experimental laboratory MELESSA of the University 
of Munich. The sessions lasted up to 120 minutes and were anonymously run. We exclude 
the last session (with 5 participants from the field and 4 participants from the MELESSA 
subject pool) from the further data analysis, as the participants from the field revealed at the 
end that they realized a field experiment was run with them and that they discussed this in the 
group before the session started. This discussion might have influenced the decisions in the 
lab.  
Table 3.2 outlines the number of subjects in the labor tory and field experiment as we 
also included them in the further data analysis. Thus, in the column “Participation in lab 
experiment” we only include the subjects from the first 6 laboratory sessions. In the field 
experiment 237 subjects participated. 45 of them also participated in the laboratory 
experiment, which yields a participation rate of 19.0%. Altogether 66 subjects participated in 
the lab experiment.  
 
Table 3.2 - Number of subjects in the laboratory and field experim nt. 
 Participation in lab 
experiment 
No participation in 
lab experiment 
Total 
Participation in field experiment 45 (12) 192 (64) 237 (76) 
No participation in field experiment 21 ---  
Total 66   
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the number of norm enforcers in the field. 
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At the beginning of each laboratory session the experimenter read the neutrally written 
instructions aloud.49 In order to test the participants’ understanding of the incentive structure 
and the decision situation, subjects were asked to answer control questions.50 We assume full 
understanding, as we only started the treatments as oon as all participants answered all 
questions correctly.  
At the end of the laboratory sessions the authoress entered the laboratory and informed 
the subjects that she had met each of them in the we ks before. She asked the subjects 
whether they recognized her and, if so, where they m t her. In the first 6 sessions at most 
10% of the participants from the field experiment remembered that the authoress had cut in 
line in front of them. Thus, we can assume that the majority did not have a clue that the 
queue-jumping is linked with the laboratory experiment. Finally, we informed subjects about 
their participation in the field experiment and asked them for a written consent to the storage 
and analysis of their behavioral data in the field. Subjects thereby knew that their field and 
laboratory behavior is anonymously linked via their personal code. All of the subjects who 
participated in both, the lab and the field, gave us their written consent to the storage and 
analysis of their behavioral data from the field. 
The laboratory experiment was programmed and conducte  with the experiment 
software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The subjects from the MELESSA subject pool were 
invited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We did not impose any specific restrictions on them. 
They are similar to the subjects from the field experiment with respect to average age 
(subjects from the field: 24 years; subjects from the MELESSA pool: 25 years) and gender 
(subjects from the field: 66.7% female; subjects from the MELESSA pool: 52.4% female). 
Furthermore, similar to the subjects from the field xperiment, the majority of them are 
undergraduate students (subjects from the field: 91%; subjects from the MELESSA pool: 
86%). At the end of the experiment we exchanged the payoffs at an exchange rate of 
1Guilder = 0.2€, which yielded an average payoff of 25.30€. 
 
 
3.4 Results  
The results part is divided into six sections. First we report the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field experiment (section 3.4.1). Section 3.4.2 gives a general overview of the 
lab decisions. In section 3.4.3 we check whether th selection from the field to the lab is non-
                                                
49 Appendix A.3.1 outlines the instructions. 
50 Control questions for the QG+P are provided in Appendix A.3.2.  
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random and whether the participation in the field experiment affects the decisions in the lab. 
Section 3.4.4 provides the lab-field comparison. Weexamine whether further variables 
influence the norm enforcement behavior in the field (section 3.4.5) and present the results on 
the questionnaire scenarios in section 3.4.6. In the following we refer to the norm enforcers 
and non-norm enforcers in the field experiment, if we talk about norm enforcers and non-
norm enforcers. The notation MWU-test refers to the two-sided Mann-Whitney U-test. We 
call the subjects participating both in the lab and the field the lab and field participants, the 
subjects only participating in the lab the lab participants and the subjects only participating 
in the field the field participants. 
 
3.4.1 Norm Enforcement in the Field 
The last column of table 3.2 indicates that in 32.1% of all cases in the field norm 
enforcement occurred. Typical comments directed to the norm violator were “Excuse me, I 
am also waiting in the line” or “Excuse me, you have to queue up at the end of the line”. 
Except for tapping the norm violator on the shoulder, no physical action occurred.  
 
RESULT 3.1: Norm enforcement in the field is observed in 32.1% of all cases.  
 
In 83% of all cases of norm enforcement the queuer dir ctly behind the norm violator 
enforced the norm, which confirms the results by Milgram (1986) and Schmitt et al. (1992) 
that queuers directly behind the norm violator have  special obligation to enforce the norm 
compared to queuers following.  
 
3.4.2 Overview of Laboratory Decisions 
First we explain the measure we use in the following for the sanctioning decisions in 
the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP: The sanctioning behavior in the second stage of the PDG+P 
and PDG+PCP is elicited with the strategy vector method respectively. Thus, subjects decide 
for each of four possible combinations of first stage decisions made by the other two unit 
members how much punishment points to distribute. In the following we report the results on 
the sanctioning level in the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP each as the average sanctioning level 
in the two cases in which only one other group membr defects and the other one cooperates, 
as in the field there is also only one norm violator and the other queuers adhere to the norm. 
However, the main results in the following also hold, if we additionally include the case in 
which either both other subjects defect (for the variable “sanctioning of defectors”) or both 
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other subjects cooperate (for the variable “sanctioing of cooperators”). The same applies for 
the punishment likelihood. We indicate the sanctioning level in terms of sanctioning points 
(and not in terms of sanctioning cost). 
In this section we give an overview of the laboratoy decisions made by all 66 subjects 
participating in the lab. Column 1 of table 3.3 shows a cooperation rate of 42.4% in the 
PDG+P. This rate is lower than the cooperation rateof 61% reported in the corresponding 
treatment by Falk et al. (2005). We come to this point again in the next section. In line with 
the findings by Falk et al. (2005) cooperators in the PDG+P are punished by on average 0.2 
points and with a punishment rate of 7.6%. For the punishment of defectors we find a slightly 
lower punishment level of 1.1 punishment points and  lower punishment rate of 36.4% 
compared to the punishment level of 1.7 points and a punishment rate of 58% found by Falk 
et al. (2005). We also come to this point again in the next section. In line with standard 
results we find that defectors are more heavily punished than cooperators (Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test, p = 0.000) and that they are more likely to be punished (McNemar test, p = 0.000).  
In the PDG+PCP 36.4% of the subjects cooperate. In line with the results by 
Nikiforakis (2008) the cooperation rate seems to be lower in the PDG+PCP compared to the 
PDG+P. However, the difference is not significant (McNemar test, p = 0.317). In line with 
standard results defectors are again more heavily punished than cooperators in the second 
stage (0.9 versus 0.2 punishment points, Wilcoxon sig ed-ranks test, p = 0.000) and they are 
more likely to be punished (30.3% versus 7.6%, McNemar test, p = 0.000). In contrast to 
Nikiforakis (2008) we find that the punishment severity (0.6 versus 0.5 punishment points, 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.398) and the willingness to punish in the second stage 
(36.4% versus 30.3%, McNemar test, p = 0.157) are similar between the PDG+P and the 
PDG+PCP. Columns 2 and 3 of table 3.3 further outline the lab decisions of the lab and field 
subjects versus the decisions of the subjects only participating in the lab. Among the lab and 
field subjects we find that the punishment severity (0.8 versus 0.6 punishment points, 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test, p = 0.053) and the willingness to punish (44.4% versus 31.1%, 
McNemar, p = 0.014) are higher in the PDG+P than in the PDG+PCP respectively, which is 
in line with standard results (Nikiforakis, 2008). In contrast, among the subjects only 
participating in the lab the punishment severity is even higher in the PDG+PCP than in the 
PDG+P (0.3 versus 0.2 punishment points, Wilcoxon sig ed-ranks test, p = 0.046), which is 
in contrast to standard results. We explain this abnormality in the next section. Punishment is 
avenged in 8 out of 20 (40.0%) possible cases in the third stage – which is still in line with 
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the counter-punishment rate of 25.7% reported by Nikiforakis (2008) – with an average 
counter-punishment severity of 1.0 counter-points.  
 
Table 3.3 - Descriptive statistics: Decisions made in the lab. 
 All subjects in 
lab 
Lab and field 
participants 
Lab 
participants 
Test statistic 
PDG+P:     
  Cooperation decision 
0.424 
(0.498) 
0.489 
(0.506) 
0.286 
(0.463) 
χ2-test, 
p = 0.120 
  Sanctioning of cooperators 
0.152 
(0.701) 
0.211 
(0.843) 
0.024 
(0.109) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.519 
  Sanctioning of defectors 
1.090 
(1.780) 
1.456 
(2.011) 
0.310 
(0.680) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.020 
PDG+PCP:     
  Cooperation decision 
0.364 
(0.485) 
0.422 
(0.499) 
0.238 
(0.436) 
χ2-test, 
p = 0.148 
  Sanctioning of cooperators 
0.152 
(0.701) 
0.189 
(0.835) 
0.071 
(0.239) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.741 
  Sanctioning of defectors 
0.856 
(1.751) 
1.033 
(2.021) 
0.476 
(0.873) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.582 
QG+P:     
  Queue-jumping 
0.545 
(0.502) 
0.533 
(0.571) 
0.571 
(0.507) 
χ2-test, 
p = 0.772 
  Sanctioning 
2.136 
(3.043) 
2.444 
(3.223) 
1.476 
(2.561) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.251 
Cooperation types:     
  Free-riders 0.762 0.714 0.857 
  Conditional cooperators 0.222 0.262 0.143 
  Altruists 0.016 0.024 0.000 
Fisher exact 
test, 
p = 0.564 
Scenarios:     
  Confr. in Group task scenario  
5.636 
(0.871) 
5.578 
(0.941) 
5.762 
(0.700) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.349 
  Confr. in Littering scenario  
2.758 
(1.815) 
2.578 
(1.802) 
3.143 
(1.824) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.258 
  Confr. in Queuing scenario  
4.394 
(1.709) 
4.178 
(1.862) 
4.857 
(1.236) 
MWU-test, 
p = 0.231 
 
Notes: This table outlines the laboratory decisions of all 66 subjects participating in the lab. It compares the 
decisions of the 45 subjects participating both in the lab and in the field with the decisions of the 21 subjects 
participating only in the lab experiment. The sanctioning variables in the PDG+PCP refer to the sanctio ing 
level in the second stage. The test statistics refer to the comparison between lab and field participants versus lab 
participants respectively. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
With respect to the newly created QG+P we find that54.5% of the subjects “cut in 
line”, which is comparable to the defection rate of 57.6% in the PDG+P (McNemar test, p = 
0.724). 42.4% of subjects punish the queue-jumper, which is comparable to the willingness to 
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punish defectors (36.4%) in the PDG+P (McNemar test, p = 0.206). The punishment severity 
is with 2.1 points higher than the punishment of defectors in the PDG+P. However this is 
plausible, as in the QG+P there is only one unit memb r that can be punished.  
Depending on their decision between defection and cooperation for each combination 
of decisions of the other two group members we classify the lab and field subjects as free 
riders (who always defect), conditional cooperators (who cooperate if others cooperate) and 
altruists (who always cooperate). This is a simplification of the classification by Fischbacher 
et al. (2001), which allows for ordering the cooperation types. Table 3.3 outlines that 76.2% 
of the subjects in the lab are free-riders, 22.2% are conditional cooperators and 1.6% are 
altruists. There are three subjects left that we cannot categorize. Note that in the study by 
Fischbacher et al. (2001) 50% of the subjects are classified as conditional cooperators and 
only 30% are classified as free-riders. However, this discrepancy is plausible, as Fischbacher 
et al. (2001) apply a continuous public goods game, in which the free-riding option is just one 
out of 21 possible choices, whereas in our binary version of the public goods game, free-
riding is just one of two possible options. Hence, th  likelihood of free-riding is much higher 
in our study.  
Table A.3.1 in appendix A.3.5 displays the correlations between the different decisions 
in the lab. It shows that there are significant and positive inter-correlations among the 
cooperation types and the cooperation decisions in the PDG+P and PDG+PCP as well as 
among the different sanctioning decisions in the QG+P, the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP, 
which seems plausible. Furthermore the “queue-jumping” decision in the QG+P negatively 
correlates with the cooperation type. 
 
3.4.3 Selection into the Lab and Influence of the Participation in the Field  
We examine whether the selection into the lab is non-random. Table 3.4 outlines the 
characteristics of those subjects participating both in the lab and the field and of those 
subjects only participating in the field. Regarding the norm enforcement rate in the field table 
3.4 indicates a slightly lower rate of 26.7% among the lab and field subjects than among the 
subjects only participating in the field (33.2%). However, the difference is far from 
significant. Hence, we do not find any evidence for a selection bias with respect to norm 
enforcement in the field. Table 3.4 further indicates hat the same applies regarding gender. 
In the course of the field experiment we started to estimate the age of 123 observers of whom 
23 also participated in the lab, i.e. of whom we know the actual age. The estimated age is 
significantly correlated with the actual age by 81.8% (Spearman rank correlation coefficient, 
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p = 0.000), although it is systematically higher than the actual age (26 years versus 24 years, 
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, p = 0.087). Table 3.4 outlines that we neither find any 
significant differences in the estimated age between th  lab and field subjects and the subjects 
only participating in the field. Hence, overall we assume a random selection from the field to 
the lab. 
 
Table 3.4 - Descriptive statistics: Lab and field participants versus field participants. 
 Lab and field 
participants 
Field participants Test statistic 
Norm enforcement in the field  0.267 0.332 
χ
2-test, p = 0.402 
(45 vs. 187 obs.) 
Female 0.667 0.674 
χ
2-test, p = 0.927 
(45 vs. 187 obs.) 
Estimated age 26 27 
MWU-test, p = 0.927  
(23 vs. 100 obs.) 
 
Note: This table outlines the norm enforcement rate, th gender and the average estimated age of subjects 
participating both in the lab and the field and of subjects only participating in the field.  
 
Next we examine whether participation in the field xperiment has an effect on the 
decisions later in the lab. Therefore the second and third columns of table 3.3 present the lab 
decisions of subjects participating both in the laband the field versus the decisions of 
subjects only participating in the lab. Regarding most lab decisions we do not find any 
evidence of an effect of the participation in the field experiment. However, table 3.3 outlines 
that lab and field participants show higher levels of sanctioning towards defectors in the 
PDG+P than lab participants. Furthermore the difference in the cooperation likelihood in the 
PDG+P is also close to significant at the 10% level. In section 3.4.2 we state that the 
cooperation likelihood and the sanctioning of defectors in the PDG+P over all subjects in the 
lab is rather low compared to the results by Falk et al. (2005). Table 3.3 indicates that this 
divergence is rather driven by the subjects from the MELESSA pool than by the lab and field 
subjects. This suggests that the difference between lab and field subjects versus lab subjects 
in the PDG+P might not be attributed to an influence of the participation in the field 
experiment. Instead there might be an influence that reduced the cooperation rate and the 
sanctioning of defectors among the lab subjects. When we invite the subjects from the 
MELESSA pool to the lab experiment we add one short pa agraph at the beginning of the 
standard invitation email stating that another group f subjects is already invited – namely the 
lab and field subjects – and that this group is allowed to participate in the lab experiment at 
any rate, also if a person of this group appears later to the lab experiment than the subject 
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from the MELESSA pool. Although we tried to phrase the paragraph as respectful as 
possible, this paragraph and the corresponding handling of subjects directly before the 
session might have created a feeling of being a second-order subject among the participants 
from the MELESSA pool. There are good reasons to assume that this might have played out 
at the beginning of the session, thus in the PDG+P, in the form of less cooperation and 
therefore also less sanctioning of defectors. This argumentation also explains the abnormal 
result of a lower sanctioning level in the PDG+P than in the second stage of the PDG+PCP 
among the MELESSA subjects. At the same time this might not have played out in the 
“queue-jumping” and the sanctioning decision in the QG+P because there is the mathematical 
task in between. Hence, we assume that the participation in the field experiment has not 
affected the decisions in the lab.   
 
3.4.4 Lab-Field Comparison 
In the following we compare the behavioral measures in the lab with the norm 
enforcement behavior in the field of the same 45 lab and field subjects. 
 
PDG+P 
Table 3.5 reveals the lab decisions of non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers in the 
field. We find no significant difference in the cooperation rate: 48.5% of non-norm enforcers 
and 50.0% of the norm enforcers cooperate in the PDG+P. Table 3.5 outlines that we neither 
find any difference between non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers with respect to the 
sanctioning of cooperators nor the sanctioning of defectors: Cooperators are punished by 
non-norm enforcers by 0.3 points and by norm enforcers by 0.0 points. Defectors are 
sanctioned by non-norm enforcers by 1.3 points and by norm enforcers by 1.8 points. The 
same applies for the willingness to sanction defectors (42.4% versus 50.0%, χ2-test, p = 
0.651). Moreover, the difference between the sanctio ing of defectors and of cooperators 
does not differ between non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers. Table 3.5 accordingly 
outlines that we do not find any significant correlations between the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field and the lab decisions in the PDG+P. With respect to both decisions, the 
cooperation decision and the sanctioning level in the PDG+P, we do not find any effect of the 
order of treatments (Cooperation: χ2-test, p = 1.000; Sanctioning level: MWU-test, p = 
0.434).  
 
Chapter 3 
 122 
RESULT 3.2: We do not find any significant correlation between the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field and the lab decisions in the PDG+P. 
 
Table 3.5 - Descriptive statistics: Non-norm enforcers versus norm enforcers. 
 Non-norm 
enforcers 
Norm 
enforcers 
Test statistic 
PDG+P:    
  Cooperation decision 
0.485 
(0.507) 
0.500 
(0.522) 
χ
2-test, p = 0.928 
rs = 0.013, p = 0.930 
  Sanctioning of cooperators 
0.288 
(0.977) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
MWU-test, p = 0.212 
rs = -0.188, p = 0.216 
  Sanctioning of defectors 
1.348 
(1.873) 
1.750 
(2.417) 
MWU-test, p = 0.714 
rs = 0.055, p = 0.718 
  Diff. in sanctioning of  
  defectors and cooperators 
1.061 
(1.676) 
1.750 
(2.417) 
MWU-test, p = 0.392 
rs = 0.129, p = 0.398 
PDG+PCP:    
  Cooperation decision 
0.333 
(0.479) 
0.667 
(0.492) 
χ
2-test, p = 0.045 
rs = 0.298, p = 0.046 
  Sanctioning of cooperators 
0.227 
(0.961) 
0.083 
(0.289) 
MWU-test, p = 0.835 
rs = 0.031, p = 0.838 
  Sanctioning of defectors 
0.545 
(1.141) 
2.375 
(3.142) 
MWU-test, p = 0.045 
rs = 0.302, p = 0.044 
  Diff. in sanctioning of  
  defectors and cooperators 
0.318 
(1.144) 
2.292 
(3.108) 
MWU-test, p = 0.015 
rs = 0.368, p = 0.013 
QG+P:    
  Queue-jumping 
54.5% 
(0.506) 
50.0% 
(0.522) 
χ
2-test, p = 0.787 
rs = -0.040, p = 0.793 
  Sanctioning 
2.576 
(3.373) 
2.083 
(2.875) 
MWU-test, p = 0.867 
rs = -0.025, p = 0.869 
Cooperation types:    
  Free-riders 0.800 0.500 
  Conditional cooperators 0.200 0.417 
  Altruists 0.000 0.083 
Fisher exact test, p = 0.074 
rs = 0.315, p = 0.042 
Scenarios:    
  Confront. in Group task scenario  
5.484 
(1.064) 
5.833 
(0.389) 
MWU-test, p = 0.393 
rs = 0.129, p = 0.400 
  Confront. in Littering scenario  
2.455 
(1.787) 
2.917 
(1.891) 
MWU-test, p = 0.441 
rs = 0.116, p = 0.447 
  Confront. in Queuing scenario  
3.667 
(1.882) 
5.583 
(0.793) 
MWU-test, p = 0.001 
rs = 0.494, p = 0.001 
 
Notes: One independent observation in the table is one out of the 45 subjects participating both in the lab and in 
the field. The characteristics of those 12 subjects who enforce the norm in the field and of those 33 subjects who 
do not enforce the norm are compared. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. The sanctioning 
variables in the PDG+PCP refer to the sanctioning level in the second stage. rs denotes the Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficient. Kendall rank-order correlation coefficients yield very similar results.  
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PDG+PCP 
Table 3.5 reveals that, in contrast to the PDG+P, we find significant differences 
between non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers with respect to the behavior of subjects in 
the PDG+PCP, i.e. if two-sided punishment is possible. Table 3.5 outlines that non-norm 
enforcers cooperate significantly less than norm enforcers in the PDG+PCP: Only 33.3% of 
non-norm enforcers cooperate, whereas among the norm enforcers the cooperation rate is 
66.7%. Hence, cooperation among norm enforcers is twice as frequent as among non-norm 
enforcers in the PDG+PCP. Accordingly the cooperation rate in the PDG+PCP significantly 
correlates by 29.8% with the norm enforcement decision in the field. 
With respect to the sanctioning level towards cooperators in the second stage we do not 
find any significant difference between non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers. In contrast, 
defectors are punished by 0.5 points by non-norm enforcers, but by 2.4 points by norm 
enforcers in the PDG+PCP. The difference is significant. Accordingly the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field significantly correlates by 30.2% with the sanctioning level towards 
defectors: Thus, the more a subject sanctions defectors in the PDG+PCP the higher is the 
likelihood that she enforces the social norm in the field. The result is comparable for the 
willingness to sanction defectors (24.2% among non-rm enforcers versus 50.0% among 
norm enforcers, χ2-test, p = 0.099). These results suggest that the sanctioning of defectors in 
the PDG+PCP has a high external validity with respect to the norm enforcement behavior in 
our field experiment. Hence, in contrast to the PDG+P, the prisonsers’ dilemma game with a 
two-sided punishment option seems to be a valid workhorse with respect to the norm 
enforcement behavior in the field. Additionally table 3.5 demonstrates that norm enforcers 
differentiate in their sanctioning behavior more heavily between cooperators and defectors 
than non-norm enforcers do.  
 
RESULT 3.3: The decisions in the PDG+PCP correlate with the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field: Norm enforcers are more likely to cooperate in the PDG+PCP than 
non-norm enforcers. At the same time they sanction defectors more heavily than non-norm 
enforcers do. Furthermore, in contrast to non-norm enforcers, norm enforcers differentiate in 
their sanctioning behavior more heavily between cooperators and defectors. 
 
QG+P 
Table 3.5 indicates that the “queue-jumping” decision in the lab does not correlate with 
norm enforcement in the field: Among non-norm enforcers 54.5% “cut in line” in the lab, 
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among norm enforcers 50.0% do so. The sanctioning behavior in the QG+P is neither related 
to the norm enforcement in the field: Non-norm enforcers sanction queue-jumpers by 2.6 
points, whereas norm enforcers punish by 2.1 points. The same holds for the willingness to 
sanction queue-jumpers (45.5% versus 50.0%, χ2-test, p = 0.787). Thereby the order, in 
which we present the treatments does not affect the queue-jumping nor the sanctioning of the 
queue-jumper (Queue-jumping: χ2-test, p = 0.138; Sanctioning level: MWU-test, p = 0.260) 
 
RESULT 3.4: We do not find any significant correlation between the norm enforcement 
behavior in the field and the decisions in the queuing game. 
 
Cooperation types 
Table 3.5 reveals that the distribution of cooperation ypes significantly differs between 
non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers: Among the non-norm enforcers 80.0% of subjects 
are free-riders. In contrast, among the norm enforcers there are only 50.0% free-riders. 
Cooperation types significantly correlate with the norm enforcement behavior in the field by 
31.5%. This result is in line with the enhanced cooperation likelihood in the PDG+PCP 
among norm enforcers compared to non-norm enforcers. It further corresponds to standard 
lab results showing that cooperators punish defectors more heavily than defectors do (e.g. 
Falk et al., 2005). Our result extends this standard result across the border of the lab.   
 
RESULT 3.5: The norm enforcement behavior in the field correlates with the cooperation 
type: Persons who are classified as more cooperative types in the lab are more likely to 
enforce the social norm in the field. 
 
In order to investigate the robustness of our findings so far to various specifications, we 
run several regressions of norm enforcement in the field, which are outlined in table 3.6. 
Specifications (I) and (VI) demonstrate that the decisions both in the PDG+P and in the 
QG+P do not correlate with the norm enforcement behavior in the field and therefore confirm 
results 3.2 and 3.4. In contrast, specifications (II) to (V) reveal that most of the decisions in 
the PDG+PCP are related to the norm enforcement behavior in the field. According to 
specification (II) subjects who cooperate in the PDG+PCP are by 26.7% more likely to 
enforce the norm in the field. Specification (III) shows that with each punishment point 
assigned to a defector in the PDG+PCP the likelihood f norm enforcement in the field 
increases by 7.9%, even if we control for the cooperation decision in the first stage. As 
outlined in specification (IV) the level of sanction ng cooperators in the PDG+PCP is not 
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linked to norm enforcement in the field. Specificaton (V) confirms that norm enforcers 
distinguish to a greater extent than non-norm enforcers between defectors and cooperators in 
the PDG+PCP. Hence, specifications (II) to (V) confirm result 3.3. Specification (VII) 
confirms result 3.5, which states that more cooperative types are more likely to enforce the 
social norm in the field. With each category the likelihood of norm enforcement in the field 
increases by 28.4%. Table A.3.2 in appendix A.3.5 outlines the probit regressions of norm 
enforcement with the willingness to sanction defectors in the PDG+P, the PDG+PCP and the 
QG+P as regressors. The results are comparable. 
In summary, we can conclude: The likelihood of norm enforcement in the field 
increases with the cooperation decision and the sanctioning of defectors in the PDG+PCP as 
well as with the cooperation types in the lab. If we compare the results of the QG+P, the 
PDG+P and the PDG+PCP in the sense of a “horse race”, we can state that for the norm 
enforcement decision in the field the possibility of c unter-punishment seems to be crucial, 
i.e. subjects in the field weigh up the possibility of being counter-punished. In contrast, we do 
not find a link between measures in lab treatments that only allow one-sided punishment, 
may it be the PDG+P or the QG+P, and norm enforcement behavior in the field. 
 
3.4.5 Control Variables and Norm Enforcement in the Field 
We elicit several control variables in the field and several characteristics of the lab and 
field subjects during the lab experiment. In this section we examine their influence on the 
norm enforcement behavior in the field. These variables are the observer’s gender and age, 
her field of study (an eightfold scaled categorical v riable), the weather on the day of the 
field experiment (a fivefold scaled ordered variable taking the value 0 in case of cloudy, rainy 
weather and the value 4 in case of warm, sunny weather) and the wear of the norm violator (a 
threefold scaled ordered variable with value 0 indicating sporty, casual wear and value 2 
indicating rather chic, elegant wear). We include th  latter variable, as the wear of the norm 
violator presumably expresses her social status.  
In contrast to Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012) wedo not find a link between the 
observer’s gender and the norm enforcement behavior in the field experiment: Out of the 160 
women 52 enforce the norm (32.5%). Among the 77 men24 enforce the norm (31.2%, χ2-
test, p = 0.837). With respect to the field of study most of our subjects participating both in 
the lab and the field are arts students. We find no effect of the field of study on norm 
enforcement (Fisher exact test, p = 0.157). Furthermore the weather – we find a norm  
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Table 3.6 - Probit regressions of norm enforcement in the field. 
Dep. var.:  
Norm enforcement in the field 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
PDG+P:      
  Cooperation decision 
0.005 
(0.411) 
    
  Sanctioning of defectors 
0.019 
(0.100) 
    
PDG+PCP:      
  Cooperation decision  
0.267** 
(0.421) 
0.212 
(0.451) 
0.301** 
(0.138) 
0.250* 
(0.450) 
  Sanctioning of cooperators    
-0.112 
(0.072) 
 
  Sanctioning of defectors   
0.079** 
(0.110) 
  
  Diff. in sanctioning of  
  defectors and cooperators 
    
0.100** 
(0.050) 
QG+P:       
  Queue-jumping 
     
  Sanctioning 
     
Cooperation type      
Scenarios      
  N. enfor. in Group task scen. 
     
  N. enfor. in Littering scen.  
     
  N enfor. in Queuing scen.  
     
Constant      
N 45 45 45 45 45 
Wald χ2  0.34 3.81* 10.93*** 5.88* 7.99** 
Log pseudo-likelihood -25.924 -24.094 -21.559 -23.475 -20.516 
 
(Continued)   
 
enforcement rate of 36.0% in case of cloudy, rainy weather versus 33.3% in case of warm, 
sunny weather (χ2-test, p = 0.692) – and the wear of the norm violator – we find a norm 
enforcement rate of 34.8% in case of sporty, casual wear versus 26.1% in case of chic, 
elegant wear (χ2-test, p = 0.601) – do not seem to be related to norm enforcement in the field. 
In contrast, we find a significant effect of the observers’ age. Among the lab and field 
subjects age ranges from 18 to 44 years. We find that the norm enforcers in the field are on  
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Table 3.6 – Probit regressions of norm enforcement in the field (Continued).   
Dep. var.:  
Norm enforcement in the field 
(VI) (VII) (VIII) 
PDG+P:    
  Cooperation decision 
 
 
  
  Sanctioning of defectors 
 
 
  
PDG+PCP:    
  Cooperation decision 
 
 
  
  Sanctioning of cooperators 
 
 
  
  Sanctioning of defectors 
 
 
  
  Diff. in sanctioning of  
  defectors and cooperators 
   
QG+P:     
  Queue-jumping 
-0.049 
(0.420) 
  
  Sanctioning 
-0.012 
(0.065) 
  
Cooperation type 
 
0.284** 
(0.389) 
 
Scenarios    
  N. enfor. in Group task scen.   
0.043 
(0.060) 
  N. enfor. in Littering scen.    
-0.001 
(0.032) 
  N enfor. in Queuing scen.    
0.138*** 
(0.039) 
Constant    
N 45 42 45 
Wald χ2  0.33 4.78** 9.72** 
Log pseudo-likelihood -25.920 -22.855 -19.438 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of probit regression  of norm enforcement in the field. We report the
marginal effects at the mean. An observation in the regression is one subject participating both in the lab and the 
field. For the PDG+P we do not include the sanctioning of cooperators as regressor, as all subjects who are 
willing to sanction cooperators are non-norm enforcers and therefore determine norm enforcement in the field 
perfectly. OLS regressions yield similar results. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **,*  denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
average by 4 years older than the non-norm enforcers (27 years versus 23 years, MWU-test, p 
= 0.074).  
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Table 3.7 - Probit regressions of norm enforcement in the field (control variables included). 
Dep. var.:  
Norm enforcement in the field 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) 
PDG+P:      
  Cooperation decision 
 -0.004 
(0.138) 
   
  Sanctioning of defectors 
 0.003 
(0.033) 
   
PDG+PCP:      
  Cooperation decision 
  0.197 
(0.142) 
  
  Sanctioning of defectors 
  0.074* 
(0.041) 
  
QG+P:       
  Queue-jumping 
   -0.044 
(0.130) 
 
  Sanctioning 
   -0.023 
(0.020) 
 
Cooperation type 
    0.215* 
(0.125) 
Control variables:      
  Female 
-0.032 
(0.405) 
-0.060 
(0.129) 
-0.112 
(0.133) 
-0.021 
(0.136) 
-0.013 
(0.136) 
  Age 
0.033*** 
(0.042) 
0.033*** 
(0.013) 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.033** 
(0.015) 
  Field of study  
0.044 
(0.147) 
0.042 
(0.042) 
0.003 
(0.043) 
0.041 
(0.042) 
0.042 
(0.048) 
  Weather 
-0.034 
(0.144) 
-0.027 
(0.046) 
-0.021 
(0.051) 
-0.028 
(0.045) 
-0.029 
(0.050) 
  Wear 
0.069 
(0.309) 
-0.007 
(0.075) 
-0.021 
(0.078) 
-0.016 
(0.072) 
-0.023 
(0.073) 
N 45 45 45 45 42 
Wald χ2  8.64 8.43 12.98* 13.13* 9.05 
Log pseudo-likelihood -21.274 -21.510 -18.947 -21.053 -19.097 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of probit regression  of norm enforcement in the field. We report the
marginal effects at the mean. An observation in the regression is one subject participating both in the lab and the 
field. OLS regressions yield similar results. Standrd errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 3.7 outlines the results of probit regressions f norm enforcement in the field. In 
specification (I) we examine the relation between norm enforcement in the field and the 
control variables. We further outline several specifications of table 3.6 whereby we 
additionally include the control variables. All specifications confirm the non-parametric 
results in this section: Among the control variables only age is correlated with norm 
enforcement in the field. The willingness to enforce the norm increases by about 3% with 
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each additional year of an observer’s life. The norm enforcement rate might increase with 
age, because the adherence of social norms might become more important for people in the 
course of life. Another explanation might be that peo le rather dare to enforce social norms 
with increasing age. Specifications (II) to (V) indcate that the results of section 3.4.4 hold 
even if we include the control variables.  
 
3.4.6 Results on the Questionnaire Scenarios 
In this section we present of the 66 subjects participating in the lab the intended norm 
enforcement behavior stated in the three questionnare scenarios, each describing the 
violation of a concrete social norm. We ask subjects to rate on a 7-point scale from 0 to 6 
whether they would confront the norm violator in the scenario. The detailed description of the 
scenarios as well as the related questions with the corresponding answers are outlined in 
appendix A.3.3. 
Table 3.5 outlines that non-norm enforcers and norm enforcers in the field only differ 
regarding the stated sanctioning behavior in the Quuing scenario (3.7 versus 5.6), but not in 
the other scenarios. This result is confirmed by specification (VIII) of table 3.6. Hence, stated 
intentions on norm enforcement behavior seem to be correlated with the actual norm 
enforcement behavior in the field, as long as the same social norm is affected. This finding 
confirms former research in social psychology: Within the framework of the theory of 
reasoned action several studies show that stated int ntions have a highly predictive power, as 
long as the intention corresponds to or is compatible with the predicted behavior (Ajzen, 
1991; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2011).  
In the Group task scenario subjects on average completely agree to confront the norm 
violator (5.6), in the Littering scenario they are n utral (2.8) and in Queuing scenario they 
would rather confront the queue-jumper (4.4). Traxler and Winter (2012) find in the domain 
of legal norms survey evidence that law violations with the largest negative externalities are 
punished most frequently. In our study the Group task scenario describes the norm violation 
with the potentially largest negative externality. Accordingly we find that the intended 
sanctioning in this scenario is highest (pair wise Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, p = 0.000, p = 
0.000), which suggests that the result by Traxler and Winter (2012) on the punishment of law 
violations may be extended to the enforcement of social norms.  
This leads us to the question whether a norm enforci g type exists, i.e. somebody who 
generally behaves in a norm enforcing way across several social norms, or whether norm 
enforcement depends on the concrete social norm. The scatterplots in figure 3.1 show that 
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there is hardly any systematic relation between the scenarios with respect to intended norm 
enforcement behavior. This finding is supported by table A.3.1 which outlines the 
correlations between stated norm enforcement in the thr e scenarios. It shows that these 
correlations do not exceed 23.0% and are at best significant at the 10%-level.  
 
Figure 3.1 - Scatterplots of norm enforcement stated in the questionnaire scenarios. 
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Notes: These scatterplots outline the pair wise relations between the three questionnaire scenarios with respect 
to intended norm enforcement. One independent observation in the figures is one out of the 66 subjects 
participating in the lab, respectively. The first scatterplot refers to the relation between the Group task and the 
Littering scenario, the second scatterplot shows the relation between the Group task and the Queuing scenario, 
and the third scatterplot refers to the relation betwe n the Littering and the Queuing scenario.  
 
We additionally calculate Cronbach’s α, the widely accepted index for the internal 
consistency, i.e. the interrelatedness of items (Cortina, 1993). If the number of items is small, 
as is the case in our questionnaire, a value of at least 0.70 can be considered as satisfactory 
and as a necessary but not sufficient condition for unidimensionality (Green et al., 1977; 
Cortina, 1993). Cronbach’s α for the stated norm enforcement in our three scenarios reaches a 
mean value of 0.423, with a one-sided 95% confidence i terval at a value of 0.186 – hence 
clearly below the 0.70 boundary.  
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RESULT 3.6: We do not find evidence for a norm enforcing type. Our questionnaire data 
rather suggest that norm enforcement depends on the concrete social norm violated, and 
specifically on the externality of the norm violation. 
 
Contingent on the stated norm enforcement intentions in the scenarios, we ask the 
subjects for their reasons for confronting or not confronting the norm violator. The results are 
presented in appendix A.3.3. We are especially interes d in the reasons why people do not 
confront the norm violator. Unfortunately in case of the Group task scenario and the Queuing 
scenario no subject states that she would not confront the norm violator. Therefore we do not 
have any information on the reasons for not confronting the violator in these scenarios. In 
case of the Littering scenario subjects most frequently state the fear of counter-punishment 
for not confronting the norm violator (pair wise Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests, p = 0.000, p = 
0.001, 26 obs.). This result further supports our interpretation of result 3.3: Weighing up the 
danger of being counter-punished is crucial for norm enforcement decisions in the field.  
 
 
3.5 Discussion 
In our field experiment we observe a norm enforcement rate of 32.1%. Interestingly this 
rate corresponds to the average expected norm enforc ment rate of 37.6%, which subjects 
state in our lab questionnaire in case of queue-jumping (see appendix A.3.3). Our norm 
enforcement rate lies between the one of 43.3% and 54.0% by Milgram et al. (1986) and 
Schmitt et al. (1992) and the norm enforcement rate of 4.0% for the universal norm and of 
19.3% for the environment-specific norm by Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012). There are 
several reasons that might explain why our norm enforcement is lower than the one by 
Milgram et al. (1986) and Schmitt et al. (1992): A methodological reason might be that in our 
study we do not evaluate as norm enforcing if the qu uer next to the norm violator pushes 
herself in front of the norm violator. In this case w  observe the reaction of the following 
queuers. Secondly, most of the queuers in our study are students, i.e. rather young people. We 
have shown that the likelihood of norm enforcement increases with age. Thirdly, the other 
two studies on queue-jumping are predominantly carried out at the ticket counter of the 
Grand Central Station in New York City, where peopl are in hurry, as they need to reach 
their trains. This might increase the likelihood of norm enforcement. Moreover we cannot 
exclude inter-temporal or cultural differences in norm enforcement. The latter is supported by 
laboratory findings (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Marlowe et al., 2008).  
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On the other hand our norm enforcement rate is higher than the ones by Balafoutas and 
Nikiforakis (2012), which might be due to the different social norms. Interestingly the 
different norm enforcement rates correspond to our results of the questionnaire scenarios that 
also indicate that queue-jumping is more heavily confronted than littering in public places, 
which is one of the norm violations in the field exp riment by Balafoutas and Nikiforakis 
(2012). Our questionnaire data further suggest that the finding by Traxler and Winter (2012), 
that norm enforcement increases with the negative ext rnality of law violations, can be 
extended to the domain of social norms. There are good reasons to assume that queue-
jumping causes larger negative externalities than littering in public places or stopping at the 
left side of the escalator. Secondly, Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012) conduct their field 
experiment in the highly frequented main subway station in Athens. Hence strategic motives 
of norm enforcement are minimized. Our field study is carried out at the subway station near 
the University of Munich which is presumably frequented by less people and it might be 
frequented by several students everyday. Thus, we can not completely exclude the possibility 
that some subjects in our field experiment have seen th  norm violator before. Thus, the 
strategic motives in our field experiment might be enhanced compared to the ones in the 
study by Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (2012). Thirdly, these authors use a more conservative 
measure of norm enforcement than in our field experiment: Only if the observer reacts twice 
this is evaluated as norm enforcing. Fourthly, we cannot exclude cultural differences to 
account for the different norm enforcement rates.   
The main finding of our experiment is that norm enforcement in the field correlates 
with decisions in the lab PDG+PCP – specifically with the cooperation decision and the 
sanctioning of defectors – but it does not correlate with decisions in the PDG+P or the QG+P, 
i.e. the treatments which allow only for a one-sided punishment option. We discuss whether it 
is really the possibility of counter-punishment that is responsible for these different 
correlations or whether there are any design specifics that drive them. Therefore we compare 
the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP in detail. Firstly, one could object that the PDG+P is either 
played as the first or second part, whereas the PDG+PCP is always played as the last – i.e. 
the forth – part. Specifically one could object that learning or order effects drive the different 
correlations. However, as no feedback is given before the last stage of the PDG+PCP, 
learning effects are unlikely to drive the different correlations. Secondly, one could complain 
that we pay out all parts of the lab experiment. Expectations about earnings in former parts 
might influence decisions in later parts. In the light of these first two objections, however, it 
is even more surprising that the norm enforcement bhavior in the field does not correlate 
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with decisions made in the first or second part, bu with decisions made in the forth part, i.e. 
in the PDG+PCP.  
Thirdly, in the PDG+P the feedback on the first and second stage is given at the end of 
the laboratory session, whereas in the PDG+PCP the feedback on both stages is immediately 
given at the beginning of the counter-punishment stage. Thus, the time span between the 
decisions and the corresponding feedback is unequally large. As we are not aware of any 
laboratory study that finds an effect of the time span between decisions and the feedback on 
the decisions, we rather assume that this point is an unlikely candidate to be responsible for 
the main result. However, this might be an interesting methodological research question for 
future research.   
Fourthly, one could object the slightly different feedback format regarding the first 
stage of the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP: In the PDG+P subjects receive feedback – at the end 
of the session – on the individual first stage decisions of each unit member and on their own 
first stage profit, whereas in the PDG+PCP subjects additionally receive feedback on the 
individual first stage profits of their unit members. Nikiforakis (2010) shows that the 
feedback format in a repeated public goods game with a one-sided punishment option affects 
contribution and punishment decisions over time. However, the feedback format does not 
affect decisions in the first period. As the PDG+P and the PDG+PCP are both only played for 
one period, the feedback format is an unlikely to drive our main result. Moreover in the 
prisoners’ dilemma game in comparison to a public goods game it is much easier to derive 
earnings from individual cooperation decisions. In the light of this argumentation we are 
confident to assume that the different correlations between the norm enforcement behavior in 
the field and the decisions in the PDG+PCP in contrast to the decisions in the PDG+P are 
primarily driven by the possibility of counter-punishment.  
Next we discuss the impact of the strategy vector method on the generalizability of our 
main result to lab decisions elicited wit the direct response method. In the lab we implement 
the strategy vector method (Selten, 1967) in each treatment in order to avoid learning effects 
across treatments and to receive information on the sanctioning behavior contingent on all 
possible cooperation decisions of the other unit members. Falk et al. (2005) elicit decisions in 
a three-person prisoners’ dilemma game both with the s rategy vector method and the direct 
response method. They find a qualitatively similar p ttern of punishment decisions, similar 
punishment rates, but a higher punishment severity w h the direct response method. 
Regarding cooperation the vast majority of studies (e.g. Brandts and Charness 2000; for an 
overview see Brandts and Charness, 2011) do not find a significant difference between the 
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direct response and the strategy vector method. Moreover Brandts and Charness (2011) 
conclude that they find no case in which a treatmen effect found with the strategy vector 
method does not hold with the direct response method. Hence, we are confident to assume 
that all significant results that we find for the PDG+PCP also hold with the direct response 
method. As cooperation and punishment rates are not found to differ between the elicitation 
methods, we also assume that our results in the PDG+  and the QG+P regarding cooperation 
and punishment rates also generalize to the elicitation with the direct response method. The 
only case for which we cannot exclude that the elicitat on method might matter is the non-
significant result on the sanctioning level in the PDG+P and QG+P. Except for the latter case 
we are confident to assume that our main finding also extends to laboratory decisions elicited 
with the direct response method.  
Our main result states that norm enforcement in our field experiment correlates by 
29.8% with the cooperation decision and by 30.2% with the level of sanctioning defectors in 
the PDG+PCP. How does this magnitude of correlations relate to findings in social 
psychology? In the context of the person-situation debate many psychological studies report 
correlations of behavior in different situations not exceeding 30% (Mischel, 1968; Ross and 
Nisbett, 1991). In order to obtain a more reliable m asure of individual acts, psychologists 
suggest to aggregate behavior over several situations (Epstein and O’Brian, 1985). In the 
context of these social psychological results the repo ted correlations are quite remarkable, 
especially as we elicit the behavioral measures in the lab and in the field only once.  
Our field experiment contains some restrictions. Specifically, the norm violation is only 
committed by one single norm violator, namely the authoress, as we could not exclude the 
possibility that the queue-jumping provokes aggressiv  reactions or yields a loss of reputation 
for the queue-jumper. Balafoutas and Nikiforakis (201 ) do not find an effect of the norm 
violator’s gender and height on norm enforcement, bu  it is not clear whether this also holds 
for our norm violation. In the field experiment by Milgram et al. (1986) the gender of the 
queue-jumper is varied. However, the authors do not report whether it has an effect on norm 
enforcement or not. A further restriction of our study is that we consider one specific norm 
violation in the field. Thus, generalizations of our main result have to be made with care. Our 
lab-field comparison can be seen as first evidence on the external validity of lab experiments 
regarding norm enforcement. It opens up an interesting avenue for future research on lab-
field comparisons including the violation of further social norms and varying for instance the 
gender, age and height of the norm violator in the field. 
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3.6 Conclusion  
We examine whether norm enforcement in the lab translates to the field. Therefore we 
conduct a within-subjects comparison. In a natural fie d experiment we elicit norm 
enforcement when a norm violator cuts in line. We invite the subjects from the field to the lab 
without revealing that they have participated in a field experiment. In the lab three treatments 
dealing with norm enforcement are implemented, which allows us to run a “horse race” 
between institutions: The standard treatment to examine norm enforcement in the lab – a 
three-person prisoners’ dilemma game with a one-sidd punishment option (see Fehr and 
Gächter, 2000; 2002; Falk et al., 2005) – and a tretm nt additionally allowing for counter-
punishment (Nikiforakis, 2008). Thirdly, we apply a newly created game with which we try 
to represent the situation in the queue in an abstrct way. This so-called “queuing game” 
includes a one-sided punishment option. In addition  the treatments dealing with norm 
enforcement we elicit the cooperation types of subjects.  
Our main finding says that norm enforcement in the field correlates with decisions in 
the lab treatment allowing for counter-punishment, but not with decisions in treatments 
including only a one-sided punishment option. Despit  the differences between lab and field 
with respect to anonymity, stakes, scrutiny, strategic motives etc. (see also Levitt and List, 
2007b) we specifically find that the likelihood of norm enforcement in the field increases 
with the willingness to cooperate and with the sanctio ing of defectors in a prisoners’ 
dilemma game with a two-sided punishment option. Our lab-field comparison is a first 
examination of the external validity of norm enforcement in the lab. Therefore 
generalizations regarding the interpretation and implication of our main result have to be 
made with care. However it suggests the following: Firstly, with respect to norm enforcement 
our main result confirms prior survey evidence that weighing up the danger of being counter-
punished is crucial for norm enforcement decisions in the field. The fact that counter-
punishment opportunities mostly exist in decentralized interactions in the field, whenever 
punishment opportunities exist, even increases the implication of our main result. Secondly, 
concerning the methodological aspect, our main result suggests that more evidence from the 
field is necessary to establish the external validity of the standard treatment with a one-sided 
punishment option. Overall our main finding is encouraging with respect to the 
generalizability of lab behavior to the field. However, it also illustrates that the relevant 
institutional factors of the field need to be incorp rated in the lab to allow for external 
validity. 
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Our further results are the following: We find a norm enforcement rate of 32.1% in the 
field. The likelihood of norm enforcement in the field increases with age and with the 
cooperation type elicited in the lab. Presenting several questionnaire scenarios with violations 
of concrete social norms to the subjects in the lab, we examine whether a norm enforcing 
type exists, i.e. someone who generally behaves in a norm enforcing way across several 
social norms. We find a high external validity of the norm enforcement intentions stated in 
the survey, as long as the same social norm is affected in the survey scenario and in the field. 
However, we do not find evidence for a norm enforcing type. Instead our questionnaire data 
suggest that the likelihood of norm enforcement varies with the concrete social norm 
affected, and specifically with the negative externality of the norm violation. This result can 
be considered as a first indication. We recommend further research including a greater 
number of social norm violations presented to a larger sample of subjects. As our main result 
stresses that the danger of being counter-punished i  crucial for norm enforcement decisions 
in the field we suggest more lab experiments including the possibility of avenging 
punishment. Moreover we recommend more “horse races” of economic institutions to get a 
deeper understanding of certain field behavior. Finally our lab-field comparison can be seen 
as first evidence on the external validity of lab exp riments regarding norm enforcement. It 
opens up an interesting avenue for future research on lab-field comparisons including the 
violation of further social norms in the field.  
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3.7 Appendix A.3 
A.3.1 Instructions (translated from German) 
 
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your participation! 
From now on please do not speak with other participants of the experiment and please turn 
off your mobiles. 
 
 
General remarks about the procedure  
 
This experiment examines decision-making behavior. Y u can earn money, which will be paid cash 
after the experiment. During the experiment you andthe other participants will be asked to take 
decisions. Your decisions as well as the other participants’ decisions will determine your payment 
according to the following rules. 
The experiment will last at most 120 minutes. If you have questions or if something is not clear, you 
can just raise your hands. I will come to you and aswer your question privately. For the sake of 
simplicity we only use male notations in this experiment. 
During the experiment we will not speak of Euros but of Guilders. Your profit during the experiment 
will therefore be calculated in Guilders. At the end of the experiment all your earned Guilders will be 
converted into Euros according to the following exchange rate: 
 
5 Guilders = 1 Euro 
1 Guilder =  0.20 Euros (or 20 Eurocent) 
 
For your punctual appearance you will additionally receive 20 Guilders. At the end of the experiment 
you will receive the sum of all your profits made during the experiment in private and in cash. 
While you are coming to your decisions, a clock will run down in the upper right corner of the screen. 
This will give you an orientation in which time you should take your decisions. Normally you can 
exceed this given time frame. If exceeding the time frame is not possible, we will inform you in 
advance.  
 
Anonymity  
All your inputs over the whole experiment will be anonymous. You will at no time receive personal 
information about the other participants of this exp riment. The elicited data will be encoded and 
treated as confidential. At the end of the experiment you will have to sign a receipt, which will only 
serve our accounting. Neither the sponsor of the experiment will receive any individual data of the 
experiment. Furthermore, at the end of the experiment we will need your written consent for saving 
your elicited data anonymously as well as for analysing it in aggregated form. 
 
Tools 
At your place you find a pen as well as a piece of paper. We ask you to leave both at your table after
having finished the experiment.  
 
The experiment 
The experiment consists of four parts and five questionnaires. For each part of the experiment you 
will receive an instruction. The single parts are further subdivided into several steps and are 
independent of each other, i.e. decisions in one part do not have any influence on later parts of the 
experiment. Your overall earnings arise from the sum of all the earnings you gained within the parts I 
to IV, from the questionnaires and from the 20 Guilders for your punctual appearance. At the end of 
the experiment you will be informed about your overall earnings and about the purpose of this 
experiment. Each of you will then separately receive the payment in cash.  
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Part I - First Stage 
 
You are a member of a randomly created three-person group. Your group thus consists of you and two 
other group members. You will at no time be told the identity of your two group members. The group 
formation with the other two participants is only valid within part I. It is impossible to form another 
group with the same two participants in subsequent parts. 
Part I consists of three stages: Initially, we will explain to you the first step. 
 
First stage 
In the first step you have to calculate the sum of five randomly chosen two-digit numbers which 
appear on the screen. You will be given 5 minutes to calculate the correct sum of a series of these 
problems. For the calculation of the sums you are not allowed to use a calculator. You can, however, 
use the piece of paper at your place. Below you can see an example of how the screen will look like in 
the first stage.  
 
Part I: First Stage 
 
Problem 3 
 
Please calculate the sum of the five numbers 
 
67 65 36 77 33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the last column, the input field, you have to type in the sum of the five given numbers. To confirm 
the sum please press the “OK” button in the lower right corner. After pressing “OK” you will no 
longer be able to change your decision. Afterwards you will be immediately informed whether your 
answer has been correct or not.  
 
At the end of the 5 minutes, you and your group memb rs will be put in a ranking according to the 
quantity of correctly solved problems. The group member that has correctly calculated the largest 
number of problems within the given time will obtain position A; the group member that has correctly 
calculated the second largest number of sums will obtain position B; the group member that has 
correctly calculated the lowest number of sums willobtain position C. If two group members solve 
the same amount of problems correctly, the PC will randomly decide between the two positions.  
 
Your income in the first stage depends on your position within the ranking: 
The group member on position A (we will call him “group member A”) earns 40 Guilders,  
the group member on position B (we will call him “group member B”) earns 30 Guilders,  
the group member on position C (we will call him “group member C”) earns 20 Guilders 
in the first stage. 
 
It is advantageous for you to correctly solve as many problems as possible in the first stage. 
 
Only at the end of the experiment you will be informed about the amount of correctly solved 
problems by your group members and yourself and thus about your position in the ranking.  
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We will now start with the first stage. Afterwards you will be explained the second and the third stage 
of part I. Do you have any questions? If so, please r ise your hand. I will come to your cubicle and 
answer your questions privately.  
 
 
Part I – Second and Third Stage 
(The instruction for the second and third stage wasonly presented after the accomplishment 
of the first stage) 
 
The general decision situation  
 
Based on the amount of correctly solved problems a ranking out of you and your two group members 
was set up in the first stage. You will get to know your position at the end of the experiment.  
 
In the following we will first explain to you the general decision situation in the second and the third
stage. Afterwards you will find on the screen some sample exercises to familiarise yourself with the 
decision situation. After that you will learn the precise procedure of the second and the third stage. 
 
Second stage 
In the second stage the group member on position C (group member C) decides whether 
• the original ranking of the group members’ income from the first step should be 
maintained or 
• whether an alternative ranking should apply. 
If group member C chooses the alternative ranking, the group members will earn the following 
income: 
Group member C earns 40 Guilders. 
Group member A earns 30 Guilders. 
Group member B earns 20 Guilders. 
 
If group member C chooses the original ranking from the first stage, the group members will earn the 
same income as determined in the first stage. 
 
Third stage 
If group member C maintains in the second step the original ranking (from the first stage), your 
income of the first stage will count as your final income from part I and a third stage will not take 
place anymore.  
 
If group member C however chooses the alternative ranking of incomes in the second stage, 
group member A can reduce group member C’s income from the second stage or leave it 
unchanged. Group member A can reduce group member C’s income by allocating deduction points 
to C. 
 
The allocation of deduction points has an impact on the incomes of group members A and C. First we 
describe the impact on group member C’s income. If group member A allocates deduction points to 
C, the 40 Guilders of group member C from the second stage will be reduced by three times the 
allocated deduction points. If, for example, group member C receives one deduction point from 
group member A, then in part I group member C will earn 40 – 1 * 3 = 37 Guilders. If group member 
C, however, receives 3 deduction points, then group member C will earn 40 – 3 * 3 = 31 Guilders etc. 
Thus, every deduction point that group member C receiv s will reduce his income by 3 Guilders. 
Please note that group member A can allocate at most 10 deduction points to group member C.  
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If group member A allocates deduction points to group member C, then group member A has to 
bear cost as well. Every deduction point that group member A allocates to group member C costs 
group member A one Guilder each. If, for example, group member A allocates one deduction point 
to 
 group member C, then group member A earns in part I 30 – 1 * 1 = 29 Guilders. If group member A, 
for example, allocates 8 deduction points to group member C, then A earns 30 – 8 * 1 = 22 Guilders.  
 
Thus, the following income (in Guilders) for group member C results in part I: 
= 40 – 3 * (the number of received deduction points) 
 
Thus, the following income (in Guilders) for group member A results in part I: 
= 30 – 1 * (the number of allocated deduction points) 
 
The income (in Guilders) of group member B is in any case: 
= 20 
 
Please note that these rules only apply if group member C chooses the alternative ranking in the 
second stage.  
 
Control questions 
Before continuing with the instruction, we ask you t  complete the sample exercises on your screen. 
In case of questions please raise your hand. I will then come to your cubicle and answer your 
questions privately.  
 
 
Part I – Second and Third Stage 
 
Procedure 
 
The second and the third stage contain the decision situation as described above. You will take your 
decisions in both stages of part I only once. In doing so, you take your decision in the second stage 
assuming to be group member C and in the third stage assuming to be group member A.  
 
Second stage 
In the second stage, for the case of being group member C, you have to indicate whether the 
original distribution of incomes from the first stage should be maintained or whether it should be 
changed as described above. If you take this decision n the second stage you do not know whether 
you are group member C or not. Therefore you should consider your decision carefully, as it could be 
relevant for you.  
Only at the end of the experiment you will get to know whether you are group member C or not, i.e. 
whether your second stage decision is payoff-relevant for all members of your group or whether the 
second stage decision of another group member will be payoff-relevant.  
 
Third stage 
In the third stage we assume that group member C chose the alternative income ranking in the 
second stage and that you are group member A. If you make the decision in the third stage you d 
not know which group member you are and whether group member C chose the alternative ranking in 
the second stage. However, your decision in the third stage could be payoff-relevant for you. Please 
think about your decision carefully.  
 
In the third stage you indicate whether you want to distribute deduction points to group member C 
and, if yes, how many – always assuming you are group member A and that group member C chose 
the alternative ranking in the second stage. The screen in this stage looks as follows: 
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You have to type in a number between 0 and 10 in the input field. You definitely have to make an 
input. If you do not want to change the income of group member C you have to type in “0”. If you 
want to distribute, for example, 3 deduction points please type in “3” etc. You can distribute at most 
10 deduction points to group member C. If you have made your decision, please press the “OK” 
button. Then you will not be able to revise your decision. 
 
You take your decision only once. You will be informed about the result of part I at the end of the 
experiment, after finishing the questionnaires. Then you will get to know how many problems your 
two group members and yourself correctly answered in the first stage and as which group member 
you arise from the first stage. Furthermore all participants of your group will learn to know the 
decision of group member C in the second stage and the number of deduction points group member C 
received. Every participant will be informed about his own income of part I.  
 
Do you have any questions? If so, please raise your hand. I will come to your cubicle and answer your 
questions privately.  
 
 
Part II 
(Parts and instruction were presented sequentially) 
 
The general decision situation 
 
First we will explain to you the general decision situation. Afterwards you will find some sample 
exercises on the screen, which will help you to famili rise yourself with the decision situation. After 
that you will learn the precise procedure of part II.  
 
You are again a member of a randomly matched t ree-person group. Thus, your group consists of 
you and two other group members. You will at no time be told the identity of your two group 
members. The group formation with the other two participants is only valid in part II. It is impossible 
to form a group with the same two participants as in part I or to form a group with the same persons in 
subsequent parts. 
 
Part II consists of two stages. In the first stage you take a decision between two options: Option A 
and option B. In the second stage you then decide whether you want to reduce the first stage 
income of the other two group members or not and, if so, by how much. This can be done by 
allocating deduction points. In the following we will explain part II in detail.  
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Part I – Third stage 
 
Assume that you are group member A and that group member C in the second 
stage chose the alternative ranking.  
Please decide as group member A, whether you want to distribute deduction 
points to group member C and, if yes, how many:  
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First Stage 
In the first stage of part II you decide between two options: option A and option B. The other two 
members of your group also decide between option A and option B. The income of each group 
member in the first stage of part II will be determined in the same way according to the following 
payoff matrix: 
 
This means: 
If all three group members choose option B, then all three group members receive in the first stage of 
part II 36 Guilders each, i.e. you as well as your two group members will earn 36 Guilders each in the 
first stage of part II.  
If you and a second group member both choose option B, whereas the third group member chooses 
option A, then you and the second group member will receive 24 Guilders each. The third group 
member, who chose option A, will then receive 44 Guilders. 
If you choose option B and your two group members choose option A, then you will receive 12 
Guilders in the first stage of part II, whereas your two group members earn 32 Guilders each.  
 
If all three group members choose option A, then all three ones will receive 20 Guilders each.  
If you and a second group member choose option A while t e third group member chooses option B, 
then you and the second group member will receive 32 Guilders each. The third group member, who 
chose option B, will then receive 12 Guilders.  
If you choose option A and your two group members choose option B, then you will receive 44 
Guilders in the first stage of part II. The two other group members will then receive 24 Guilders each.  
 
Thus, your earnings in the first stage depend on your own decision as well as on the decision of the 
other two group members. As soon as all members of your group took their decision in the first stage, 
the second stage follows. 
 
Second Stage 
In the second stage you may reduce the income of each other group member by allocating 
deduction points. You may also leave the incomes unchanged. The other two group members can 
reduce your income in the same way, if they want to.  
 
In the following we will describe how the distribution of deduction points affects the incomes: If you 
allocate deduction points to one of the group members, you will reduce his first stage income by 
three times your distributed deduction points. If, for example, you allocate 1 deduction point to 
another group member, then you will reduce his first stage income by 3 Guilders. If you allocate to 
another group member 2 deduction points, you will reduce his income by 6 Guilders, etc. Thus, each 
deduction point, which you allocate to another group member, will reduce his income by 3 Guilders. 
Equally, each deduction point allocated to you reduc s your first stage income by 3 Guilders. Please 
note that you can allocate at most 10 deduction points per group member.  
 
Cost of received deduction points (in Guilders) = 3* (sum of received deduction points) 
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 Your two group 
members both choose 
Option A 
One group member 
chooses Option A, the 
other chooses Option B 
Your two group 
members both choose 
Option B 
You choose 
Option A 
20 32 44 
You choose 
Option B 
12 24 36 
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If you allocate deduction points, you have to bear cost in Guilders as well. Each distributed 
deduction point costs you one Guilder. For example, if you allocate altogether 4 deduction points, 
this will cost you 4 Guilders and so on. If you do n t allocate deduction points, then there obviously 
will not arise any cost to you. 
 
Your income at the end of the second stage, i.e. your income in part II, will be therefore calculated as 
follows: 
 
Your income (in Guilders) at the end of the second stage = 
= First stage income – 3 * (sum of received deduction points) – sum of distributed deduction points 
 
For example, if your first stage income amounts to 36 Guilders and if you received from the other two 
group members altogether 3 deduction points in the second stage while distributing one deduction 
point to another group member, then your income will be calculated as 36 – 3 * 3 – 1 = 26 Guilders. 
In contrast, if your first stage income amounts to 20 Guilders and if you receive 2 deduction points 
and you do not allocate any deduction points in the second stage, then your income of part II will be 
calculated as 20 – 2 * 3 – 0 = 14 Guilders. 
 
Please note that the income of one group member cannot be reduced further than to 0 Guilders 
by the other two group members. This means, if the cost of the received deduction p i ts is larger 
than the group member’s first stage income, his income will be reduced to 0 Guilders and not further. 
Nevertheless, even in this case the group member has to bear the cost of his distributed deduction 
points.  
 
This means that your income (in Guilders) may be negative at the end of the second stage in part II, if 
your cost of distributing deduction points in the second stage exceed your (possibly reduced) first 
stage income. However, you can avoid such losses in part II with certainty by virtue of your own 
decision. Possible losses will be covered by the 20 Guilders, which you received automatically in the 
beginning of the experiment and which will be charged against your overall income of the experiment 
at the end.  
 
Control questions 
Before continuing with the instruction, we ask you t  complete the sample exercises on your screen. 
In case of questions please raise your hand. I will then come to your cubicle and answer your 
questions privately.  
 
 
Part II 
 
Procedure 
 
Part II includes the decision situation as described above. You take your decision in part II only once. 
 
First Stage 
You take your decision in the first stage by selecting either the field “I choose option A” or the field 
“I choose option B”. If you have taken your decision please click on the “OK” button.  
 
Second Stage 
Only at the end of the experiment after finishing the questionnaires you will learn how the other two 
participants decided in the first stage. Therefore you have to indicate in the second stage for each 
possible case how many deduction points you want to dis ribute. There are four possible cases: 
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Case 1: The other two group members chose option A.  
Case 2: The second group member chose option A and the third member chose option B. 
Case 3: The second group member chose option B and the third member chose option A. 
Case 4: The other two group members chose option B. 
 
For all four possible cases you have to decide whether you want to allocate deduction points to the 
other group members and, if so, how many. So that you can take your decision, four input screens 
representing the four cases will arise. We show you the third screen (case 3) as an example: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The screen shows case 3 in which the second group member chose option B and the third group 
member chose option A. We suppose that you chose option B in the first stage. Now you have to 
decide for this case, whether you want to distribute deduction points to the other two group members 
and, if so, how many.  
The screen is built as follows: 
• The second row indicates the decision between option A and option B i the first stage. 
• The third row  indicates the income of each group member that results from the first stage. 
Under the heading “You” you find your income and in the third and fourth column you see 
the incomes of the other two group members. 
• In the fourth row (“Your decision in the second stage”) you have to decide, how many 
deduction points you want to distribute to each of the other two group members by indicating 
a number between 0 and 10 in each input field. You definitely have to make an input. If you 
do not want to change the income of one of the group members, you indicate “0”. If you want 
to distribute for example 7 deduction points you have to indicate “7” etc. You can distribute 
at most 10 deduction points to each member of your group.  
 
First you take your decision for case 1. As soon as you made your input, please click on the “OK” 
button. Then the second screen (case 2) will appear, followed by the third (case 3) and the fourth (case 
4) screen. Thus, with regard to the distribution of the deduction points you take 8 decisions in total n 
four screens. 
 
Obviously, the other two group members only took one combination of decisions in the first stage. 
This means, that only one of the four cases actually applies. For your payoff it will therefore be 
relevant how you decided in this specific case.  
 
For example, imagine that case 1 applies (the second as well as the third group member chose option 
A): This means, that your decision on the first screen will be payoff-relevant. The deduction points 
you indicated in case 1 determine your payoff and the payoff of the other two group members. In 
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Part II – Second stage 
 
Please decide whether you want to distribute deduction points and, if so, how many: 
 
Case 3 
 
 You Second group 
member 
Third group 
member 
First stage decision  Option B Option B Option A 
First stage income  24 24 44 
Your decision in the 
second stage 
---   
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contrast, if case 3 applies, the decisions you tookon the third screen will be payoff-relevant. 
 
You take your decision only once. At the end of the experiment, after finishing thequestionnaires, 
you will get to know how the other two group members decided in the first stage, the number of 
deduction points you received in the second stage as well as your earnings from part II.  
 
Do you have any questions? If so, I will come to your cubicle and answer them privately. 
 
 
Part III 
 
The general decision situation 
 
Again we will first outline the general decision situation. Afterwards you will learn the procedure of 
part III in detail.  
 
You are again a member of a randomly matched t ree-person group. You will at no time be told the 
identity of your two group members. It is impossible to form a group with the same two participants 
from former parts or to form a group with the same persons in part IV. 
 
In part III you have to decide again between option A and option B. The other two members of 
your group have to decide as well between option A and option B. The income of each group member 
will be determined in the same way according to the following payoff matrix: 
 
 Your two group 
members both choose 
Option A 
One group member 
chooses Option A, the 
other chooses Option B 
Your two group 
members both choose 
Option B 
You choose 
Option A 
20 32 44 
You choose 
Option B 
12 24 36 
 
This means: 
If all three group members choose option B, then all three group members receive 36 Guilders each in 
part III and so on. 
 
Procedure 
 
Part III includes the decision situation as described above. You take your decision in part III only 
once.  
 
Your input  
As described above you have the choice between option A and option B. In part III, each group 
member has to take two types of decisions, which we will call in the following the unconditional 
decision and the decision table. 
• When taking your unconditional decision you simply choose between option A and option B. 
As soon as you have taken your unconditional decision, please press the “OK” button. 
• You will then be asked to fill in a decision table. In the decision table you have to indicate 
for each possible combination of unconditional decis ons of the other two group 
members, how you want to decide yourself between option A and option B. Thus, you 
have to take your decision between option A and option B depending on how the other two 
group members made their unconditional decisions. The screen will be built up as follows: 
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In the first row of the table above you see the possible combinations of unconditional decisions of 
the other two group members. For each of those thre possible combinations you now select in the 
second row option A or option B – given the decision  f the other two group members. You have 
to choose an option for each possible combination of decisions of the other two group members. 
Thus, you have to indicate how you decide between option A and option B, if both of the other 
group members choose option A, if only one chooses ption A and the other one chooses option B 
and if both choose option B. After having taken all three decisions on the screen, please press the 
“OK” button. 
 
Payoff relevance of the decision table 
As soon as all participants have taken their decisions, the computer randomly chooses one member in 
each group. For this randomly chosen member only his filled in decision table will be payoff-
relevant. For the other two group members, who are not chosen, the unconditional decision is 
payoff-relevant. When you fill in your decision table, you obviously do not know whether you will be 
the group member who is randomly chosen. Thus, you have to make both types of decisions very 
carefully, as both could become relevant for you. We present two examples: 
 
Example 1: Suppose you are the randomly chosen group member, i.e. your decision table is 
payoff-relevant. Thus, for the other two group members the unconditional decision is payoff-
relevant. Suppose that one of the other two group members chose option A as unconditional decision, 
while the other one chose option B as unconditional decision.  
If you indicated in your decision table to choose option A if one of the other group members chooses 
option A and the other one chooses option B, then you earn 32 Guilders in part III. The other group 
member, who chose option A, earns 32 Guilders as well. The group member who chose option B 
earns 12 Guilders in part III.  
In contrast, if you selected in your decision table option B if one of the other group members chooses 
option A and the other one chooses option B, then you earn 24 Guilders. The group member who 
chose option A earns 44 Guilders. The group member, who also chose option B, earns 24 Guilders as 
well.  
 
Example 2: Suppose you have not been chosen, so that for you and another group member the 
unconditional decision is payoff-relevant. We assume that your unconditional decision is option B 
and the one of the other group member is also option B. If the randomly chosen group member 
indicated in his decision table to choose option A, if the other two members chose option B, then you 
and the other group member, who chose option B, earn 24 Guilders each. The group member, who 
selected in the decision table option A, if the other two ones choose option B, earns 44 Guilders. 
In contrast, if the randomly chosen group member select d in the decision table option B as well, if 
the other two members choose option B, then all three group members earn 36 points each. 
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Part III 
 
Your conditional decision (Decision table): 
 
Combinations of 
unconditional 
decisions of the 
other group 
members 
Your two group 
members both 
choose Option A 
One of your group 
members chooses Option 
A, the other group 
member chooses Option 
B 
Your two group 
members both 
choose Option B 
Your decision ○ Option A 
○ Option B 
○ Option A 
○ Option B 
○ Option A 
○ Option B 
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You take your decisions only once. You will be informed about the result of part III at the end of the 
experiment, after finishing the questionnaires. Then you will get to know which decision is payoff-
relevant for you (your unconditional decision or the decision table), the corresponding decisions of 
your group members and your earnings in part III. 
 
 
Part IV 
 
The general decision situation 
 
Firs we will explain to you the general decision situation. Then you will find some sample exercises 
on the screen, which will help you to familiarize yourself with the decision situation. Afterwards you 
will learn the procedure of part IV in detail.  
 
You are again a member of a randomly matched t ree-person group. Thus, your group consists of 
you and two other group members. You will at no time be told the identity of your two group 
members. The group formation with the other two participants is only valid in part IV. It is impossible 
to form a group with the same participants from forme  parts. 
 
Part IV consists of three stages. In the first stage you decide again between option A and option B. 
In the second stage you decide whether you want to reduce the individual first stage income of 
the other two group members or not and, if so, by how much. This can be done by allocating 
deduction points. In the third stage you can then decide, whether or by how much you want to 
reduce the income of those group members from whom you received deduction points in the 
second stage. This can be done by allocating counter-points. In the following we describe part IV in 
detail.  
 
First Stage 
In the first stage of part IV you decide again between option A and option B. The income of each 
group member will be determined in the same way according to the following payoff matrix: 
 
 Your two group 
members both choose 
Option A 
One group member 
chooses Option A, the 
other chooses Option B 
Your two group 
members both choose 
Option B 
You choose 
Option A 
20 32 44 
You choose 
Option B 
12 24 36 
 
This means: 
If all three group members choose option B, then all three group members receive 36 Guilders in the 
first stage of part IV and so on. 
 
Second Stage 
In the second stage you can reduce the income of each other group member by allocating 
deduction points. You can leave the income also unchanged. The other group members can reduce 
your income in the same way, if they want to.  
 
Again the following rule applies: If you allocate dduction points to one of the other group members, 
you will reduce his income by three times your distributed deduction points. Likewise each 
distributed deduction point to you reduces your income by 3 Guilders. Please note that you can 
allocate at most 10 deduction points per group member. 
 
Cost of received deduction points (in Guilders) = 3* (sum of received deduction points) 
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If you allocate deduction points, you have to bear cost in Guilders as well. Each distributed 
deduction point costs you one Guilder.  
 
Thus, your income at the end of the second stage will be calculated as follows: 
 
Your income (in Guilders) at the end of the second stage = 
= First stage income – 3 * (sum of received deduction points) – sum of distributed deduction points 
 
Please note: The income of one group member cannot be reduced further than to 0 Guilders by 
the other two group members. This means that if the cost of received deduction p ints are larger 
than the group member’s first stage income, his income will be reduced to 0 Guilders and not further. 
Nevertheless, even in this case the group member has to bear the cost of his distributed deduction 
points.  
 
Since your income at the end of the second stage can be negative, possible losses will be covered by 
the lump sum of 20 Guilders. 
 
Third Stage 
Then you have the possibility to redistribute points to those group members from whom you 
received deduction points in the second stage. We will call these points counter-points. Please 
note  that you can allocate counter-points only to those group members from whom you received 
deduction points in the second stage. Group members with a negative income or an income of 
zero are neither able to distribute counter-points nor to receive any. Again you can only distribute 
at most 10 counter-points per group member. 
 
The income reduction based on received counter-points as well as the cost for distributing counter-
points arise analogously to the second stage. This means: If you allocate counter-points to one of the 
group members, you will reduce his income by three times your distributed counter-points. 
Likewise, each counter-point distributed to you reduces your income by 3 Guilders. If you distribute 
counter-points there will arise costs in Guilders for you. Each distributed counter-point will cost 
you one Guilder. Thus, your income at the end of the third stage results as follows: 
 
Your income (in Guilders) at the end of the third stage = 
= Second stage income – 3 * (sum of received counter-points) – sum of distributed counter-points 
 
For example, if your income at the end of the second stage amounts to 20 Guilders and you receive in 
the third stage altogether 3 counter-points of the other two group members and you distribute 1 
counter-point to one group member, then your income in part IV will be calculated as  20 – 3 * 3 – 1 
= 10 Guilders. 
 
Please note: Analogously to the second stage he income of one group member cannot be reduced 
further than to 0 Guilders by the other two group members. This means, if the cost of the 
received counter-points are larger than the group member’s second stage income, his income will be 
reduced to 0 Guilders and not further. Nevertheless, ven in this case the group member has to bear 
the cost of his distributed counter-points.  
 
Since your income at the end of the second stage can be negative, possible losses will be covered by 
the lump sum of 20 Guilders. 
 
Control questions 
Before continuing with the instruction, we ask you t  complete the sample exercises on your screen. 
In case of questions please raise your hand. I will then come to your cubicle and answer your 
questions privately.  
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Part IV 
 
Procedure 
 
Part IV includes the decision situation as described above. You take your decision in part IV only 
once.  
 
First stage 
In the first stage all participants take their decision between option A and option B by selecting either 
“I choose option A” or “I choose option B” on the screen.  
 
Second stage 
You will be informed about the decision of the other two group members only at the end of the 
experiment after having finished the questionnaires. Therefore you have to determine in the second 
stage how many deduction points you want to allocate in each possible case. There are again four 
possible cases: 
Case 1: The other two group members chose option A.  
Case 2: The second group member chose option A and the third member chose option B. 
Case 3: The second group member chose option B and the third member chose option A. 
Case 4: The other two group members chose option B. 
 
For all four possible cases you have to decide whether you want to allocate deduction points to the 
other group members and, if so, how many. So that you can take your decision, four input screens will 
arise again. You have to indicate a number between 0 and 10 in each input field. 
 
Obviously, only one of the four possible cases actually applies. How you decided in this specific case 
will determine your payoff.  
 
Third stage 
In the third stage you decide, whether or how many counter-points you want to allocate. In the 
following we exemplarily show you how the screen will be built up: 
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Part IV – Third stage 
 
Please decide whether you want to distribute counter-points and, if so, how many: 
 
 You Second group 
member 
Third group 
member 
First stage decision Option A Option A Option B 
First stage income  32 32 12 
Your distributed deduction 
points in the second stage 
--- 3 1 
Your received deduction 
points in the second stage 
--- 1 2 
Your decision in the third 
stage ---   
 
OK 
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• The second row indicates the decisions between option A and option B in the first stage. We 
exemplarily assume that you chose option A, the second group member chose option A and 
the third group member chose option B. 
• The third row  indicates the income of each group member that results from the first stage 
decisions. Under the heading “You” you find your income and in the third and fourth column 
you see the incomes of the other two group members. 
• In the fourth row (“Your distributed deduction points in the second stage”) you again see the 
deduction points that you allocated to the second and the third group member in the second 
stage.  
• The fifth row  (“Your received deduction points in the second stage”) shows the amount of 
deduction points that you received from the second and the third group member in the second 
stage.  
• In the sixth row (“Your decision in the third stage”) you now indicate, how many counter-
points you want to distribute to each of the other two group members by entering in the sixth 
row a number between 0 and 10 in each input field. Please note: You can only allocate 
counter-points to those group members from whom you received deduction points in the 
second stage. Furthermore you can only distribute counter-points to another group member if 
your income and the income of the other member are positive. These three conditions are 
fulfilled if an input field appears under the header of the other two group members in the fifth 
row. Otherwise you cannot allocate counter-points to the particular group member and no 
input field will appear on the screen. 
 
At the end of the experiment you will be informed about the amount of received counter-points as 
well as about your income in part IV.  
 
Do you have questions? If so, I will come to your cbi le and answer them privately. 
 
 
Five Questionnaires 
 
Finally you will have to answer five short questionnaires. These questionnaires are an important part 
of our research. Please answer honestly and spontaneously. Of course, your answers are anonymous.  
Partly you can give free answers. In this case you will see a blue chat box on the screen. If you write 
your answer in the blue box and press afterwards “Enter” your response will be saved.  
On the last page we will ask you to indicate your personal code, which will be explained to you on the 
PC and which serves to make your data anonymous.  
For filling in the questionnaires you receive in total 10 Guilders, or 2 Euros. 
 
 
Feedback, Clarification and Payoff 
 
You now receive information about the decisions of your respective group members in the parts I to 
IV and about your income. 
Finally we need your consent that we are allowed to an nymously save and analyse your data. 
Therefore we inform you about the purpose of this experiment.  
 
Payoff 
At the end you individually receive your income in cash. This is made up of: 
Your income from part I 
+ your income from part II 
+ your income from part III 
+ your income from part IV 
+ 2 euros for the completion of the questionnaires 
+ the rest of the 4 euros for your punctual appearance.  
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A.3.2 Control questions for the QG+P 
 
Control question 1:  
You are a member of a three-person group. Imagine group member C chooses in the second stage the 
alternative ranking. What will be your income (in Guilders) at the end of the second stage, if … 
  a) … you come out as group member A of the first stage? 
  b) … you come out as group member B of the first stage? 
  c) What will be the income of group member C? 
 
Control question 2: 
You are a member of a three-person group. Imagine you are group member A and group member C 
chooses in the second stage the alternative ranking. What will be your income (in Guilders) at the end 
of the third stage, if … 
  a) … you distribute 0 points to group member C in the third stage? 
  b) … you distribute 3 points to group member C in the third stage? 
  c) … you distribute 8 points to group member C in the third stage? 
  d) In all these cases what will be the income of group member B at the end of the third stage, if 
group member C has chosen the alternative ranking? 
 
Control question 3: 
You are a member of a three-person group. Imagine you are group member C and you choose the 
alternative ranking in the second stage. What will be your income (in Guilders) at the end of the third 
stage, if … 
  a) … group member A distributes 0 points to you in the third stage? 
  b) … group member A distributes 3 points to you in the third stage? 
  c) … group member A distributes 8 points to you in the third stage? 
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A.3.3 Post-experimental questionnaire on scenarios  
Numbers in square brackets indicate the average agrement with the statements on a 7-point 
Likert scale from “0 - completely disagree” to “6 - completely agree” respectively. Numbers 
in round brackets refer to the standard deviations each. If necessary, the number of 
observations is indicated respectively. The numbers r garding the emotions anger and fear 
indicate the difference to the corresponding baseline emotions respectively.  
 
Group task scenario  
Imagine you are a student and attend a university course. In this course students are divided into 
groups of three to accomplish in their group a student project until the end of the semester. Your 
group splits the project into three parts, whereby all group members agree to accomplish one part 
each. You arrange to meet shortly before the deadline to merge the three parts. On the day of the 
planned meeting, one of your group members announces per email without further explanation that he 
did not accomplish his part. If his part is missing, the whole group will not pass the course. You now 
accidentally meet this group member on the corridor of the university building.  
• Please rate your emotions towards this person. 
Anger: [3.742 (2.143)] 
Fear:    [0.015 (1.130)] 
• Would you confront the group member? [5.636 (0.871)] 
o In case of no norm enforcement: Why would you not confront the group member?  
– In order to avoid tension. [--] 
– Because I do not find it especially badly if somebody does not accomplish his part of 
the project. [--] 
– Because the group member probably has a good reason for not having accomplished 
her part. [--] 
– Because I prefer the third person in the group to confront the group member.  [--] 
– Other: free text. 
o In case of norm enforcement: Why would you confront the group member?  
– In order to make the group member accomplish his part in the future. [3.905 (2.006), 
63 obs.] 
– Because it is wrong not to accomplish one’s part of he project. [5.476 (1.030), 63 
obs.] 
– Other: free text. 
 
Littering scenario  
Imagine you are standing at the subway station withsome other pedestrians and you are waiting for 
the subway. Another pedestrian throws his litter on the ground when he passes you.  
• Please rate your emotions towards this person. 
Anger: [2.591 (2.267)] 
Fear:    [-0.106 (1.191)] 
• Would you call on the pedestrian to bin his litter? [2.758 (1.815)] 
o In case of no norm enforcement: Why would you not call on the pedestrian? 
– In order to avoid tension. [4.423 (1.474), 26 obs.] 
– Because I don’t find it especially badly, if somebody litters. [1.308 (1.644), 26 obs.] 
– Because I prefer other persons to confront the pedestrian. [2.500 (2.140), 26 obs.] 
– Other: free text. 
o In case of norm enforcement: Why would you call on the pedestrian?  
– In order to make the pedestrian binning his litter in the future. [4.227 (2.045), 22 obs.] 
– Because it is wrong to litter. [5.773 (0.429), 22 obs.] 
– Other: free text. 
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Queuing scenario  
Imagine you are standing in a waiting line. Someone cuts in line directly in front of you.  
• Please rate your emotions towards this person. 
Anger: [2.985 (2.072)] 
Fear:    [-0.333 (1.072)] 
• Would you call on this person to go to the end of the line? [4.394 (1.709)] 
o In case of no norm enforcement: Why would you not call on the person?  
– In order to avoid tension. [--] 
– Because I do not find it especially badly if somebody cuts in line. [--] 
– Because the person presumably accidentally cut in line. [--] 
– Because I prefer other persons waiting in the line to confront the person. [--] 
– Other: free text. 
o In case of norm enforcement: Why would you call on the person?  
– In order to make the other person going to the end of the line in the future. [3.688 
(1.980), 48 obs.] 
– Because it is wrong to cut in line. [5.438 (1.319), 48 obs.] 
– Other: free text. 
 
 
What do you think:  
• Out of 100 persons how many know the social norm to line up at the end of the line? [97.0 
(4.861)] 
• Out of 100 persons how many confront another person who cuts in line directly in front of 
them? [37.6 (26.561)] 
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A.3.4 Photos of the field experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norm violator 
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Norm violator 
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A
.3.5 T
ables 
 
N. enfor. 
Queuing 
scenario 
 
-0.085 
0.055 
 
0.021 
0.193 
 
-0.011 
0.153 
-0.102 
 
0.230* 
0.212* 
 
N. enfor. 
Littering 
scenario 
 
0.033 
0.003 
 
-0.090 
-0.013 
 
-0.007 
0.090 
-0.037 
 
0.192 
 
0.212* 
Scenarios 
N. enfor. 
Group 
task sce. 
 
0.135 
-0.006 
 
0.235* 
0.041 
 
0.073 
0.034 
0.020 
 
 
0.192 
0.230* 
Coop. 
type 
 
0.368** 
0.036 
 
0.245* 
0.097 
 
-0.310** 
0.069 
 
 
0.020 
-0.037 
-0.102 
Sanction. 
 
-0.144 
0.645*** 
 
-0.009 
0.541*** 
 
-0.104 
 
0.069 
 
0.034 
0.090 
0.153 
QG+P 
Queue-
jumping 
 
-0.017 
0.055 
 
-0.132 
0.091 
 
 
-0.104 
-0.310** 
 
0.073 
-0.007 
-0.011 
Sanction. 
of 
defectors 
 
-0.197 
0.737*** 
 
0.154 
 
 
0.091 
0.541*** 
0.097 
 
0.041 
-0.013 
0.193 
PDG+PCP 
Coop. 
decision 
 
0.498*** 
0.089 
 
 
0.154 
 
-0.132 
-0.009 
0.245* 
 
0.235* 
-0.090 
0.021 
Sanction. 
of 
defectors 
 
0.011 
 
 
0.089 
0.737*** 
 
0.055 
0.645*** 
0.036 
 
-0.006 
0.003 
0.055 
PDG+P 
Coop. 
decision 
 
 
0.011 
 
0.498*** 
-0.197 
 
-0.017 
-0.144 
0.368** 
 
0.135 
0.033 
-0.085 
 
PDG+P 
  Coop. decision 
  Sanctioning of 
  defectors 
PDG+PCP 
  Coop. decision 
  Sanctioning of  
  defectors 
QG+P 
  Queue-jump. 
  Sanctioning 
Coop. type 
Scenarios 
  N. enf.: Group 
  task scenario 
  N. enf.:Lit- 
  tering scenario 
  N enf.: Queu- 
  ing scenario 
 
Notes: This table outlines the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients between laboratory decisions. An independent observation in the table  
 is one out of the 66 subjects participating in the lab . Kendall correlation coefficients yield similar results.  
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Table A.3.1 - Correlation matrix: Decisions made in the lab.      
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Table A.3.2 - Probit regressions of norm enforcement (willingness to anction included). 
Dep. var.:  
Norm enforcement in the field 
(I) (II) (III) 
PDG+P:    
  Cooperation decision 
0.018 
(0.132) 
  
  Willingness to sanction defectors 
0.062 
(0.134) 
  
PDG+PCP:    
  Cooperation decision  
0.261* 
(0.138) 
 
  Willingness to sanction defectors  
0.224§ 
(0.159) 
 
QG+P:     
  Queue-jumping   
-0.035 
(0.134) 
  Willingness to sanction   
0.035 
(0.134) 
N 45 45 45 
Wald χ2  0.24 6.81** 0.14 
Log pseudo-likelihood -25.985 -22.882 -26.024 
 
Notes: This table outlines the results of probit regression  of norm enforcement in the field. We report the
marginal effects at the mean. An observation in the regression is one of the 45 subjects participating both in the 
lab and the field. OLS regressions yield similar results. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. § denotes p = 0.135. 
 
 
 157 
REFERENCES 
 
ABBINK, K., J. BRANDTS, B. HERRMANN, AND H. ORZEN (2010): Intergroup conflict 
and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game. American Economic 
Review 100, 420-447. 
ABELE, S., G. STRASSER, AND C. CHARTIER (2010): Conflict and coordination in the 
provision of public goods: A conceptual analysis of c ntinuous and step-level games. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 14, 385-401. 
AI, C. AND E. C. NORTON (2003): Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics 
Letters 80, 123-129. 
AJZEN, I. (1991): The theory of planned behaviour. O ganizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes 50, 179-211.  
AJZEN, I. AND M. FISHBEIN (2011): Predicting and changing behavior: The reasoned 
action approach. Taylor & Francis Group. 
AMBRUS, A. AND B. GREINER (2012): Imperfect public monitoring with costly 
punishment – An experimental study. American Economic Review 102, 3317-3332. 
ANDERSON, C. M. AND L. PUTTERMAN (2006): Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law 
of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism. 
Games and Economic Behavior 54, 1-24. 
ANDREONI, J., W. T. HARBAUGH, AND L. VESTERLUND (2003): The carrot or the 
stick: Rewards, punishments and cooperation. American Economic Review 93, 893-902. 
AUBE, C. AND V. ROUSSEAU (2005): Team goal commitment and team ffectiveness: The 
role of task interdependence and supportive behaviours. Group Dynamics: Theory, 
Research, and Practice 9, 189-204. 
BAGNOLI, M. AND M. MCKEE (1991): Voluntary contributions games: Efficient private 
provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry 29, 351-366. 
BALAFOUTAS, L., R. KERSCHBAMER, M. KOCHER, AND M. SUTTER (2014): 
Revealed distributional differences: Individuals versus teams. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization, in press. 
BALAFOUTAS, L. AND N. NIKIFORAKIS (2012): Norm enforcement in the city: A natural 
field experiment. European Economic Review 56, 1773-1785.  
References 
 158 
BALAFOUTAS, L., N. NIKIFORIKS, AND B. ROCKENBACH (2014): Direct vs. indirect 
punishment among strangers in the field. mimeo. 
BARAN, N., P. SAPIENZA AND L. ZINGALES (2010): Can we infer social preferences 
from the lab? Evidence from the trust game. NBER Working Paper No. 15654. 
BENZ, M. AND S. MEIER (2008): Do people behave in experiments as in the field? –
Evidence from donations. Experimental Economics 11, 268-281.  
BICCHIERI, C. (2006): The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms. 
Cambridge University Press. 
BLINDER, A. S. AND J. MORGAN (2005): Are two heads better than one? Monetary policy 
by committee. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 37, 789-812. 
BLUMENTHAL, M., C. CHRISTIAN, AND J. SLEMROD (2001): Do normative appeals 
affect tax compliance? Evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota. National 
Tax Journal 54,125-138. 
BOCHET, O., T. PAGE, AND L. PUTTERMAN (2006): Communication and punishment in 
voluntary contribution experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 60, 
11-26. 
BOCHET, O. AND L. PUTTERMAN (2009): Not just babble: Opening the black box of 
communication in a voluntary contribution experiment. European Economic Review 53, 
309-326. 
BOLTEN, G. E. AND A. OCKENFELS (2000): ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and 
competition. American Economic Review 90, 166-193. 
BORKENAU, P. AND F. OSTENDORF (2008): NEO-FFI: NEO-Fünf-Faktoren-Inve tar 
nach Costa und McCrae, Manual. Hogrefe.  
BORNSTEIN, G., T. KUGLER, AND A. ZIEGELMEYER (2004): Individual and group 
behavior in the centipede game: Are groups more ‘ration l’ players? Journal of 
Experimental Social Psychology 40, 599-605. 
BORNSTEIN, G. AND I. YANIV (1998): Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum 
game: Are groups more ’rational’ players? Experimental Economics 1, 101-108. 
BOSMAN, R., H. HENNIG-SCHMIDT, AND F. VAN WINDEN (2006): Exploring group 
decision making in a power-to-take experiment. Experimental Economics 9, 35-51. 
References 
 159 
BOTELHO, A., G. W. HARRISON, L. M. C. PINTO, AND E. E. RUTSTRÖM (2009): 
Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods. 
Games and Economic Behavior 67, 253-265.   
BOWLES, S. AND H. GINTIS (2004): The evolution of strong reciprocity: Cooperation in 
heterogeneous groups. Theoretical Population Biology 65, 17-28. 
BRANDTS, J. AND G. CHARNESS (2000): Hot vs. cold: Sequential respon es and 
preference stability in experimental games. Experimental Economics 2, 227-238. 
BRANDTS, J. AND G. CHARNESS (2011): The strategy versus the direct-r sponse method: 
A first survey of experimental comparison. Experimental Economics 14, 375-398. 
BURTON-CHELLEW, M. N., A. ROSS-GILLESPIE, AND S. A. WEST (2010): Cooperation 
in humans: Competition between groups and proximate emotions. Evolution and 
Human Behavior 31, 104-108. 
CADSBY, C. AND E. MAYNES (1999): Voluntary provision of threshold public goods with 
continuous contributions: Experimental evidence. Journal of Public Economics 71, 53-
73. 
CAMERER, C. F. (2003): Behavioral game theory: Experim nts in strategic interaction. 
Princeton University Press. 
CAMERER, C. F. (2011): The promise and success of lab-field generalizability in 
experimental economics: A critical reply to Levitt and List. Working Paper. Retrieved 
from Social Science Research Network. 
CAMERON, A. C. AND P. K. TRIVEDI (2005): Microeconometrics: Methods and 
applications. Cambridge University Press. 
CARPENTER, J. (2007): The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 62, 522-542. 
CARPENTER, J. AND C. MYERS (2010): Why volunteer? Evidence on the rol of altruism, 
image, and incentives. Journal of Public Economics 94, 911-920. 
CARPENTER, J. AND E. SEKI (2011): Do social preferences increase productivity? Field 
experimental evidence from fishermen in Toyama Bay. Economic Inquiry 49, 612-630. 
CASON, T. N. AND V.-L. MUI (1997): A laboratory study of group polarisation in the team 
dictator game. Economic Journal 107, 1465-1483. 
References 
 160 
CHARNESS, G. AND M. RABIN (2002): Understanding social preferences with simple tests. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817-869. 
CHARNESS, G., L. RIGOTTI, AND A. RUSTICHINI (2007): Individual behavior and group 
membership. American Economic Review 97, 1340-1352. 
CHARNESS, G. AND M. SUTTER (2012): Teams make better self-interested d cisions. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 26, 157-176. 
CHAUDHURI, A. (2011): Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: A 
selective survey of the literature. Experimental Economics 14, 47-83. 
CINYABUGUMA, M., T. PAGE, AND L. PUTTERMAN (2005): Cooperation under the 
threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment. Journal of Public Economics 89, 
1421-1435. 
COOPER, D. J. AND J. H. KAGEL (2005): Are two heads better than one? T am versus 
individual play in signaling games. American Economic Review 95, 477-509. 
CORTINA, J. (1993): What is coefficient alpha? An examination of theory and applications. 
Journal of Applied Psychology 78, 98-104. 
COX, J. C. (2002): Trust, reciprocity, and other-regarding preferences: Groups vs. 
individuals and males vs. females. In R. Zwick and A. Rapoport (eds.), Experimental 
Business Research, 331-350. Kluwer Academic Publishers.  
COX, J. C. AND S. C. HAYNE (2006): Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational 
agents? Experimental Economics 9, 209-222. 
CRAGG, J. G. (1971): Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with 
application to the demand for durables goods. Econometrica 39, 829-844.  
CROSON, R. AND M. MARKS (2000): Step returns in threshold public goods: A meta- and 
experimental analysis. Experimental Economics 2, 239-259. 
DARIEL, A. AND A. RIEDL (2010): Different social preferences, similar selfish actions: The 
case of public goods game and gift exchange game. mimeo. 
DENANT-BOEMONT, L., D. MASCLET, AND C. NOUSSAIR (2007): Punishment, 
counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment. 
Economic Theory 33, 145-167. 
DE OLIVEIRA, A., R. CROSON, AND C. ECKEL (2011): The giving type: Identifying 
donors. Journal of Public Economics 95, 428-435.  
References 
 161 
EGAS, M. AND A. RIEDL (2008): The economics of altruistic punishment and the 
maintenance of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society – Biological Sciences 
275, 871-878. 
ENGLMAIER, F. AND G. GEBHARDT (2013): Free-riding in the lab and in the field. 
Working Paper.   
ENGELMANN, D. AND N. NIKIFORAKIS (2014): In the long run we are all dead: On the 
benefits of peer punishment in rich environments. Social Choice and Welfare, in press. 
EPSTEIN, S. AND E. J. O’BRIAN (1985): The person-situation debate in historical and 
current perspective. Psychological Bulletin 98, 513-537. 
ERTAN, A., T. PAGE, AND L. PUTTERMAN (2009): Who to punish? Individual decisions 
and majority rule in mitigating the free rider problem. European Economic Review 53, 
495-511. 
FALK, A., E. FEHR, AND U. FISCHBACHER (2005): The driving forces behind informal 
sanctions. Econometrica 73, 2017-2030. 
FEHR, E. AND S. GÄCHTER (2000): Cooperation and punishment in public goods 
experiments. American Economic Review 90, 980-994. 
FEHR, E. AND S. GÄCHTER (2002): Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415, 137-
140. 
FEHR, E. AND A. LEIBBRANDT (2011): A field study on cooperativen ss and impatience 
in the tragedy of the commons. Journal of Public Economics 95, 1144-1155. 
FEHR, E. AND K. SCHMIDT (1999): A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817-868. 
FEHR, E. AND K. SCHMIDT (2003): Theories of fairness and reciprocity: Evidence and 
economic applications. In M. Dewatripont et al. (eds.), Advances in Economics and 
Econometrics. Eighth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Vol 1. Cambridge 
University Press. 
FELLNER, G., R. SAUSGRUBER, AND C. TRAXLER (2013): Testing enforcement 
strategies in the field: Threat, moral appeal and social information. Journal of the 
European Economic Association 11, 634-660. 
References 
 162 
FERI, F., B. IRLENBUSCH, AND M. SUTTER (2010): Efficiency gains from team-based 
coordination – Large scale experimental evidence. American Economic Review 100, 
1892-1912. 
FISCHBACHER, U. (2007): Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. 
Experimental Economics 10, 171-178.  
FISCHBACHER, U. AND S. GÄCHTER (2010): Social preferences, beliefs, and the 
dynamics of free riding in the public good experiments. American Economic Review 
100, 541-556. 
FISCHBACHER, U., S. GÄCHTER, AND E. FEHR (2001): Are people conditionally 
cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 71, 397-
404. 
FISCHBACHER, U., W. GÜTH, AND M. V. LEVATI (2011): Crossing the point of no 
return: A public goods experiment. Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011-059.  
FRANZEN, A. AND S. POINTNER (2013): The external validity of giving in the dictator 
game. A field experiment using the misdirected letter echnique. Experimental 
Economics 16, 155-169. 
FREYTAG, A., W. GÜTH, H. KOPPEL, AND L. WANGLER (2014): Is regulation by 
milestones efficiency enhancing? An experimental study of environmental protection. 
European Journal of Political Economy 33, 71-84. 
FUDENBERG, D. AND P. A. PATHAK (2010): Unobserved punishment supports 
cooperation. Journal of Public Economics 94, 78-86. 
GÄCHTER, S., E. RENNER, AND M. SEFTON (2008): The long-run benefits of 
punishment. Science 322, 1510. 
GALINKSKY, A. D. AND T. MUSSWEILER (2001): First offers as anchors: The role of 
perspective-taking and negotiator focus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
81, 657-669. 
GILLET, J., A. SCHRAM, AND J. SONNEMANS (2009): The tragedy of the commons 
revisited: The importance of group decision-making. Journal of Public Economics 93, 
785-797. 
GINTIS, H., J. HENRICH, S. BOWLES, R. BOYD, AND E. FEHR (2008): Strong 
reciprocity and the roots of human morality. Social Justice Research 21, 241-253.  
References 
 163 
GRECHENIG, K., A. NICKLISCH, AND C. THÖNI (2010): Punishment despite reasonable 
doubt – A public goods experiment with uncertainty over contributions. Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 7, 847-867.  
GREINER, B. (2004): An online recruitment system for economic experiments. In K. 
Kremer and V. Macho (eds.), Forschung und wissenschaftliches Rechnen 2003. GWDG 
Bericht 63, 79-93. Gesellschaft für Wissenschaftliche Datenverarbeitung. 
GREEN, S. B., LISSITZ, R. W., AND S. A. MULAIK (1977): Limitations of coefficient 
alpha as an index of test unidimensionality. Educational and Psychological 
Measurement 37, 827-838. 
GUALA, F. (2012): Reciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do 
not) demonstrate. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35, 1-59. 
GÜRERK, Ö., B. ILRENBUSCH, AND B. ROCKENBACH (2006): The competitive 
advantage of sanctioning institutions. Science 312, 108-111. 
GURVEN, M. AND J. WINKING (2008): Collective action in action: Prosocial behavior in 
and out of the laboratory. American Anthropologist 110, 179-190. 
HARRISON, G. W. AND J. A. LIST (2004): Field experiments. Journal of Economic 
Literature 42, 1009-1055. 
HECKMAN, J. J. (1979): Sample selection as a specificat on error. Econometrica 47, 153-
161. 
HENRICH, J., R. MCELREATH, A. BARR, J. ENSMINGER, C. BARRETT, A. 
BOLYANATZ, J. C. CARDENAS, M. GURVEN, E. GWAKO, N. HENRICH, C. 
LESOROGOL, F. MARLOWE, D. TRACER, AND J. ZIKER (2006): Costly 
punishment across human societies. Science 312, 1767-1770. 
HERRMANN, B., C. THÖNI, AND S. GÄCHTER (2008): Antisocial punishment across 
societies. Science 319, 1362-1367. 
HOYLE, R. H., R. L. PINKLEY, AND C. A. INSKO (1989): Perceptions of behavior: 
Evidence of differing expectations for interpersonal and intergroup interactions. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 15, 365-376. 
INSKO, C., R. HOYLE, R. PINKLEY, G.-Y. HONG, R. SLIM, B. DALTON, Y.-H. LIN, P. 
RUFFIN, G. DARDIS, P. BERNTHAL, AND J. SCHOPLER (1988): Individual-group 
References 
 164 
discontinuity: The role of a consensus rule. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
24, 505-519. 
INSKO, C., R. PINKLEY, R. HOYLE, B. DALTON, G. HONG, R. SLIM, P. LANDRY, B. 
HOLTON, P. RUFFIN, AND J. THIBAUT (1987a): Individual versus group 
discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology 23, 250-267. 
INSKO, C.A., R. L. PINKLEY, K. HARRING, B. HOLTON, G. HONG, D. S. KRAMS, R. 
H. HOYLE, AND J. THIBAUT (1987b): Minimal conditions for real groups: Mere 
categorization or competitive between category behaviour. Representative Research in 
Social Psychology 17, 5-36.  
INSKO, C. AND J. SCHOPLER (1987): Categorization, competition and collectivity. In C. 
Hendrick (ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology: Group Processes, 8, 213-
251. Sage. 
INSKO, C., J. SCHOPLER, R. H. HOYLE, G. J. DARDIS, AND K. A. GRAETZ (1990): 
Individual-group discontinuity as a function of fear and greed. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 58, 68-79.  
ISAAC, R., K. MCCUE, AND C. PLOTT (1985): Public goods provision in an experim ntal 
environment. Journal of Public Economics 26, 51-74. 
ISSAC, R., D. SCHMIDTZ, AND J. WALKER (1989): The assurance problem in a 
laboratory market. Public Choice 62, 217-236. 
ISAAC, R. AND J. WALKER (1988): Group size effects in public goods provision: The 
voluntary contributions mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 179-199. 
KARLAN, D. S. (2005): Experimental economics to measure social capital and predict 
financial decisions. American Economic Review 95, 1688-1699. 
KLEVEN, H., M. KNUDSEN, C. KREINER, S. PEDERSEN, AND E. SAEZ (2011): 
Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a randomized tax audit experiment in 
Denmark. Econometrica 79, 651-692. 
KOCHER, M. G., STRAUSS, S., AND M. SUTTER (2006): Individual or team decision-
making – causes and consequences of self-selection. Games and Economic Behaviour 
56, 259-270. 
References 
 165 
KOCHER, M. G. AND M. SUTTER (2005): The decision-maker matters: Individual versus 
group behaviour in experimental beauty-contest games. Economic Journal 115, 200-
223. 
KOCHER, M. G. AND M. SUTTER (2007): Individual versus group behavior and the role of 
the decision making process in gift-exchange experim nts. Empirica 34, 63-88. 
KUGLER, T. AND G. BORNSTEIN (2013): Social dilemmas between individuals and 
groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 120, 191-205. 
KUGLER, T., E. E. KAUSEL, AND M. G. KOCHER (2012): Are groups more rational than 
individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups. Wiley Interdisciplinary 
Reviews: Cognitive Science 3, 471–482. 
KUGLER, T., M. G. KOCHER, M. SUTTER, AND G. BORNSTEIN (2007): Trust between 
individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy. 
Journal of Economic Psychology 28, 646-657.  
LANDIS, J. R. AND G. G. KOCH (1977): The measurement of observer agreement for 
categorical data. Biometrics 33, 159-174. 
LEVITT, S. D. AND J. A. LIST (2007a): What do laboratory experiments measuring social 
preferences reveal about the real world? Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 153-174. 
LEVITT, S. D. AND J. A. LIST (2007b): Viewpoint: On the generalizability of lab behaviour 
to the field. Canadian Journal of Economics 40, 347-370. 
LEVITT, S. D., J. A. LIST, AND D. REILEY (2010): What happens in the field stays in the 
field: Professionals do not play minimax in laboraty experiments. Econometrica 78, 
1413-1434. 
LIEBRAND, W. B. G. (1984): The effects of social motives, communication and group size 
on behaviour in an n-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of 
Social Psychology 14, 239-264. 
LIEBRAND, W. B. G. AND C. G. MCCLINTOCK (1988): The ring measure of social values: 
A computerized procedure for assessing individual differences in information 
processing and social value orientation. European Journal of Personality 2, 217-230. 
LIST, J. (2006): The bahvioralist meets the market: Measuring social preferences and 
reputation effects in actual transactions. Journal of Political Economy 114, 1-37. 
References 
 166 
LUHAN, W., M. G. KOCHER, AND M. SUTTER (2009): Group polarization in the team 
dictator game reconsidered. Experimental Economics 12, 26-41. 
MARLOWE, F. W., J. C. BERBESQUE, A. BARR, C. BARRETT, A. BOLYANATZ, J. C. 
CARDENAS, J. ENSMINGER, M. GURVEN, E. GWAKO, J. HENRICH, N. 
HENRICH, C. LESOROGOL, R. MCELREATH, AND D. TRACER (2008): More 
‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies. Proceedings of the Royal Society – Biological 
Sciences 275, 587-590. 
MARKS, M. AND R. CROSON (1998): Alternative rebate rules in the provision of a 
threshold public good: An experimental investigation. Journal of Public Economics 67, 
195-220. 
MARWELL, G. AND R. E. AMES (1981): Economists free ride, does anyone else?: 
Experiments on the provision of public goods. Journal of Public Economics 15, 295-
310. 
MASCLET, D., C. NOUSSAIR, S. TUCKER, AND M. VILLEVAL (2003): Monetary and 
nonmonetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American 
Economic Review 93, 366-380. 
MASCLET, D., C. N. NOUSSAIR, AND M.-C. VILLEVAL (2013): Threat and punishment 
in public good experiments. Economic Inquiry 51, 1421-1441. 
MCDOWELL, A. (2003): From the help desk: hurdle models. The Stata Journal 3, 178-184. 
MILGRAM, S., H. J. LIBERTY, R. TOLEDO, AND J. WACKENHUT (1986): Response to 
intrusion into waiting lines. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51, 683-689. 
MISCHEL, W (1968): Personality and assessment. Wiley. 
MÜLLER, W. AND F. TAN (2013): Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and 
individual play in a sequential market game and the eff ct of the time horizon. Games 
and Economic Behavior 82, 658-674.  
NIEDERLE, M. AND L. VESTERLUND (2007): Do women shy away from competition? Do 
men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics 122, 1067-1101. 
NIKIFORAKIS, N. (2008): Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can 
we really govern ourselves? Journal of Public Economics 92, 91-112. 
NIKIFORAKIS, N. (2010): Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good 
experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 68, 689-702. 
References 
 167 
NIKIFORAKIS, N. AND D. ENGELMANN (2011): Altruistic punishment and the threat of 
feuds. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 78, 319-332. 
NIKIFORAKIS, N. AND H. NORMANN (2008): A comparative statics analysis of
punishment in public good experiments. Experimental Economics 11, 358-369. 
NIKIFORAKIS, N., C. NOUSSAIR, AND T. WILKENING (2012): Normative conflict and 
feuds: The limits of self-enforcement. Journal of Public Economics 96, 797-807. 
NOUSSAIR, C., D. VAN SOEST AND J. STOOP (2011): Punishment, reward, and 
cooperation in a framed field experiment. MPRA Paper No. 34067, University Library 
of Munich, Germany. 
OBERHOLZER-GEE, F. (2006): A market for time. Fairness and efficiency in waiting lines. 
Kyklos 59, 427-440. 
OSTROM, E., J. WALKER, AND R. GARDNER (1992): Covenants with and without a 
sword: self-governance is possible. American Political Science Review 86, 404-417. 
PAGE, T., L. PUTTERMAN, AND B. UNEL (2005): Voluntary association in public goods 
experiments: Reciprocity, mimicry, and efficiency. Economic Journal 115, 1032-1053. 
PALACIOS-HUERTA, I. AND O. VOLIJ (2008): Experientia docet: Professionals p ay 
minimax in laboratory experiments. Econometrica 76, 71-115. 
PALACIOS-HUERTA, I. AND O. VOLIJ (2009): Field centipedes. American Economic 
Review 99, 1619-1635. 
PUURTINEN, M. AND T. MAPPES (2009): Between-group competition and human 
cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society - Biological Sciences 276, 355-360. 
RABIN, M. (1993): Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American 
Economic Review 83, 1281-1302. 
REGE, M. AND K. TELLE (2004): The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation 
in public good situations. Journal of Public Economics 88, 1625-1644. 
RONDEAU, D., G. POE, AND W. SCHULZE (2005): VCM or PPM? A comparison of the 
performance of two voluntary public goods mechanisms. Journal of Public Economics 
89, 1581-1592. 
ROSS, L. AND R. E. NISBETT (1991): The person and the situation: Perspectives of social 
psychology. McGraw-Hill. 
References 
 168 
RUSTAGI, D., S. ENGEL, AND M. KOSFELD (2010): Conditional cooperation and costly 
monitoring explain success in forest commons management. Science 320, 961-965. 
SCHMITT, B. H., L. DUBE, AND F. LECLERC (1992): Intrusions into waiting lines: Does 
the queue constitute a social system? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 63, 
806-815. 
SCHOPLER, J. AND C. A. INSKO (1992): The discontinuity effect in interpersonal and 
intergroup relations: Generality and mediation. In W. Strobe and M. Hewstone (eds.), 
European Review of Social Psychology, 3, 121–151. Wiley. 
SCHOPLER, J., C. INSKO, J. WIESELQUIST, M. PEMBERTON, B. WITCHER, R. 
KOZAR, C. RODDENBERRY, AND T. WILDSCHUT (2001): When groups are more 
competitive than individuals: The domain of the discontinuity effect. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 80, 632-644. 
SCHOPLER, J., C. A. INSKO, K. A. GRAETZ, S. M. DRIGOTAS, AND V. A. SMITH 
(1991): The generality of the individual-group discontinuity effect: Variations in 
positivity-negativity of outcomes, players’ relative power, and magnitude of outcomes. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 17, 612-624. 
SEFTON, M., R. SHUPP, AND J. WALKER (2007): The effect of rewards and sanctions in 
provision of public goods. Economic Inquiry 45, 671-690. 
SELTEN, R. (1967): Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen 
Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. I  H. Sauermann (ed.), Beiträge zur 
experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, 136-168. J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
SENECAL, J., T. M. LOUGHEAD, AND G. A. BLOOM (2008): A season-long team-
building intervention: Examining the effect of team goal setting on cohesion. Journal of 
Sport and Exercise Psychology 30, 186-199. 
SLEMROD, J., M. BLUMENTHAL, AND C. CHRISTIAN (2001): Taxpayer response to an 
increased probability of audit: Evidence from a contr lled experiment in Minnesota. 
Journal of Public Economics 79, 483-483. 
SOUSA, S. (2010): Cooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcement. CeDEx 
Discussion Paper Series No. 2010-06. 
SPENCER, M., S. SWALLOW, J. SHOGREN, AND J. LIST (2009): Rebate rules in 
threshold public good provision. Journal of Public Economics 93, 798-806. 
References 
 169 
STOOP, J., C. N. NOUSSAIR, AND D. VAN SOEST (2012): From the lab to the field: 
Cooperation among fishermen. Journal of Political Economy 120, 1027-1056. 
STRASSER, S. (2012): Cooperation, competition and preference heterogeneity. mimeo.  
SULEIMAN, R. AND A. RAPOPORT (1992): Provision of step-level public goods with 
continuous contribution. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 5, 133-153. 
SUTTER, M., S. HAIGNER, AND M. KOCHER (2010): Choosing the carrot or the stick? 
Endogenous institutional choice in social dilemma situations. Review of Economic 
Studies 77, 1540-1566. 
SUTTER, M., M. KOCHER, AND S. STRAUSS (2009): Individuals and teams in auctions. 
Oxford Economic Papers 61, 380-394. 
TAN, J. H. W. AND F. BOLLE (2007): Team competition and the public goods game. 
Economics Letters 96, 133-139. 
TRAXLER, C. AND J. WINTER (2012): Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 28, 390-398. 
TVERSKY, A. AND D. KAHNEMAN (1974): Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and 
biases. Science 185, 1124-1130. 
VAN DEN BERGH, J. C. AND J. M. GOWDY (2009): A group selection perspective on 
economic behavior, institutions and organizations. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 72, 1-20. 
WILDSCHUT, T. AND C. INSKO (2007): Explanations of interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity: A review of the evidence. European Review of Social Psychology 18, 
175-211. 
WILDSCHUT, T., C. A. INSKO, AND B. PINTER (2007): Interindividual-intergroup 
discontinuity as a joint function of acting as a group and interacting with a group. 
European Journal of Social Psychology 37, 390–399. 
WILDSCHUT, T., B. PINTER, J. VEVEA, C. INSKO, AND J. SCHOPLER (2003): Beyond 
the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity 
effect. Psychological Bulletin 129, 698-722. 
XIAO, E. AND H. KUNREUTHER (2012): Punishment and cooperation in stochastic social 
dilemmas. NBER Working Paper No. 18458.  
References 
 170 
YAMAGASHI, T. (1986): The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 51, 110–116. 
YE, M., S. ASHER, L. CASABURI, AND P. NIKOLOV (2013): One step at a time: Does 
gradualism build coordination? mimeo. 
YOUNG, H. P. (2008): Social norms. In S. N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume (eds.), The new 
Palgrave dictionary of economics, second edition. Palgrave MacMillan.  
ZHANG, J. AND M. CASARI (2012): How groups reach agreement in risky choices: An 
experiment. Economic Inquiry 50, 502-515. 
 
 
 171 
 
 
Eidesstattliche Versicherung 
 
Ich versichere hiermit eidesstattlich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne 
fremde Hilfe verfasst habe. Die aus fremden Quellen direkt oder indirekt übernommenen 
Gedanken sowie mir gegebene Anregungen sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die Arbeit 
wurde bisher keiner anderen Prüfungsbehörde vorgelegt und auch noch nicht veröffentlicht. 
Sofern ein Teil der Arbeit aus bereits veröffentlichten Papers besteht, habe ich dies 
ausdrücklich angegeben. 
 
Datum: 27. Juni 2014 
  
 
 
Bianca Kern 
 
 
